

**THE INVOLVEMENT OF AFRICAN ARMED
FORCES IN RESOLVING AFRICAN CONFLICTS:
A CASE STUDY OF THE AU MISSION IN SUDAN**

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that except for the reference to other peoples work, which have been duly acknowledged, the study presented here was written by me under the supervision of Dr. Kumi Ansah-Koi. It is a record of my own research work and has not been presented in any form whatsoever in any application for any degree elsewhere. All sources of reference collected and material used have been duly acknowledged by means of reference and bibliography.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to all men and women of the AU Mission in Sudan who have made the ultimate sacrifice towards peace in that country.



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I am very grateful to all the individuals and institutions from where I harvested my information. All the credit in this work belongs to them and all short-comings are mine.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APF	:	African Peace Fund
APSA	:	African Peace and Security Architecture
AMIS	:	African Union Mission in Sudan
ASF	:	African Standby Force
AU	:	African Union
AU PSC	:	Africa Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC)
AU PKO	:	African Union Peacekeeping Operations
CADSP	:	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CEWS	:	Continental Early Warning System
DRC	:	Democratic Republic of Congo
DPKO	:	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
DPA	:	Darfur Peace Agreement
HCFA	:	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
JEM	:	Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
MILOBS	:	Military Observers
MSC	:	Military Staff Committee
NATO	:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OAU	:	Organisation of African Unity
OPCOM	:	Operational Command
ONUC	:	United Nations Operations in the Congo
PKOs	:	Peacekeeping Operations
PoW	:	Panel of the Wise
PSC	:	Peace and Security Council
PSD	:	Peace and Security Department
PSOD	:	AU Peace Support Operations Division

RPF	:	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RRF	:	Rapid Reaction Force
SPLM/A	:	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
UN	:	United Nations
UNSC	:	United Nations Security Council
UNMIS	:	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNAMID	:	United Nations/Africa Mission in Darfur

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ABSTRACT

Conflicts in human settlements on the globe are inevitable due to cultural and ethnic matters, identity and individual differences, social settings, political/power struggles and struggle over scarce natural resources. The African continent since end of the Cold War up to date has witnessed a number of wars and conflicts with current and most devastating one being the conflict in Darfur - Sudan. The involvement of African Armed Forces alongside the UN and other agencies has become necessary in fostering peace and security in most countries in Africa, especially in Darfur, Sudan. This paper focuses mainly on analysing the conflict situations in Africa and the involvement of African Armed Forces to solve these problems; using the AU Mission in Sudan as a Case Study. The qualitative research methodology is employed to analyse the conflicts in Sudan, the African Union intervention and the successes and challenges encountered in the mission. It was found that the country's historical background explained the root causes of continuous conflicts in the region. However, the struggle over oil sharing, border demarcation, and national currencies are among the current reasons for the conflict. The AU's record in conflict resolution using African Armed Forces on the African Continent and in Sudan in particular, has been a mixed bag of successes and challenges. The normative shift from 'non-interference' to 'non-indifference' in itself is a basic success story in the history of conflict resolution in Africa. In Sudan in particular, the intervention has helped to contain the conflict to some extent. It has also prevented violence against women, reduced the recruitment of children into armed forces, assisted with displaced persons and protected humanitarian corridors and convoys. However, the mission was also challenged by the lack of resources, ill-defined mission and mandate, and lack of clear plan for achieving peace. This thesis is of the view that the AU should ensure that peace operations are adequately resourced and armed with clear operational directives and clear mandates to carry out missions successfully to ensure stability and security for the African continent. Further, AU should also ensure that it upholds the provision of the Constitutive Act which affirms the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State with respect to crisis situations or grave circumstances; namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Human settlements anywhere on the globe have experienced one conflict or another due to cultural and ethnic matters, identity and individual differences, social settings and political/power struggles, among others. According to Lamberton and Minor¹ there is conflict everywhere or wherever there are people. Conflict in human environment is inevitable.² There have been clashes between incompatible people, ideas or interest, leading to conflict or civil wars.³ According to Mullins, conflict is related to power and politics.⁴ It is therefore common to see people engaging in conflict to get or increase power or influence in organisational or social setting.⁵ The results of conflict can range from minor inconveniences to major losses of lives and properties and the collapse of even nations.⁶ It is perceived in most instances as disruptive and unnatural.⁷ An uncontrolled conflict is eventually destructive.⁸ The phenomenon can be viewed at the individual, group, organisational, regional, national, and even international level.

