Civil Wars and State Formation.
Violence and the Politics of Legitimacy in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and South Sudan

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Abstract: Civil wars do not only destroy existing political orders. They contribute to shaping new ones, and thereby play a crucial role in dynamics of state formation. This working paper is based on a 2-year research project funded by the Swiss Network of International Studies and conducted by a consortium of five research institutions in Switzerland and Africa. It reflects on the social construction of order and legitimacy during and after violent conflict by focusing on political orders put in place by armed groups, their strategies to legitimize their (violent) action as well as their claim to power, and on the extent to which they strive and manage to institutionalize their military power and transform it into political domination. Drawing on case studies in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and South Sudan, it shows how strategies of legitimization are central to understanding the politics of armed groups and their relation to the state, how international aid agencies impact on the legitimacy of armed groups and state actors, and how continuities between war and peace, especially in key sectors such as security forces, need to be taken into account in any effort at establishing long-term peace and stability.

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Introduction

Dominant narratives and theories developed at the turn of the 21st century to account for civil wars in Africa converged around two main ideas. First that the increase in civil wars across Africa was the expression of the weakness and collapse of state institutions. Second, guerrilla movements, once viewed as the ideological armed wings of Cold War contenders, were seen as roving bandits interested in plundering the spoils left by decaying states and primarily driven by economic or personal interests.

However, recent research has challenged such accounts by looking into the day-to-day politics of civil war beyond armed groups' motives to wage war against the established order. Indeed, civil wars, while being the cause of immense suffering, contribute to shaping and producing political orders. Thus, if we are to understand how stable political institutions can be built after civil war, it is essential to study the institutions that regulate political life *during* conflict. This implies a need to take into account governance institutions and relations in areas beyond the control of the state.

This working paper[1] thus focuses on political orders put in place by armed groups, their strategies to legitimise their existence and claim to power, and on the extent to which they manage to institutionalise their military power and transform it into political domination. To this end, we take a broad perspective by looking at (dis)continuities between political orders established under rebel rule and post-war state formation. Drawing on a Weberian conception of the making of political orders as the passage from raw power *(Macht)* to domination *(Herrschaft)*, we interrogate the social fabric of legitimacy in areas under rebel control during conflict and analyse how it relates to state formation in the post-conflict phase.

Based on a political anthropology of governance and state practices in three different countries (Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and South Sudan) this paper provides empirical and theoretical insights into state formation in Africa as well as into domination and legitimacy. It also links to current policy debates on statebuilding and peacebuilding in fragile contexts. The paper starts with a review of the literature on civil wars and statebuilding. It then presents the analytical framework that was developed for the three case studies, which constitute the bulk of the paper.

Origins and causes of civil wars in the post-Cold War era

In the last 20 years the origins of civil wars have been a constant object of debate. The end of the Cold War, contrarily to what many had hoped, led to a dramatic upsurge in widely publicised violent episodes such as the failure of the peace process in Angola in 1991-1992 (Messiant 1998a), the maelstrom of conflicts that ravaged the Mano River states in West Africa (Reno 1998) and "Africa's World War", as Prunier (2009) described the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. They also called for renewed attention to understand the causes of such violence.

Ethnicity, especially in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, seemed to provide an explanatory grid for seemingly endless conflict (Gurr and Harff 1994) as did the abundance of natural resources such as oil or diamonds (Le Billon 2001; 2005) or the growing scarcity of other natural resources such as land and

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water (Goetschel and Péclard 2011; Homer-Dixon 1994). In view of the apparent "anarchy" (Kaplan 1994) prevailing in the so-called "new wars" of the 1990s (Kaldor 1999), the balance of arguments gradually shifted in favour of an economic approach. In this line of argument, the "greed" of armed groups leaders in search for economic and political power was far more important a variable in explaining their motives and behaviour than political "grievances" (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). In other words, the "new wars" of the 1990s were no longer fought "with" or "alongside the people" in defence of clearly articulated political projects sustained by identifiable ideologies, but "against the people" by greedy rebels exclusively interested in getting their share of the economic and political cake (Kaldor 1999; Kalyvas 2001). While economic approaches rightly pointed to the interconnections between the availability of natural resources and the occurrence of conflict, the "greed vs. grievances" model has been widely criticised for its methodological and conceptual flaws (Marchal and Messiant 2002), for its economic reductionism (Cramer 2006; M. R. Duffield 2001; Francis 2006; Richards and Helander 2005) and for failing to see rebels and insurgents as anything else than simple "bandits devoid of any political agenda" (Bøås and Dunn 2007, 1).

More generally, the very idea of warfare as a political project was put into question in mainstream research on civil wars in the post-Cold War era. As Paul Richards put it, the main problem with such arguments is that they "serve to set up a dichotomy between war as some kind of inherent 'bad' (the world ruled by instincts and base desire), and peace as an ideal 'good' (the world ruled by principle and law). With this kind of approach war itself becomes the enemy - indeed, the common enemy of human kind" (Richards and Helander 2005, 3).War is thereby taken out of its social context, away from the historical, cultural, religious, and political element that, if properly analysed, would in fact contribute to giving it meaning. Rather than opposing war and peace, if we want to better understand the governance patterns that emerge "between war and peace" (Arnaut and Højbjerg 2008), it is more insightful, sociologically speaking, to focus on the continuities from the one to the other.

Civil wars, while being the cause of immense suffering on the part of civilian populations, do not simply destroy political orders. They contribute to shaping and producing them (Kalyvas 2006; Arjona 2009; Péclard 2011), as a growing body of literature that we now turn to argues.

The (micro)politics of civil wars

In recent years, debates about civil wars have been moving from a single focus on the quest for belligerents' motives and for the origins of warfare to an in-depth analysis of the political dimensions of life "inside rebellions" (Weinstein 2007) during civil war. War making since the end of the Cold War has not followed a single and uniform pattern. One striking commonality across many civil wars, however, is the fact that rebel movements exert control over sometimes vast portions of a country's territory. Although the extent of this control and the depth of its impact on the levels of violence exerted by rebels differ (Kalyvas 2006), this means that the significance of armed groups goes far beyond their military strength. Consequently, they have come to be viewed not simply through the lens of their military power, but also as political actors exerting power over civilian populations (Wood 2003; Arjona 2008). Armed groups represent the de facto public authority in the areas under their control and they perform acts of governance in the new 'order' they establish. It is imperative to understand the "(micro)politics of armed groups" (Schlichte 2009) and "insurgent governance" (Mampilly 2011), since "even in zones of civil war and widespread brawling, most people most of the time are interacting in nonviolent ways" (Tilly 2003, 12). In other words, there is (social) life beyond

the logics of weapons and war-induced violence, and rulers, be they 'rebel' or 'state representatives', have an important role to play in the regulation of this (social) life (Kasfir 2005).

However, the relation of armed groups to civilian order and governance is anything but straightforward. Violence serves as a means to address grievances and thus legitimises the actions of armed groups. At the same time, the use of violence also has delegitimising effects for them. It casts a "shadow" of suffering and destruction upon the very population whose interests they claim to defend (Schlichte 2009). To mitigate these potentially delegitimising effects, they need to make this violence socially acceptable and to "turn it into authority" (Schlichte 2012, 723), that is a socially accepted form of domination. The legitimacy of armed groups during war as well as their ability to transform into political actors after the end of a violent conflict (Zeeuw 2008; Manning 2007) depends on their capability to rule and be granted recognition as rulers by the population under their control so as to ensure "civilian participation" in the war effort (Kasfir 2005).

Based on this understanding, recent literature has provided important insights into the organisational structures of (rebel) armed groups (Weinstein 2007), into the emergence of alternative forms of social order in war-affected zones (Arjona 2009; Kasfir 2005; Mampilly 2011) and the conditions of collective action (Wood 2003), as well as into the relationships between territorial control and the use of violence (Kalyvas 2006). Taken together, and beyond their obvious diversity, these studies build a new, 're-politicised' narrative of state-society relations in rebel-held territories. They also offer new interrogations on the continuities between war and peace (Manning 2007; Müller 2012; Zeeuw 2008) and thereby contribute to a better understanding of statebuilding in post-conflict contexts, since "variation in post-war regimes has wartime origins" (Huang 2012, 3).

This working paper studies these continuities and captures how governance relations and institutions developed during civil wars influence post-war statebuilding. In doing so, it also addresses a third body of literature, on the links between statebuilding and peacebuilding.