This work focuses mainly on national conflicts within Africa. According to Mathiasen and Carpenter, Africa is a continent rife with conflicts.⁹ The African region since 1960s independence has been plagued by conflicts and widespread destruction of life, limb and property.¹⁰ A conflict resolution mechanism has to be capable of conducting operations in both civil wars, transnational, and international conflicts. The usage of Military Forces to foster peace and calm at conflict zones is one of the numerous strategies to control conflicts. The involvement of African Armed Forces in African conflicts dates back to the Congo Crisis of the 1960s when the United Nations (UN) deployed a Peace Keeping (PK) Force known as the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) in that country. Since then, the military involvement has continued in several forms. The forms of involvement that have taken place

include International (with the UN), Continental (with the African Union - AU) or Sub-regional (with the Southern African Development Cooperation – SADC or Economic Community of West African States - ECOWAS). The culture of African Armed Forces involvement in African conflicts has been influenced by the East and West dichotomy during the Cold War and the unwillingness of the international community to interfere in Africa's conflicts in the post Cold War era. The involvements were also affected by the peace and security architecture or framework of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and her successor, the African Union (AU).

The numerous numbers of conflicts that afflicted the African continent from the end of the Cold War to the first decade of the twenty-first century and the inertia of the international community demanded that urgent changes be made to the way of doing things at a regional level. It is against this background that African leader's came up with the idea of African solutions to African problems at the penultimate Summit of the Organisation of OAU convened in 1999, in Sirte Libya. Subsequently, the Constitutive Act of the African Union which was signed, in Lome, Togo, on 11th July 2000 established the Peace and Security Council in 2004 through the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council, to deal with peace and security issues on the continent. The Organization of African Unity evolved into the African Union in July 2002. The AU is modelled on the European Union and aims to promote democracy, human rights, and economic development across Africa. The AU was officially inaugurated on July 2002, in Durban, South Africa and a year later it had already deployed its first peace keeping operation in Burundi. The AU subsequently deployed peacekeeping missions in Darfur, in 2004, and in Somalia in 2007. Experts say the AU, although more assertive on security issues than its predecessor, still has a long way to go to become truly effective.

These political era and legal regimes have therefore defined the history and culture of African Armed Forces involvement in African conflicts. For instance, the Protocol of Non Interference in the Internal Affairs of Member Countries of the OAU disabled the organisation in her ability to interfere militarily to resolve conflicts on the continent. This period therefore did not witness any such involvement in African conflicts by African Armed Forces under the auspices of the continental body except regional organisations such as the ECOWAS (in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s) and SADC in Lesotho (in 1998). However, there is a complete departure from the principle of ‘non interference’ when it comes to the era of the AU. This is partly due to the unwillingness of international community to interfere in Africa’s conflicts in the post Cold War era following the failure of the UN in Somalia in 1992 and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The experience of the United States of America (USA) in the war ravaged Somalia in 1992 might also be viewed as the turning point of her involvement in African conflicts.

The inertia on the part of the international community which spurred on the African leaders to attempt to developed African solutions to African problems especially in the area of conflicts/wars has opened a new chapter in the history of Africa in terms of conflict resolution. Consequently, the new Constitutive Act of the AU, 2002¹¹ established the Peace and Security Council in 2004 through the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council.¹²

The Council makes a decision or recommendation to authorize and legitimize the AU’s intervention in internal crisis situations of member countries. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act affirms the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State with respect to crisis situations. Specifically, Article 7, item (e), of the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council, states that the Council can recommend to the Assembly (of Heads of State), intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances,

namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments.¹³ Consequently, this era has witnessed such involvement in African conflicts by African Armed Forces under the auspices of the AU, in Burundi (African Union Mission in Burundi - AMIB), Somalia (African Union Mission in Somalia - AMISOM) and Darfur (African Union Mission in Darfur - AMID). This work is designed to explore these military interventions and involvements in controlling tensions in African conflicts/wars zones.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The post Cold War era saw an upsurge in conflict in the world. However, there was a shift away from ideologically-based conflict, as witnessed in Namibia, Angola and Mozambique to conflicts driven by socio-political, religious, economic and resources issues.¹⁴ The consequences of these conflicts have been very costly. Conflict destabilizes states and borders, stifles economic growth and investment, and robs young Africans of the opportunity for an education and a better life.