Statebuliding and peacebuilding

The links between statebuilding and peacebuilding have attracted renewed attention from scholars and policymakers in the last few years[2]. After the publication of the 1992 *Agenda for Peace* by the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding was gradually developed as a set of technical solutions paying little attention to the historical specificities of each conflict context (Paris 2004; Newman, Paris, and Richmond 2009). This approach offered little or no reflection on what peace and conflict actually meant and instead reproduced a number of "peace orthodoxies", thus contributing to the "bureaucratisation" of peace (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009) rather than providing an understanding for the deeply political nature of the search for peace and political stability (Chandler 2006; M. R. Duffield 2001). It treated "peace as an uncontroversial, ahistoric 'end', and peacebuilding as the means to get there" (Curtis 2012, 9). By promoting political and economic liberalisation without taking into account the institutional, political and social context within which these reforms were to take place, it also risked leading to further insecurity or even fuelling renewed conflict (Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2008). This led researchers and policy-makers to consider legitimate and well-functioning institutions as crucial to the success of peacebuilding and, therefore, statebuilding as an essential precondition to lasting peace (Rocha Menocal 2011).

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[2] See for instance (Call 2008; Rocha Menocal 2011; Paris and Sisk 2008; Roberts 2008).

Yet, definitions of statebuilding and peacebuilding vary greatly, and how exactly they relate is still an object of debate. As several authors point out, the two agendas are potentially contradictory (Rocha Menocal 2011; Paris and Sisk 2008; Call and Cousens 2008), and bringing them together is not in itself a guarantee of a lasting peace. Besides, the literature (both academic and policy-oriented) on the peacebuilding-statebuilding nexus still largely relies on a "blank slate" approach (Cramer 2006), that is on the idea that there is a clear historical discontinuity between war and peace. As a result, war as an object of research and conceptual reflection has been somewhat neglected in the peacebuilding literature. Thus, research on rebel governance is still largely absent from current discussions on the relations between statebuilding and peacebuilding. Indeed, critics of the liberal peacebuilding model have so far focused on the dangers of a 'toolkit' approach to peacebuilding (Newman, Paris, and Richmond 2009; Paris 2004), on the neo-imperialism implicit in international interventionism (Chandler 2006), on the contradictions between statebuilding and peacebuilding (Rocha Menocal 2011) or on the need to take into account local actors and values in peacebuilding interventions (Paris and Sisk 2008).

But so far very little research has been produced on how relations and institutions of governance that were developed under rebel rule fit into long-term dynamics of state formation through armed conflict. Moreover, much of the literature on the peacebuilding-statebuilding nexus still relies on a normative and prescriptive concept of states as structures rather than as processes, and on the idea that states are the product of conscious policies aimed at constructing the institutional infrastructure of governance rather than historical formations.

We argue that states cannot be engineered. Rather, they are the results of long-lasting historical processes including phases of violence. We refer here to the distinction introduced by Berman and Lonsdale (1992, 5) between state*building*, defined as "a conscious effort of creating an apparatus of control", and state *formation*, defined as "an historical process whose outcome is a largely unconscious and contradictory process of conflicts, negotiations and compromises between diverse groups whose self-serving actions and trade-offs constitute the 'vulgarization' of power". While statebuilding constitutes the visible tip of the iceberg that is most often addressed in the peacebuilding literature, this project builds on the historical sociology of the state (Bayart 2006; Abrams 1988; Mitchell 1991).

Accordingly, we argue that civil wars need to be seen as part and parcel of historical processes of state *formation* and not, as the expression of states' inability to maintain their monopoly over the use of violence, or as the result of their structural "weakness" (Jackson and Rosberg 1982), their "collapse" (Zartman 1995) and failure (Bates 2008). While the literature on state failure rests on a very normative understanding of states (Hill 2005), we look into the "dynamics of states" (Migdal and Schlichte 2005), i.e. the way in which states are the constantly changing product of "negotiations" (Hagmann and Péclard 2010) between state and non-state actors involved in the institutionalisation of power relations (Lund 2006) - *during* and *after* civil wars. Such a bottom-up approach to statehood provides for a better understanding of legitimate institutions and their formation.

Conceptualizing violent conflict, legitimacy and state formation

Based on the above, research in the project addressed three related issues. Firstly, considering that "civil war is not a stupid thing" (Cramer 2006), and that it needs to be analysed as "one social project among many competing social projects" (Richards and Helander 2005, 3), we interrogated the narratives that armed groups construct to legitimise their rebellion and to garner popular support and consent. Secondly, we analysed the degree to which selected armed groups in different socio-political

environments engage in the development of a system of civilian rule and a bureaucratic apparatus. Following Mampilly (2011), we posited that their ability to institutionalise their power is strongly influenced by the kind of state-society relationship that characterised social life prior to conflict in the areas under their control, and we therefore looked at how rebel governance relates to other sources of power (traditional or religious authorities, remnants of the state administration, local, national and international NGOs, etc.). Thirdly, we argue that the literature on rebel governance has thus far paid too little attention to the continuities and discontinuities between war and post-war contexts. While the focus of research has been on rebel governance during conflict or on the ability of rebel movements to transform into political parties after conflict, we look at how the symbolic and material aspects of rebel rule "survive" the end of hostilities, especially in formerly rebel-held territories, and how this impacts long-term state formation processes.

Research in the project was based on a non-normative, open-ended theoretical perspective based on the following propositions (Hagmann and Péclard 2010): (1) Rather than objects, states are historical processes that are "never definitively formed" (Lund 2006, 697) and whose outcomes are undetermined. (2) While the lack of a clear boundary between state and society is often seen as the root cause of institutional fragility, we consider this elusive boundary "not as a problem of conceptual precision but as a clue to the nature of the phenomenon" (Mitchell 1991, 78), and, following Migdal and Schlichte, propose to work on the "dynamics of state", that is the complex interplay between images and practices of the state (Migdal and Schlichte 2005). (3) States cannot be reduced to institutions, policies and administrative practices; they are also made out of cultural and symbolic repertoires and exist through people's ideas and representations (Gupta 1995). Civil wars are important because they represent key moments when these elements are contested, put to question, actively fought by violent means and new visions are put forward.

The case studies presented below drew on a Weberian conception of the development of political orders as the passage from raw power (*Macht*) to domination (*Herrschaft*) — a type of authority that is based on obedience and recognition rather than sheer physical force (Weber 1947). Indeed, the exercise of power by force and violence alone is not sufficient for the establishment of stable political orders. Research on authoritarian rule and "the rise of semi-authoritarianism" (Ottaway 2003) in the post-Cold War era has thus shown that the durability of such regimes depends not only on their repressive capacity, but also on other elements such as the cohesiveness of party structures (Levitsky and Way 2010) or on their ability to build broad elite coalitions to sustain state power (Slater 2010). Besides, as Béatrice Hibou argues, the "force of obedience" (2011) rests on the way in which authoritarian regimes manage to respond to people's aspiration to a "normal life" in the context of recurrent crises and the threat of political and military repression. Drawing on such insights, we analyzed the manufacture of popular consent in rebel political orders as the central element of the "vulgarisation of power" which is at the basis of state formation processes (Berman and Lonsdale 1992, 5). In other words, the key to understanding the politics of armed groups and their influence on state formation is legitimacy, seen not as a norm but as "an empirical phenomenon" depending on "people's beliefs, perceptions and expectations", a "particular quality that is conferred upon a social or political entity by those who are subject to it or part of it, thus granting it *authority*" (Bellina et al. 2009).

In order to illustrate the arguments made above, research was conducted in three different countries, Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and South Sudan. The three countries have been profoundly marked and shaped by protracted episodes of civil wars. In all three, armed groups opposed the postcolonial state (in the case of Angola the civil war is even rooted in the history of competing nationalist movements during

the war of decolonization) and took control of vast swaths of the country's territory in the course of the war. The three armed groups under scrutiny, namely the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the 'Forces Nouvelles' in Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), were confronted with the challenge of ruling over civilian populations in a context of civil war, and as we shall see, they responded differently to this challenge. The three countries went through different processes of transition from war to peace. Angola offers one of the relatively rare instances of a clear military victory of government troops against "rebels", whereas South Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire offer two different cases where former rebels took over power. South Sudan was established as an independent country after decades of a bloody conflict between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A and after a popular referendum in 2011 where close to 100% of the ballots were cast in favor of independence. Yet the overwhelming victory of the SPLM/A has been overshadowed by deep-seated divisions within the party-state and the country has gone through a very violent new cycle of fighting as of December 2013, and peace is still very precarious. In Côte d'Ivoire, the victory of the rebel Forces Nouvelles was more indirect than that of the SPLM/A in South Sudan. President Alassane Ouattara was sworn into office in May 2011. His accession to power was made possible after the Forces Nouvelles, supported by French troops, took over control of the capital Abidjan and arrested former President Laurent Gbagbo who had refused the December 2010 electoral results that had sanctioned his long-time opponent Alassane Ouattara's victory. While Ouattara had no formal links to the Forces Nouvelles, his nomination represented the victory of those, mostly from the North of the country, who had felt disempowered and growingly discriminated by Laurent Gbagbo's regime and his nationalist politics of "ivoirité". These grievances were also at the heart of the Forces Nouvelles' political discourse.

Research in the three countries was conducted by the authors of the present working paper in a series of short research stays over a two-year period. Due to the absence of archival or written material by the three armed groups under study, information was gathered mainly through interviews and on-site observations. The interviews, mostly semi-structured, were conducted with a mix of (former and current) members of the three rebel movements, government officials, academics, journalists, church leaders, chiefs, community leaders, traders, youth, students and teachers. All interviewees originated from conflict zones in the three countries. Information gathered from interviews was triangulated and complemented with the authors' prior deep knowledge of the three countries (Péclard 2015; Schubert 2017; Santschi 2013; Cook and Moro 2012; Zina 2017a; 2017b).

South Sudan

During the last six decades, South Sudan has been at civil war most of the time (1955–1972, 1983–2005 and 2013–2018) with only short periods of relative stability and peace. As a consequence, armed conflict, rebel groups and peace agreements have profoundly shaped state formation, governance and public authority in the country. We can divide this protracted time of war in three different periods which have been the focus of this research (1) The first civil war started in 1955, few months before Sudan gained independence. Yet, it was in the 1960s, particularly from 1964 onwards, that armed conflict spread in the South. The Anya Nya movement that emerged in 1963 received some support from neighboring countries and did not feature strong centralized command structures. In 1972, this civil war formally ended with the signing of a peace agreement that accommodated important demands of Southern leaders including more autonomy for the South. In the 1970s, tension between some Equatorian and Dinka leaders emerged about power and the control of administrative positions.

Moreover, discontent with the central government also increased again in the South. (2) The second civil war broke out in 1983 and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) emerged as an important armed group under the lead of John Garang. The SPLM/A's expansion was halted in 1991 when the movement lost support from Ethiopia and was substantially weakened by an internal split. However, the SPLM/A again was able to increase its control over areas of Southern Sudan. The SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan were the signatories to a Comprehensive Peace agreement (CPA) that ended the second civil war in 2005. In July 2005, John Garang died in a helicopter crash only a few weeks after his appointment to the position of President of Southern Sudan and Vice President of Sudan. After 2005 the SPLM emerged as the dominant political party in Southern Sudan. The CPA provided for a referendum to decide about the status of Southern Sudan to remain with Sudan or to become an independent country. In January 2011, the vast majority of the Southern Sudanese electorate voted for independence. Yet only 2.5 years after South Sudan's independence the new country slid back into civil war. (3) In December 2013 armed fighting broke out among members of armed forces in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. This fighting was preceded by high political tensions among the leaders of the SPLM. The third civil war brought devastation and a large-scale humanitarian and economic crisis to South Sudan. In 2015 the Government of South Sudan and the SPLM/A IO – the main armed opposition group – signed a peace agreement. Yet, fighting continued. In September 2018 the parties to the conflict signed a revitalized peace agreement which ended fighting in most areas of South Sudan. Yet, the implementation of the revitalized peace agreement including the formation of a new government has been postponed to February 2020.The following refers to all three civil wars with a focus on the SPLM/A as armed group.

Grievances against central governments driving the support to armed groups:

In the first and second civil wars Southern armed groups fought the Sudanese government. Grievances about power and resource allocation to Southern Sudan, the role of religion in national politics and lack of recognition of ethnic diversity as well as violent counterinsurgency and atrocities against civilians drove Southern Sudanese to take up arms against the government (Deng 2011; Poggo 2002; Sharkey 2008). John Garang, the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), was able to capture the grievances of many Southern Sudanese and also Sudanese in his vision of the "New Sudan." Garang declared that the armed uprising of the SPLM/A aimed at politically transforming Sudan into a "New Sudan." He called for democracy, justice, human rights and equal political and economic opportunities.

> "When the SPLM was formed in 1983, we […] came to the conclusion that we must struggle for a new type of Sudan to which we all belong; […] a new Sudanese commonality that seeks to include rather than exclude; a new Sudanese political dispensation that provides equal opportunities for every Sudanese to develop and realise his or her potential; a Sudan where there is justice and equality of opportunity for all; a democratic Sudan in which governance is based on popular will and the rule of law; a New Sudan where religion and state are constitutionally separated; a New Sudan in which oppression and hegemony by any particular ethnic group are banished; a Sudan in which all the institutions of social, cultural and racial hegemony are dismantled; a Sudan in which there is respect for universal human rights."[3]

The notion of "New Sudan" was key to the SPLM/A's narrative of "liberation" to mobilize support in Southern Sudan and Sudan. However, critical voices have accused the SPLM/A itself of human rights

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[3] Sudan People's Liberation Movement 1998: "SPLM Vision & Programme." <http://www.splmtoday.com/index.php/vision-aamp-programme-splm-34>. 3 March 2013.

violations, an autocratic leaderships style and tribalism. While John Garang and the ideology of the "New Sudan" aimed at a united but transformed Sudan, many South Sudanese who joined the SPLM/A actually took up arms for an independent South Sudan: "South Sudanese fought for a successful liberation. It was a liberation struggle. It was not the written ideology. But it was the driving force by many South Sudanese to join."[4]

The research in the two different case study areas Kajokeji (former Central Equatoria state bordering Uganda and largely inhabited by Kuku speakers) and Aweil East (former Northern Bahr el-Ghazal state bordering Sudan and largely inhabited by Dinka speakers) illustrate that support to armed groups varied across South Sudan over time. During the second civil war for instance, many men from Aweil East joined the SPLM/A because of grievances against the government of Sudan but also to defend their home area against militias allied to the government. One respondent explained: "I joined the movement [SPLM/A] so that I fight the Arabs. So that they go away because I have seen the way they behave, the way they were treating our people. I decided to join the movement so that we liberate ourselves."[5] Another reason for Dinka speakers to take up arms was – respondents suggested – the re-division of South Sudan into three regions.[6] The peace agreement of 1972 provided for a regional government for the South. In June 1983, Jaffar Nimeiri the President of Sudan dissolved the regional government and re-divided the South into three regions. The re-division, which was supported by many Equatorians, implied that Dinka and Nuer speaking officials were relocated to Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile region[7]. The re-division caused a lot of resentment and sharpened divisions among South Sudanese groups.[8] The government in Khartoum exploited these tensions to counter the rising rebellion in South Sudan. The imposition of Sharia law in September 1983 enabled the SPLM/A to accurately portray the government in Khartoum as being against all South Sudanese. Sharia law made Equatorians to change their heart towards the SPLM/A and undermined the position of Southern leaders who had been recruited by the government including Joseph Lagu. Sharia law brought into people's mind the hostility of the Government and past policies of forceful Arabization and Islamization. One respondent recalled: "There was a lot of killing in Juba and a lot of Equatorians lost their lives. Especially the educated class. Those who were trying to come up to oppose the whole system of Islamization."[9]

In Kajokeji as in other areas in former Central Equatoria the SPLM/A was initially perceived as being dominated by one ethnic group. "Initially as you may be aware SPLA initially was seen actually as a rebellion by Dinka, not South Sudanese," one respondent explained.[10] He added that some perceived the SPLM/A that committed atrocities against civilians as a "movement which was intended to fight a war in and against Equatoria."[11] Yet, this changed over time. It was mainly leaders of the areas who were able to mobilize substantial support within their communities.[12] Some leaders and community

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[4] Interview with a SPLM/A member from Kajokeji in Juba, 24 August 2017.
[5] Interview with a SPLM/A member from Aweil East in Juba, 20 August 2017.
[6] Interview with a SPLM/A member from Kajokeji in Juba, 24 August 2017.
[7] Many Equatorians were in support of the re-division, mainly because they felt marginalized in terms of development and government and administrative positions in the regional government (Willems and Deng 2015).
[8] Interview with a SPLM/A member from 24 Kajokeji in Juba, August 2017. Interview with a SPLM/A member from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal in Juba, 22 August 2017.
[9] Interview with senior official from Aweil East, 21 August 2017.
[10] Interview with an academic from former Central Equatoria, 26 August 2017.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Interview with a SPLM/A member from Kajokeji in Juba, 21 August 2017.

members joined because they supported the idea of the "New Sudan" and aimed at "liberating" South Sudan.[13] Others joined to protect their community and families from atrocities of the SPLM/A.[14]

The leader of the SPLM/A John Garang was also able to garner support in Northern Sudan particularily in Kordofan and also in Eastern Sudan. Nevertheless, the SPLM/A was not able to "manufacture" consent all over South Sudan even by using force. After a split caused by internal power struggles in 1991 the SPLM/A was increasingly challenged by other Southern armed groups (Douglas Hamilton Johnson 2011; Nyaba 1997). As a result of the internal split and the halt of support by the Ethiopian leader Mengistu the SPLM/A temporarily lost a lot of territory in South Sudan (Bure 2005). Moreover, in former Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and in former Central Equatoria local armed groups emerged that fought the SPLM/A. Abdel Bagii Ayii Akol from Aweil East and his armed group were based in Kordofan (Kindersley 2018), whereas in Kajokeji loosely-organized militias fought the SPLM/A. Overtime, these militias joined government forces.