The African Union (AU) deployed its first peace keeping operations mission in Burundi in 2003. This was followed by Darfur in 2004 and Somalia, in 2007. These official AU peacekeeping missions using African Armed Forces have continued since then and the current one is in the Sudan. Perhaps, Africa this time, wants to show to the rest of the world its capabilities of handling its internal problems. It could be that international contributions in this direction have been woefully inadequate. This was noted in the United Nations' failure to address the Liberian crises in political terms until November 1992, almost three years after the crises erupted."¹⁵ The United States of America (US), as the world's only remaining superpower, after her experience in Somalia, has also not been very proactive in intervening directly in African conflicts. Rather, she has been willing to provide humanitarian assistance and military aid (equipment, training, strategic airlift) to the continent for its peacekeeping

and peace enforcement operations. The International community's failure to contribute significantly to emergency relief in this situation is therefore a wakeup call to African leaders to take the bull by the horn in resolving African conflicts and wars in the continent without necessarily relying on the initiatives of the international community.

The establishment of the AU in 2002 opened the opportunity for a more robust African regional architecture that is capable of responding to the numerous conflicts facing the continent. In this new opportunity the AU set forth a vision for an African Peace and Security Architecture following the model of the UN and other regional organizations. This architecture is designed to enable the AU to cooperate and collaborate with the UN in its mission to maintain international peace and security.

The involvement of the AU, using African Armed Forces has been very helpful in many instances. However, it has also faced difficulties and challenges in some other instances. The case of Darfur in Sudan can be cited as a typical example. The conflict in this part of the country exploded with the emergence of the Sudan Liberation Army in 2003. The conflict took a devastating toll claiming about two million lives and displacing about four million people.¹⁶

The several attempts made by the AU and the UN to ensure peace and security of the people in Darfur have faced several challenges. Specifically, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was deployed by the AU following UN Security Council resolution 1590 on March 2005 for peacekeeping mission failed to improve security and stability in the region. Like many of the peacekeeping operations that came before it, the Darfur mission has failed, according to experts, because the force was not big enough and the mandate was too limited. The ineffectiveness of the mission has been attributed to poor resources and weak political will.¹⁷ Many commentators have therefore described AMIS peacekeeping mission as a mission to 'keep' a non-existent peace. The weak mandate of the mission did not give the

forces the flexibility to respond to crises as they developed because the troops were authorized only to ‘monitor’ the situation and ‘verify’ violations of the cease-fire.

The failure of AU to halt the human rights violations in Darfur has confirmed that its shortage of resources and political will are a real hindrance to its effectiveness in protecting human rights.¹⁸ However, the conflict continues to take devastating dimension as it involves attacks being made on villages, camps, and even AMIS bases. Inadequately armed and under fire, AMIS peacekeepers even lost their lives. Eventually, AMIS was later replaced by the UN and African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which was deployed in Darfur through the UN Security Council Resolution 1769 in July 2007 till date.¹⁹ These developments demand that further research is conducted into the nature and background of the Sudan conflict, the performance of the African Armed Forces and their challenges.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study was to explore the African Armed Forces involvement in conflict resolution in Africa. The specific objectives included:

- a) To explore the African Union’s Framework for Conflict Resolution, Peace and Security in African;
- b) To explain the causes of the conflict in Sudan;
- c) To critically examine the African Union’s intervention in the conflict in Sudan in order to identify its successes and challenges; and
- d) To make recommendations towards the improvements of the AU’s interventions in conflicts in Africa using African Armed Forces.