Rebel governance: providing rule of law, securing support and coordinating aid

During the different phases of the civil war, Southern armed groups to some extent "governed" the areas under their control. The Anya Nya fighters of the first civil war first formed a "loosely unified front" (Beswick 1998, 317) and only after 1964 increased their control over most rural areas of South Sudan (Shepherd 1966). Nevertheless, Anya Nya fighters did not set up a unified governance system in the territories under their control. Chiefs who have played a key role in local governance, local justice and in administration since the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule (1898-1956) continued their activities at the local level (Norris 1983). Yet, both the government of Sudan and the Anya Nya fighters undermined, persecuted and punished chiefs and other community members whom they assumed to support the opposing party to the conflict (Deng 1972; Leonardi, Mijak, and Deng Hot 2005; Santschi 2013). In Aweil East for example, Anya Nya fighters killed two members of chiefly families, chief Awan Anei Tong and a relative of Abdel Bagi Ayii Akol (Kindersley 2018).

Starting from the mid-1980s, the SPLM/A first introduced a rudimentary Civil/Military Administration (CMA) and then a relief wing, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) (Rolandsen 2005). While the CMA was according to Bure established "with the primary objective of maintaining law and order and mobilising resources for the war effort" and to act as intermediary between chiefs and commanders, SRRA coordinated aid in the areas under SPLM/A control (Bure 2005, 3). Particularly after 1989, when the then largest ever humanitarian response the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was launched in response to a famine in the northern part of Southern Sudan including in Aweil East, aid became an important source of revenue and food but also a source of power and legitimacy for the SPLM/A (Moro et al. 2017). The limited services available were mostly provided by aid actors: A SPLM/A official noted: "We acknowledge the positive role of OLS in our struggle, but not because it provides food. It is primarily because it helps us run a state. Our people now feel that they belong to a government, and that is all because of aid. They think that the SPLM government is responsible for the coming of aid, and in a way we are responsible for it" (M. Duffield et al. 2000, 179).

After the first SPLM convention took place in Chukudum and the ideology of thee "New Sudan" was introduced in 1994, the SPLM/A established a civil administration the so-called Civil Authority of New Sudan (CANS) (Rolandsen 2005). The CANS reached further down to the local level than previous local government structures and at least in theory brought boma administrators to the village level, where previously chiefs administrated, judged and governed (Leonardi, Mijak, and Deng Hot 2005).

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[13] Interview with a SPLM/A member from Kajokeji in Juba, 24 August 2017.
[14] Interview with an academic from former Central Equatoria, 26 August 2017.

The SPLM/A acted like a state in the territories under its control: The SPLM secretariats were quasi ministries, the SPLM/A and the CANS produced vehicle number plates and a currency and passed laws of the "New Sudan."[15] Yet, as this study explains, in practice the CANS was mainly geared towards mobilizing recruits and material support for the SPLM/A, provided some rule of law and coordinated some services and relief. "Civil authority was not there in the areas of the SPLA. So they [SPLM/A] thought of establishing this civil authority. One to continue recruitment of abled men to go to war. Two was to gather food for the fighting force. Three was to maintain communities at the local level. So, the civil authority was built to organize local taxes and support for the movement. (…) So, actually it was the lifeline of the SPLA during the war."[16] The CANS acted as intermediaries between members of the SPLA and the chiefs and collected taxes and contributions on behalf of the SPLM/A.

The SPLM/A also established its own judiciary which was based on chiefs at the local level and regional courts at the higher level. During this time, customary law was largely the law applied in SPLM/A areas and the court revenues were one important source of income for the SPLM/A (Leonardi et al. 2010). The local government structures and practices that were introduced in South Sudan after the signing of the CPA in 2005 relate to and were built upon the administrative structure the SPLM/A had introduced with the CANS (Santschi 2013). The way in which people viewed the SPLM/A and CANS at the local level, was shaped by many factors including individuals' positionality in local political arenas, political dynamics, local political contestations and underlying ethnic tensions.

From rebel governance to state domination: continuities and discontinuities

The first and the second civil war ended with the signing of peace agreements. In both peace agreements, the central government accommodated key demands of Southern armed groups in terms of governance, allocation of state resources and citizens-state relations. Hence, the armed groups negotiated new conditions and new political and economic dispensations that paved the way for at least temporary fundamental changes in state institutions in Southern Sudan (Douglas Hamilton Johnson 2011). Yet, as research findings point out the post-war periods differed in some respects.

After 1972, leaders of the armed uprising in most cases remained in the armed forces and technocrats and few politicians filled in the positions in the regional government and the administration in Southern Sudan. As one respondent noted, the public administration was exemplary: "But the most significant thing was the public administration. We had men and women of integrity who wanted a government that works for its principles. We had administrators strictly speaking civil servants who worked for the interest of the public."[17] In the 1970s, the regional government had only limited resources available. Yet, these resources were channeled to service delivery and infrastructure projects. After 1972, important infrastructure projects were implemented including the construction of the current buildings of the national ministries, the University of Juba and a bridge across the Nile. Moreover, the regional government substantially expanded the health sector and the educational sector and rule of law was strong respondents suggested.[18]

After 2005, many government and administrative positions were filled with individuals with a SPLA background. A military legacy was a key condition for occupying political and administrative positions after 2005. Henceforth, many senior SPLA members of the second civil war, continue to fill in key positions in the government of South Sudan up to the present-day. This entrenched a sense of

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[15] Interview with a SPLM/A member from Kajokeji in Kampala June 2018.
[16] Interview with a senior local government official in Juba, August 2017.
[17] Interview with a SPLM/A member from Kajokeji in Juba, 29 August 2017.
[18] Ibid. Interview with a senior government official from Kajokeji in Juba, 29 August 2017.

entitlement on the part of those who participated in the fighting and undermined the evolution of a culture of meritocracy in employments by public institutions.[19]

To an extent, this brought forward certain ills of the SPLM/A area, especially rampant corruption which seems to worsen in the independent South Sudan. As a senior official of the SPLM/A stated: "Unlike in 1972 we walked into a dark room full of money. (Laughing). We have failed during the war to start the development of the oil (…) and we got our percent share of the oil revenue almost immediately. Large amounts of money without systems. The vanity of humanity took supremacy over us. And boy, did we go in for it. (Laughing)."[20] Despite the fact that after 2005, billions of USD of oil revenues were pouring into South Sudan, limited state resources were channeled to service delivery and infrastructure development. It was the international community that largely funded service delivery and infrastructure projects by channeling billions of USD to South Sudan after 2005. Critical voices wondered whether the international community left the government off the hook by supporting service delivery and thereby also contributed to mismanagement of state resources.

During both post-war periods (1972 – 1983 and 2005 to 2013) tensions over power and resource allocation grew within Southern Sudan thereby partly following regional and ethnic lines. These tensions fueled the renewed outbreaks into civil wars. Accordingly, one key continuity of the different periods of war and peace in South Sudan are political and military mobilization along ethnic and community lines as well as deadly violence along ethnic or community lines (Douglas H. Johnson 2014; The Sudd Institute 2014).[21] Some of the armed groups fighting the government of South Sudan during the most recent civil war, strongly resemble armed groups that took up arms against the SPLM/A during the second civil war. They feature the same leaders and mobilize in the same communities. Again, in the most recent war power struggles as well as local grievances, related for instance to the control over land and the feeling of being marginalized by the central government, feed into the national level of the armed conflict.

Angola

The modern Angolan state has been shaped by violent conflict, since the country has been at war from 1961, which marked the beginning of a 14-year long decolonization war, to 2002, when the rebel forces of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) were defeated militarily by government troops. The civil war that our research focuses on can be divided into three phases: (1) from the time of the country's independence in 1975 to the first peace agreement signed in 1991, the war was marked by Cold War logics. The MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which took power in Luanda in 1975, was supported by Cuba and the USSR, while UNITA entered into a strategic alliance with apartheid South Africa and received strong (if largely covert) support from the USA, especially under the Reagan administration. (2) In 1991, a peace agreement was signed, and first general elections held in September 1992. Organized hastily in a context of strong tensions between the two warring parties, the elections were not concluded, and the civil war started anew. It was marked first (1992-1994) by extreme violence, especially for the civilian population, and, second (1994-1998), by a time of 'no peace, no war' following a second peace agreement signed in Lusaka in 1994. Control over natural resources played an important role during this second phase, with UNITA controlling up to 80% of the national territory and its diamond mining areas, and the MPLA financing

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[19] Interview with a SPLM/A member from Kajokeji in Juba, 29 August 2017.
[20] Interview with a SPLM/A member from the Equatoria region in Juba, 23 August 2017.
[21] See for example: Johnson, Douglas 2014: The Political Crisis in South Sudan. The political crisis in South Sudan. *African Studies Review,* 57(3): 167-174. The Sudd Institute 2014: South Sudan's Crisis: Its Drivers, Key Players, and Post-conflict Prospects.

its war effort thanks to its control over oil. (3) The last phase of the war (1999-2002) started when the government launched a vast offensive against UNITA, which eventually led to the death of UNITA's founder and historical leader Jonas Savimbi and the capitulation of the armed group in early 2002, after which the movement disarmed and transformed into a political party, currently the country's largest opposition party. The focus of our research in Angola has been on UNITA.

Competing nation views and varying institutionalization processes

The MPLA, despite later (and generally largely successful) attempts to rewrite national history (Pearce 2015a; Schubert 2015), had fought a rather 'underwhelming' liberation war (Boulanger 2017, 49) and was never the sole representative of Angolan nationalism it later made itself out to be (Messiant 1998b). Though much emphasis has been placed on the contrast between the MPLA's 'modernizing' outlook and UNITA's alleged 'nativism', both movements pursued modernist, nationalist projects but both also invoked 'blood and soil' nationalism, as evinced for example in Neto's poems (Péclard 2012; Pearce 2012). The two nationalist projects were thus ultimately not that dissimilar. Like each other's distorted mirror image, they tapped into the two distinct African nationalist modes of 'self-writing' that Mbembe identifies: a 'Marxist-nationalist' project in the case of the MPLA, and a 'nativist' discourse in the case of UNITA (Mbembe 2002, 243, 252). From the mid-1970s onwards, UNITA thus successfully presented itself as the champion of what it argued were marginalized people from the interior of the country (Péclard 2012). Its legitimization discourse was built on and instrumentalized feelings of marginalization by those sectors of the Angolan population who felt estranged from the coastal, urban social groups that later took power at independence. When the MPLA secured Luanda and 'won' independence thanks to Cuban troops that held off the Zairean and South African forces that supported FNLA and UNITA, respectively (Gonçalves 2017, 248, e.g.), UNITA also instrumentalized the presence of Cuban troops as a sign of 'second colonization' against which it offered to fight. More broadly, in a context where colonial rule created deep divisions within Angolan society, UNITA presented itself as the bearer of an alternative national project, a 'nation-view' that competed with that of the MPLA who had taken power in Luanda.

UNITA thus promoted an alternative vision of what independent Angola might look like, and sought to implement it, to varying degrees, in the areas it controlled. In the project we analyzed the ways in which this alternative model of a modern Angolan nation was put forward and what its different local effects were. In the South of the country, where it established its main military bases and built its 'bush capital' Jamba, UNITA tried to put into practice its alternative view of the nation. The years in Jamba are remembered, especially by UNITA cadres, as something akin to the ideal of an egalitarian, de-monetized society. In stark contrast however, these years were also marked by Jonas Savimbi's growingly totalitarian rule and by his ruthless physical or political elimination of any potential competitor. While the bulk of existing research on UNITA focuses on the party's historical strongholds (Heywood 1989; Beck 2013; Ferrão 2016; Pearce 2017), we researched UNITA's legitimization strategies in the areas where it tried to expand its activities beyond its 'heartland'. Given the dearth of archival materials, research was carried out mainly in the form of in-depth one-on-one interviews with former UNITA commanders and cadres, as well as with 'ordinary' civilians who had experienced UNITA occupation in their respective places of residence; the latter were complemented by a number of group interviews in Uíge.

Whereas in the Central Highlands and Jamba much emphasis has been placed on UNITA's attempts to mimic a functioning state, the situation in the North of Angola (provinces of Uíge and Zaire) and in the Lobito-Bocoio corridor, where the movement tried to expand starting in the mid-1980s, was much more fluid from the beginning. A careful examination of the fluctuating mosaic of territorial control and the ways in which UNITA sought to garner support and establish its dominance in the areas it

controlled breaks up the neat dichotomy of Cold War/conventional land war in the 1980s v resource war/war of destruction in the 1990s that prevails in much of the scholarship on the conflict.

Research in and on the northern provinces of Uíge and Zaire underscores the importance of previous political mobilization in the North through FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), Angola's oldest of the three anti-colonial liberation movements, and how UNITA was able to position itself as a 'brother movement', both as a means of forging a 'pragmatic alliance' with remaining FNLA pockets of resistance in the North (in itself a largely unacknowledged fact) and to mobilize popular support. UNITA also expanded its presence through the so-called 'Front Frustration of the People' (*frente frustração do povo*), i.e. tapping into the dissatisfaction of the population with the government's performance. When UNITA stressed that they were fighting to 'free Angola from the Cuban invasion', the population was, according to them, able to see the difference between the presence of the Cubans on the side of the MPLA, and UNITA's own 'instrumental alliance' with the South Africans.[22] Another element that turned the population against the government was its crackdown on internal dissidents after the 27 May 1977 'coup attempt' (Pawson 2014). And while there were among the civilian population in the North recurring testimonies of UNITA's routine recourse to corporal and capital punishment to enforce discipline amongst its soldier and the population under its control, one key difference was, according to them that, 'UNITA, in contrast to the FAPLA, did not rape women'[23]. In addition, there appears, in the view of some *mais velhos* (elders) from Uíge, a profound ignorance of, and (deliberate) disrespect of, local mores and customs among not only the Cubans but also the FAPLA troops, who often came from other parts of the country, and who thus were indeed often seen as a foreign, occupying force.

However, in the 1980s UNITA's presence was largely limited to temporary, shifting bush bases to which the nearest villages gave more or less voluntary support, which means it did not have the same possibilities to implement something akin to a 'functioning state' like it did in Jamba. Former military commanders placed much emphasis on the provision of health services and schooling at its 'Comando de Frente' HQs (a more permanent base than the roving bush camps). Local residents, by contrast, recalled a time of great uncertainty and very limited service provision, remarking on some positive but mainly on the negative aspects of UNITA's domination. In contrast to the government soldiers, UNITA troops were known for their cleanliness and discipline (respecting elders and women) but there was much distrust, and mutual denunciation among the population, and anyone suspected of MPLA sympathies would be killed. Youths were press-ganged into serving as porters in long treks through the bush to move supplies from neighboring Zaïre in the North through Uíge to units further south and east. Mamã Joaquina, who was born in Quimbele, recalled that there was 'no social contract, nothing; threats only. It was a great punishment. They used us as cheap labour force. If you were a girl you had to be their wife. It was truly slavery. And when they noticed your father had been in the MPLA army … for them, *o filho do peixe também é peixe* — there, they would take their measures!'[24].

In the 1990s, following the derailing of the 1992 elections, UNITA quickly occupied the entirety of the province, marking presence in the actual municipal towns and cities, and relinquishing control only in

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[22] In the mid-1970s, UNITA started to receive logistical and material help from apartheid South Africa, which led the 1975 'Operation Savannah', when South African Defense Forces (SADF) joined UNITA in a failed attempt to seize the capital Luanda militarily, and which lasted until the end of the 1980s. In all interviews with UNITA cadres, all insisted that the alliance was merely tactical and that Savimbi and UNITA never relinquished their Maoist ideological inclination, some military commanders hiding Mao's Red Book in their pockets while being instructed by SADF officers.

[23] Interview, former resident of Tomboco (Zaire) — a young man — 10 Nov 2017 ; group interview w three men, Negage (Uíge), 29 Oct 2017 ; Interview, former resident of Sanza Pombo (Uíge) — a middle-aged man — 27 Oct 2017 ; Interview, former resident of Sanza Pombo (Uíge) — an older woman — 23 Oct 2017.

[24] Interview, former resident of Quimbele (Uíge) — a middle-aged woman — 27 Oct 2017.

1997. Rather than being hidden away in bush bases like in the 80s, it now controlled towns and cities, and faced the challenges of making things work there. And that capacity appears to have been very much contingent on a municipality's location, i.e. available resources and insertion into functioning markets, and the way local commanders exerted their authority. As two gentlemen in Songo explained, 'Experiences were different. In Quimbele or Mucaba people lost everything. Bungo, Mucaba, they did not give one single vote to UNITA. The way they lived here was different — Songo, Ambuila, Bembe, all very good'.[25] In the municipalities that experienced some form of *vida normal* (normal life) and even economic prosperity, as well as in neighbouring Zaire province, where UNITA could monetise the fuel reserves it had captured in Soyo, it managed to act more or less like a government, providing education, health and some administrative services to the population.[26] From the interviews it would appear that while UNITA's message to continue the fight against an 'illegitimate' government was much less convincing to the population in the 1990s, its provision of some form of normality managed to ensure if not the enthusiastic support then at least the compliance of the population.