1.4 Research Questions

The study intends to respond to certain research questions in order to achieve the main objective. These questions are:

1. How effective is the African Union's Framework for Conflict Resolution in coming out with pragmatic measures to minimising or eradicating conflicts in Africa?
2. What are the causes of the Conflict in Sudan?
3. What are the successes and challenges of the AU Mission in Sudan? And
4. What is the way forward regarding AU's interventions in conflicts in Africa using African Armed Forces?

1.5 Research Methodology

This is a study of the involvement of African Armed Forces in the resolution of conflicts on the African continent specifically in Sudan. It is therefore descriptive and explorative in nature and its value lies in the qualitative approach that is applied. According to Saunders et al, exploratory and descriptive study is a useful research design for investigating problems.²⁰ The conflict situation in Sudan has a long historical background which must be carefully examined from theoretical and empirical perspectives. The explorative design is therefore adopted to explore the possible causes of the prolonged conflicts in the country. The descriptive study is employed to analyse the military interventions and involvements in fostering peace and stability. These are the two main research designs that were employed in this study.

The study employs the case study method in analysing the conflict in Sudan. A case study offers the prospective researcher the ability to obtain rich data with high validity whilst situating and interpreting data within their wider context. It provides important research settings for AU's interventions in Sudan. This method enables the researcher to draw comparison between the interventions. Finally, the study employs documentary sources to provide relevant background information for the study. The primary data includes documentary sources, such as scholarly material on military intervention.

Secondary data was used to carry out qualitative analysis on Africa Armed Forces' involvement in Sudan. Secondary data was obtained from articles on military interventions, internet, conflict and conflict resolution textbooks and peacekeeping textbooks. For instance, secondary information sources extracted from reputable academic journals and Security Studies suggested that military interventions were very useful. The data from sources such as Institute of Security Studies (ISS) Monograph Series, Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University and Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation formed part of the evidential value required for this study. They helped in explaining what actually took place and why the intervening countries acted the way they did.

The national and international newspapers also provide information relating to AU mission in some of the African countries. Several journalists presented this data in many articles in newspapers. Some of these newspapers highlight the Africa conflicts over the years and the role of the military interventions during resolutions. Extracts were made from some of these newspapers for this study. While newspapers may provide speculative assertions about events, they are important in providing details and their information is even more valuable when they corroborate each other, as in the Sudan conflicts over the years. These secondary sources therefore formed a crucial part of the study when analysing the actions of the military interventions in conflict plagued countries. These sources are reliable avenues for information on military interventions in most of the war zones in Africa and therefore were relevant in the analysis of the situation in Sudan. The data obtained were analyzed using qualitative analysis.

1.6 Significance /Purpose of the Study

The study focuses mainly on the on-going conflicts in Darfur, Sudan. It is therefore a case study which critically analysed the volatile conflict situation in that part of the country as a test case of the ability of Africans to solve their own problems. The study explored the

performance of the African military in this context and identified their successes and challenges. It is therefore relevant as addressed vital continental issues concerning peace support operations (PSO) and also proffered possible solutions. It is also hoped that the study would provoke further discussions and also add to existing body of knowledge on the subject matter.

1.7 Scope of the Study

Currently, African Armed Forces are involved in the resolution of several African conflicts under the auspices of the AU in Burundi, Somalia and Sudan/Darfur. It is worth noting that within the period from 2003 to present; several peace keeping missions have operated in Sudan/Darfur. They include; the AU Mission in Sudan - AMIS (July 2004 to December 2007), the UN Mission in Sudan – UNMIS (March 2005 to July 2011) and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur – UNAMID (December 2007 to present). Others are; United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei – UNISFA (June 2011 to present) and United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan – UNMISS (July 2011 to present). This work looked at the involvement of the AU in resolving conflicts in Africa using the African Union Mission in Sudan – AMIS (July 2004 to December 2007) as a case study. It therefore critically analysed the volatile conflict situation in that part of the continent with a view to explore the performance of the African Armed Forces.

1.8 Limitations of the Study

Largely, documents on military operations in war and conflicts are classified and therefore are not given out easily. The non-availability of these documents resulted in the use of some materials from non-military sources for the study. Arguably, such literature on the Africa Armed Forces and AU Mission in Sudan may have their inherent limitations and

weaknesses which could influence the outcome of the study. The findings made and conclusions drawn therefore cannot be generalised.