While the project's focus on ideology and political motivations is salutary for a number of reasons, results from that second phase in Uíge also point to the centrality of the production of a 'normal life' under occupation (See Hibou 2011). UNITA attempted to do so, on the one hand, through the imposition of discipline through the threat and meting out of violent punishment (ranging from corporal punishment to the death penalty); on the other hand, through creating the conditions for trade to continue and even to flourish. For instance, the organization of wartime commerce and supplies depended very as much on geography as it did on the bahaviour of the local UNITA command, both in comparison between the two neighboring provinces of Uíge and Zaire and between differently privileged/affected municipalities, i.e. municipalities like Negage and Songo benefited in relative terms of their position along major commerce routes, serving as major transit markets between goods from coastal Soyo and neighbouring Zaïre into Uíge and onto the eastern Lunda provinces.[27] This also stands in contrast to the predominant periodization of the Angolan conflict, which depicts the second phase of the war in the 1990s as a typical 'resource conflict' (i.e. the looting and monetizing chiefly of 'blood diamonds' in the east of the country).

Research in Benguela province revealed a different pattern, mainly because UNITA could build on its own history of nationalist mobilization during the liberation struggle, which in this area often relied on ethnolinguistic affinity, but more importantly on pre-existing family and church networks (Péclard 2015). Many educated youths in the central highlands and the central coast, trained in veterinary institutes, protestant missions, and the commercial institute of Benguela, filled the ranks of UNITA. Pastors, nurses, administrative technicians, students and peasants were its support base in the region. Indeed, until the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon on 25 April 1974 which brought down the Salazarist dictatorship and paved the way for decolonization in the former Portuguese empire, UNITA was still a small "party of cadres" (Messiant 1994) which lacked a social base. In June 1974, it was the first of the three Angolan nationalist movements to sign a ceasefire agreement with the new Portuguese government. It used the time between June 1974 and independence in November 1975 to campaign in the country in order to garner political support for its cause. After being militarily defeated in 1976 when the MPLA government supported by Cuban troops took over UNITA's stronghold in Huambo, Savimbi and his troops were forced to retreat to the South-Eastern corner of the country where it would eventually build its "bush capital" Jamba, while UNITA supporters in urban areas (especially in

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[25] Group interview, two men, Songo (Uíge), 30 Oct 2017.
[26] Interview w Dr Samy, former UNITA governor of Zaire, 08 Nov 2011.
[27] Group interview, two men, Songo (Uíge), 30 Oct 2017; group interview w three men, Negage (Uíge), 29 Oct 2017; interview with former UNITA captive from Sanza Pombo (Uíge) — a middle-aged woman, 09 Nov 2017.

the Lobito-Benguela area) had to hide or switch their (official) allegiance in order to avoid being targeted by the MPLA-State. Despite UNITA's military defeat in 1975-76, Savimbi managed to build the party's social base, especially among those who had been trained within Christian mission networks but felt estranged and marginalized by the MPLA elites and its Cuban allies. UNITA's alternative project of a modern Angolan nation successfully managed to speak to these feelings of marginalization (Péclard 2012). The Benguela Railway was also an important axis along which political mobilization happened, much like the spread of protestant churches in the previous decades (Heywood 2000). Following independence, when government and Cuban troops entered the coastal cities of Lobito and Benguela in 1976, UNITA troops fled into the bush, eventually creating bases in the mountain areas of Cubal do Lumbo and Monte Belo (Bocoio municipality), while its supporters in the cities opted for clandestinity, relating information on troop movements and supplies to UNITA leadership.

The bush bases were initially organized as detachments (from 1977 to 1983). In Cubal do Lumbo, UNITA operated with two units, Detachment 2 West and Detachment Poente, and formed military contingents for its basic structures that relied on the support of the civilian population that had accompanied its forces during the withdrawal from Lobito, Benguela and Bocoio town. In Monte Belo, its structures were first Detachment 1 West, and later PCA II (Posto de Comando Avançado). After 1983, when the detachments were transformed into military sectors, Sector B2 "venceremos" became one of the largest sectors that included administrative structures and concentrated a number of people who had fled and sought out protection under UNITA[28]. While UNITA did not have an administrative presence in the municipal seats (towns) in themselves, it did establish a primary education system in the areas it controlled. As such, the province of Benguela was not a 'consolidated zone', but played the role of a hub of circulation between the coast, the center, and the south of Angola[29].

In the 1992 elections, UNITA openly campaigned in the cities, reactivating its old support networks which had been muted and/or operating clandestinely during the single-party era. UNITA's strong showing in Lobito in 1992 challenges an analysis of political identities in Angola that equates 'adherence' to one or the other movement chiefly with their control over a population at a given time (Pearce 2015b). Following the derailment of the elections, hostilities restarted. Here, contrary to the North (and Central Highlands), UNITA only occupied Cubal for about three months before suffering a military defeat. Even after these defeats and the recapture of the towns by government troops, UNITA did not abandon the area. Until the end of the war, UNITA had a fluid and shifting relationship with the local population through its political and military structures. On the one hand, there were up to 40 clandestine cells in the cities of the province, especially in companies such as the Lobito Harbour, the Benguela Railway, Sonangol (the national oil company), in productive industries such as the sugar and sisal plants between Lobito and Benguela, as well as in many medium and small enterprises and even some State administration such as the Lobito Health service[30]. These groups and the clandestine cells they belonged to kept strong relations between each other meeting in "neutral" spaces whenever possible, and they also served as channels of communication between the cities (Lobito and Benguela), the interior of the Benguela province where UNITA progressively established bases (Bocoio, Cubal do Lumbo, Monte Belo), and Jamba[31]. They also received direct orientations from UNITA's central structures. On the other hand, UNITA had military and administrative control over the municipalities of Bocoio and Balombo to the north, Cubal to the south, and Ganda to the east, with the 'consolidated

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[28] Interview with a man in Bocoio (Benguela), 15.02.2019.
[29] Interview with a man in Cubal (Benguela), 24.04.2018.
[30] Several individual and group interviews with former workers of these different industries as well as with UNITA cadres, Lobito, February 2019.
[31] Interview with UNITA cadres, Lobito, 08.02.2019.

zone in Cassequel'[32]. These were effectively consolidated zones where UNITA maintained administrative structures providing services to the civilian population in exchange for food, labour, and political loyalty[33].

Peace and discontinued legitimization

The modalities of peace in Angola have had a very strong impact on UNITA's legitimacy and its potential for legitimization. In 1999, after four years of a 'no peace, no war' situation, the MPLA government decided to launch a vast offensive against UNITA in order to put a military end to the civil war. One of the important drivers of this change in strategy were mounting pressure, both nationally and internationally, for a negotiated settlement and a reconciliation process (Messiant 2003a). The military option was a way for the MPLA and President dos Santos to avoid making any concessions to its archrival, as a negotiated deal would have implied (Messiant 2003b). Besides, in the late 1990s, UNITA, who, after losing its Cold War allies, financed its war effort mainly through its control of the country's diamond mines, became the target of international sanctions as part of the campaign against 'blood diamonds'. Savimbi, a former 'Freedom fighter' of the 1980s, received as a Head of State by Ronald Reagan in 1986, became a pariah of the international community (see, e.g. Cilliers and Dietrich 2000; Greenhill and Major 2007).

In Angola itself, the international discourse of the blood diamond campaign was instrumentalized by the government in support of its own military strategy. Thus, it is not only UNITA as an armed group that was de-legitimized, but the social imaginaries and the nation view it stood for that lost their relevance in the post-war context. While UNITA is still the first opposition party in Angola, it has very little, if any, influence over government policies. Two issues, however, have come up in the research: one is the importance of training cadres. UNITA put much emphasis on educating its members during the war, and bases its claim to one day governing the country through democratic elections still partly on the idea that its cadres are better educated (and have a higher ethic of public service, service to the nation, etc.) than the current cadres of the MPLA government and heavily partisan public administration (interviews with UNITA delegate, Lobito, e.g., but see also Pearce 2018). The other, which is directly tied to the same ideas of ethics and professionalism, is that the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA) in their current incarnation, have only become such a highly professional, efficient, and nonpartisan force thanks to the integration of UNITA cadres over the years (interviews Brigadier Fonseca and General Nunda, Luanda).

Moreover, the social, political, economic and cultural grievances that UNITA mobilized in its own legitimization discourse and which were central in the creation and sustaining of its social base throughout the conflict, have not disappeared. Rather, and that has become quite clear in the 2017 elections, UNITA has successfully reshaped this message for a younger, urban electorate less marked by the direct experience or memory of the war, and made substantial gains in some urban constituencies (Pearce, Péclard, and Soares de Oliveira 2018). As these grievances continue to be largely unaddressed by the post-war MPLA government, this could result in some real gains for UNITA at the local elections planned for 2020.

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[32] Interview with a man in Cubal, 24.04.2018.
[33] Interview a man in Bocoio, 15.02.2019.

Côte d'Ivoire

Contrarily to Angola and South Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire was for most of its post-independence history known as a beacon of political stability and economic prosperity in the West African region. In 2002 however, fighting erupted when rebels originating from the North of the country attempted to take power in the capital Abidjan. The failed coup attempt was the culmination of years of political crisis and of mounting tensions between the North and the South of the country, where struggles over citizenship and the definition of Ivorian nationhood played center stage (Akindès 2004; McGovern 2011). The country was rapidly divided in two: the rebel *Forces Nouvelles* took control of the North of the country from their 'capital' Bouaké, the government ruled over the South and the de facto capital Abidjan, while international forces were in charge of protecting the ceasefire line. A peace agreement was signed in 2007, opening the way for presidential elections which took place in December 2010. According to official elections results, Alassane Ouattara was to be sworn in as President. However, allegations of fraud and the refusal of incumbent president Gbagbo to accept his opponent's victory eventually led to renewed fighting marked by great violence, especially in Abidjan. Eventually, the former rebel Forces Nouvelles took control of Abidjan and, with support from French troops, arrested Laurent Gbagbo and his wife Simone. Their arrest, followed by their transfer to the ICJ in the Hague, paved the way for the inauguration of Alassane Ouattara as new President in May 2011.

Since Ouattara came to power in 2011, the security sector has been one of the main challenges that he has had to address after the integration of former Forces Nouvelles rebels into the national army and the creation of the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (Fofana 2011b). In 2012, a program of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) was put in place, followed by a Security Sector Reform (SSR) process. This allowed for a relative peace in the country, and created the conditions to encourage foreign investment, as part of the President's strategy of strong economic growth as a way out of the war (Akindès 2017). However, since 2015, Côte d'Ivoire's new Republican army has had to face repeated instance of mutiny, mostly from former Forces Nouvelles fighters. While they reveal some of the weaknesses of the Ivorian DDR and SSR processes (Leboeuf 2016), these mutinies also shed light on the ongoing political and military power struggles that lay at the heart of the production of a post-war social order in Côte d'Ivoire. In order to understand this, we first turn to the social and political dynamics of the civil war, before zooming in on current security challenges.

Mobilizing citizenship and political grievances

The *Forces Nouvelles* articulated their legitimizing discourse around experiences of marginalization and discrimination on the part of the central government in Abidjan. The discourse had two components. The first evolved around economic and political marginalization of the North of the country, which translated into a developmental differential to the detriment of the North (Förster 2010a; Marshall-Fratani 2007). The second, and more important, echoed the politics of nationhood put forward by the successors of the first Ivorian president and 'Father of the Nation' Félix Houphouët-Boigny after his death in 1993. As part of a complex political game, Henri Konan-Bédié and Laurent Gbagbo, instrumentalized the notion of 'Ivoirité', a very restrictive definition of what it meant to be Ivorian, in order to consolidate their power and fight their historical opponent, Alassane Ouattara, a Northerner (Akindès 2004; Banégas 2006). This policy resulted in what were resented as discriminatory policies against Northerners, especially for those whose families had immigrated to Côte d'Ivoire in previous decades as response to the strong demand for labor forces in the country's plantation economy. The *Forces Nouvelles* tapped into these grievances in order to legitimize their attempted coup in 2002 as

well as the military and political control they exerted on the North[34]. Since the ambiguous victory of the *Forces Nouvelles* in 2011 and the coming to power of Alassane Ouattara, the latter's government has repeatedly been accused of 'ethnic compensation', i.e. of a politics of favoring Northerners for all important public offices (Akindès 2017).

Institutionalizing centrifugal power during rebellion

After the ceasefire in 2002 and an agreement signed in Paris in 2003, the *Forces Nouvelles* established their control over the Northern half of the country. Bouaké, the country's second city, became their capital. Governance by the *Forces Nouvelles* was a complex mix of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies (Popineau 2019). The area under control of the *Forces Nouvelles* (called CNO – Centre, Nord, Ouest) was divided into 10 military zones, each headed by a zone commander, or *'comzones'* as they are referred to (Fofana 2011b). The *comzones* were crucial in the military, political and economic control of the whole area and wielded important power. The central authority of the *Forces Nouvelles* in Bouaké were headed by Guillaume Soro, a former student leader from the powerful Ivorian Students' Federation (Fesci), which played a crucial role on both sides of the divide and from whose structures the leader of the pro-Gbagbo militias (Charles Blé-Goudé) also came (Konate 2003; Banégas 2006; Koné 2014).

Governance in the CNO 'rebel' zones was dominated by two tendencies. Firstly, it was marked by a constant struggle between the *comzones*, who fought for their independence and in order to maintain the discretionary powers they exerted over their respective zones, especially in terms of taxation, and the Central authority in Bouaké who strived to centralize economic revenues and to prevent the *comzones* from preying on the local populations[35]. Indeed, an important dimension of the Forces Nouvelles' claim to power was rooted in deeply-felt grievances among important sectors of the Ivorian population against the marginalization of the Northern part of the country as well as anti-Northerners discriminatory politics put in place by the Gbagbo regime at the height of the 'Ivoirité' crisis (Förster 2010b). Therefore, the FN civilian commanders had to find the right but difficult balance between the interests of the *comzomes* and the interests of the FN general command, who feared that excessively predatory politics on the part of the *comzones* might end up delegitimizing the FN project. Such tensions between some of the *comzones* and political authority in the post-war context continues to be an important problem of governance and stability, as we indicate below.

Secondly, although the Forces Nouvelles established themselves as an alternative power to the Ivorian central state and claimed that they would deliver to the CNO populations what they had been deprived from by the Gbagbo administration, they paradoxically were forced to draw on the Ivorian central state in their very bid for the establishment of their alternative administration. This was the case in the area of education, for instance. Quickly after the beginning of the conflict in 2002, up to 80% of the Ivorian state employees fled the CNO zones, leaving education, health and other services virtually without staff. In order to respond to strong local demands for education in the CNO zones, the FN first drew on thousands of voluntary teachers, many of whom were students who had adhered to the FN at the beginning of the war. However, the parallel education system put in place was still dependent on the Ministry of education, especially when it came to organize annual examinations, which was a central demand on the part of parents and families (Popineau 2017). The FN government was therefore still dependent on Abidjan in order to answer demands for 'normal life' under rebel rule. This further illustrates the fact that the ability of armed movements to institutionalize their power is strongly

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[34] Interviews conducted with several demobilized Forces Nouvelles combatants in Bouaké (Jan-Feb 2018) and Korhogo (March 2018). (See also Fofana 2012; 2011a).

[35] Interview with the former Head of the 'Centrale économique', Bouaké, June 2017.

influenced by the kind of state-society relationship that characterized social life prior to conflict in the areas under their control.

The kind of government put in place by the FN in the CNO zones unveils a strategy of "state mimicry" (Popineau 2019) in a context of war, whereby an armed group takes over state functions in order to create a parallel state. As already indicated, similar attempts were made by UNITA in the vast territory around its "bush capital" Jamba and in South Sudan, where the SPLM/A set up the Civil Authority of the New Sudan (CANS) in order to administer the territories it controlled in the mid-1990s. But what these different examples suggest is that this "mimicry" is never complete nor exempt of tensions and ambiguities. Like any public authority, governments by armed groups are "twilight institutions" (Lund 2006) that need to "negotiate" the exercise of power with competing institutions, both at the local level (e.g. traditional authorities) and at the international level, with the crucial role played by humanitarian agencies in the provision of goods and services during civil wars. In the case of the Forces Nouvelles in Côte d'Ivoire, the establishment of a "civilian" government in the CNO zones must be read, as our research suggests, against the backdrop of its long-term strategy of state capture, as exemplified by the political trajectory of its former leader Guillaume Soro since the end of the war.

Security transition and makeshift production of the post-war order

After two decades of crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, one of the main challenges for the Ivorian state is to reinstate its control over the army and the security forces at large. The latter went through a series of profound changes. First, throughout the crisis the security forces were divided between the *Forces Nouvelles* and the loyalist forces. Second, during the 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis, the security forces were recomposed as Republican Defense Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI). The creation of the FRCI included the promotion and integration into the army of former rebel rank-and-file soldiers as well as officers (Fofana 2011b). In parallel, the Ivorian state implemented a classical program of DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR). This allowed in a first instance Côte d'Ivoire's security index to rise, which, in turn, served the new government's policy of economic growth backed by foreign investments (Akindès 2017). However, over five years after the termination of the war, the Ivorian army is still heavily politicized and divided, and its somewhat makeshift composition is a source of growing instability and insecurity. This was particularly visible during several instances of mutiny within the army in Bouaké, starting in 2014, that were the focus of our research. The mutinies were based on financial grievances, mostly from former *Forces Nouvelles* soldiers who claimed they had not received what they had been promised (and were eventually paid a substantial amount by the state, thus creating resentment among other soldiers)[36].

Much like social movements that developed and mobilized in Côte d'Ivoire in July 2016 to demonstrate against the rise in living costs in the country, the turmoil within the Ivorian military are part of a broader dynamic of contestation. At stake is the issue of growing socio-economic inequalities since the end of the war and as a result of the neoliberal pro-growth economic policies of the Ouattara administration which has had as a major effect a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor (Akindès 2017). Since the pro-growth policies were launched by the Ouattara administration as the principal means of transitioning out of the war, these movements also express social and political demands rooted in the grievances that the war articulated and that the post-war reconstruction policies tend to ignore. The mutinies are also an expression of a sort of revenge on the part of *cadets sociaux* (youth) against their elders (Abbink and Kessel 2005). They are a sign of the impatience of the youth towards their elders' discourses about the *émergence* of the country and peace while their living conditions in the casernes

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[36] Interviews with former FN combatants integrated into the FRCI and participant observation in Bouaké during the mutinies.

seem a far cry from the economic success that their own former FN bosses. Clearly, the pressure that these armed former rebels have been exercising on the Ouattara government by means of repeated mutinies and armed mobilization (Belaid 2019) need to be understood as a result of the lessons they learned during the war and a continuation of their war economy by other means (Keen 1998).

Our analysis shows, on the one hand, the continuity of networks of allegiance and legitimacy between some FRCI soldiers and their former *comzones*. These networks were particularly visible during the mutinies. On the other, it also highlights the extent to which the Ivorian army is the crux of the process of peace consolidation and long term (in)stability. The Ivorian security forces are being reconstructed 'from above' through the official process of SSR, but primarily 'from below', through the complex web of relations between soldiers who were integrated into the Republican Forces, demobilized soldiers and their former commanders. This creates tensions and insecurity and opens up avenues for political instrumentalization in the context of the 2020 upcoming presidential elections, when Alassane Ouattara will have to leave office after his two constitutional terms at the head of the state. This is a reminder of just how complex and multifaceted the transition process in Côte d'Ivoire is. It also suggests that the Ivorian State and its President cannot simply rely on the state's theoretical monopoly over the exercise of legitimate violence in a Weberian sense in order to reinstate its control over the whole country after a decade of political violence. The fight for control over the Ivorian security forces reveals a complex web of power struggles between the main political and military actors of the civil war.

Since his accession to power, Alassane Ouattara has had to deal with the complex legacy of a rebellion that brought him to power in the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011 and whose former commanders continue to have a very strong influence over large parts of the security forces while being also very influent in some sectors of the economy (Leboeuf 2017; Clément-Bollée and Miran-Guyon 2017). In other words, a legacy that makes the regime very dependent on the former FN, especially in the security sector. But a legacy that the Ouattara regime has been trying to keep at bay ever since it took power, in a complex game of cooptation and estrangement. Some of the reforms put in place by the Ivorian state have been launched to progressively lessen the influence of former rebel commanders on the State apparatus or to make sure that those who were integrated into the state apparatus remain loyal to the regime and do not take too much independence. The former Forces Nouvelles on their part started their conversion from armed movement to political force in 2011 under the leadership of their leader, Guillaume Soro. Their aim is to continue to have a strong influence over the political game and eventually to take control of the state by playing the democratic game.

What we can observe here are two contradictory logics of the post-war order that oppose each other in the context of the transformation of the security apparatus. Alassane Ouattara's logic is based on economic growth based on foreign investment and big infrastructural transformation as a way to create the conditions for the birth of the 'New Ivorian', i.e. a country made of citizens looking ahead to the emergence of their economy on the global stage and to the (positive) social transformations promised by the trickle-down effect of growth on all sectors of society. It is a logic that believes in oblivion as a transformative force. Former FN commanders on their part argue that their legitimacy to rule, politically, militarily and economically, is deeply rooted in the memory of war, in their military conquest of power, and in the economic power they acquired through the war. These opposing logics, which have been the cause of complex tensions and negotiations between military and politics, between formal and informal processes of reforms in the security sector, and between competing claims on the legitimacy of rule are at the heart of state formation processes in Côte d'Ivoire and illustrate the continuities between war and peace.

Conclusion

As the research presented in this working paper clearly shows, analyzing the variegated strategies that armed groups develop in order to legitimize their (violent) actions is essential to understanding their origins, their development, their military strategies, as well as their capacity to adapt to the end of the hostilities and transpose the gains they may have made during the war into the post-war order. These strategies are of different and complementary types. The *narratives* they produce help armed groups garner support for their cause and legitimize the disruption they bring to the lives of those they set out to defend. These narratives are also central for their claim to international recognition and support. The legitimacy of armed groups depends on their ability to *provide a 'normal life'* despite and beyond the disruptions caused by the war. This 'normal life' can take several forms, but it relates to economic activities, the provision of basic services such as health and education, as well as a system of justice. Armed groups may be brought to develop *institutions of governance* in order to provide these elements, but the extent to which this happens depends on the context and on the temporalities of the civil war. Armed groups often rely on international actors, including humanitarian agencies, to help them provide support to civilian populations. They also, counter-intuitively, sometimes rely on the state against which they fight, as was the case in Côte d'Ivoire.

International aid significantly interacts with public authority (of armed groups and the "formal" state) and conflict dynamics. While aid actors, particularly humanitarian agencies often stress the neutrality and apolitical nature of their engagement, aid is in practice an important resource and its allocation is deeply political. Aid influences the legitimacy of armed groups and state actors. It shapes power relations and it impacts on the relation between citizens and the state/armed groups. It is important that policy makers and practitioners critically reflect on the unintended consequences of aid on the public authority and on conflict dynamics. This is particularly the case in South Sudan, where international aid has a long history and was entangled in conflict dynamics.

It is widely acknowledged that civil wars have a strong idiosyncratic character. But this fact is often seen from a national rather than local perspective. As our research has shown, the micropolitics of civil wars do however differ greatly when looked at from a local perspective, and this needs to be taken into account, both for understanding the conflict itself and even more so for any intervention. In our research on Angola, we have thus shown how very local dynamics impacted on the capacity of UNITA to sustain its claim to legitimacy (or not). Local dynamics of conflict can ignite conflict on a much broader scale if not addressed properly, as has been the case repeatedly in Eastern DRC.

War and peace stand in a continuum, and there is rarely a clear break between the two. This was particularly visible in our research on Côte d'Ivoire and South Sudan. In Côte d'Ivoire, post-war stability and security are dependent on balances of power that developed during the civil war. As the end of President Alassane Ouattara's second term and general election approach in 2020 approach, the risk of seeing conflict dynamics reignited by the electoral game is real. Deep-seated grievances, some of which have been flared up by the strategy of economic growth as a way out of the politico-military crisis, need to be addressed before they can be instrumentalized for electoral purposes.

In South Sudan, even though the state as such is new, structures and institutions of public authority have a long history and senior government officials and local authorities have often worked for institutions of public authority (rebel movements/administrations and "formal" state institutions) for decades. This important aspect has often been overlooked by external actors who largely assumed that international state building endeavors started from a blank slate at the end of the second civil war in 2005. It is important that future peace building and state building endeavors take into account

existing structures of public authorities, political dynamics as well as power relations and their institutionalization.

Our research however also shows that, in certain cases, peace can represent a break – at least to a certain extent. This has been the case in Angola, where the 27-year long civil war ended with the clear military victory of government troops over UNITA. Due to the particular context within which the offensive that led to the defeat of UNITA took place – a context where leaders of UNITA, the armed group itself as well as its military and civilian followers were growingly criminalized in the wake of the blood diamond campaign –, there has been very little, if any, space for the expression of the social, political and economic grievances of those who adhered to UNITA's project. One positive consequence was that the unification of the defense forces in Angola was not as bumpy as in Côte d'Ivoire, since wartime loyalties could not materially survive UNITA's military defeat; the civil war has also been absent from public space and discussions in Angola. But in the middle to long term, unaddressed grievances may re-surface, including in a violent form, and especially after memories of the lived experiences of the civil war will have faded away – as the case of Mozambique shows.

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