1.9 Literature Review

Conflict is inevitable in every human environment. The phenomenon arises from differences and it occurs whenever people, states and non-state actors disagree over their goals, values, motivations, perceptions, ideas, or desires. In international politics war is the central problem of the anarchic international politics and the central actors are states. It is therefore the preoccupation of every state to pursue its national interest at all cost. It needs to be noted that, insecurity, force and survival are pervasive. However, international cooperation is the bases for achieving national interest as it is a useful tool for promoting collective security.

The idea of collective security in the liberalist view promotes the pacific settlement of disputes which forms the bases of peace and prosperity. This would later become the central theme of the Charter of a world body to be known as the United Nations. The emergence of collective security platforms such as the formation of United Nations and other regional bodies such as the European Union (EU), the Organisation of African Union (OAU) seems to suggest a triumph of the liberalist views over the realist in the aftermaths of the Second World War. Thus, the pursuit of collective security through instruments such as peace keeping, peace building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution became very useful in ensuring world peace after the Second World War especially in the post cold War era that witnessed relatively high occurrence of intra-state conflicts.²¹

Regional organisations play important role in the security architecture of the UN as their role is in line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.²² This challenge of collective security through regional organisations has therefore been taken up by regional bodies such

as the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organisations (NATO) and AU. The case of the AU's pursuit of collective security by using African Armed Forces is the main theme of this study.

As stated earlier, the involvement of African Armed Forces in African conflicts dates back to the Congo Crisis of the 1960s when the UN deployed a Peace Keeping Force known as the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) in that country. Since then, the military involvement has continued in several forms. The involvements have taken place at the International, Continental and Sub-regional levels.

African peacekeepers contribute to peacekeeping operations on the continent and beyond. According to UN Fact Sheet, as of 31 January 2013, since 1948, the UN has undertaking 67 PKOs worldwide (Current peacekeeping operations: 14).²³ The total number of these operations on the African continent are twenty-eight (28); eight 8 of them ongoing.²⁴

Total number of personnel serving in the current 14 peacekeeping operations worldwide is 111,880; uniformed personnel (Troops, Civil Police and Military Observer) are made up of 92,968.²⁵ Thirty-five African countries contribute almost 40,000 troops and police to current peacekeeping operations, more than a third of uniformed United Nations peacekeepers.²⁶

The culture of African Armed Forces involvement in African conflicts has been influenced by the East and West dichotomy during the Cold War and the unwillingness of the international community to interfere in Africa's conflicts in the post Cold War era. The involvements were also affected by the peace and security architecture or framework of the then OAU and her successor, the AU.

The numerous numbers of conflicts that afflicted the African continent from the end of the Cold War to the first decade of the twenty-first century and the inertia of the international community towards the resolution of those conflicts demanded that urgent

changes be made to the way of doing things on the African continent. Subsequently, the new Constitutive Act of the African Union has empowered the organisation through the Peace and Security Council in (2004) to deal with peace and security issues on the continent.

Pursuant of the peace and security agenda, the AU deployed its first peace keeping operation in Burundi in 2003 followed by Darfur, in 2004, and in Somalia in 2007. The involvement of the African military has been very helpful in many instances. However, it has also faced difficulties and challenges in some other instances. The case of the AMIS has attracted attention from several writers.

In his article, The African Union Mission in Sudan: Darfur Dilemmas, Commodore Seth Appiah-Mensah explored the various challenges that undermine the AU mission's effectiveness and its prospects.²⁷ He observed that inadequate funding is the major challenge. According to the article, the AU mission is currently in a dilemma with its mandate concerning how to engage with the parties, partners, implementation of the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) and the way forward. It established that the AU is totally dependent on external donations to sustain its Darfur operations.

The article highlighted some few achievements of the AU Mission in various conflicts zone especially in Darfur. According to the article, AMIS has managed to achieve a semblance of stability in much of Darfur, which has been reflected in the improvement of humanitarian conditions. The article also revealed that the AU mission in Sudan has failed to respond appropriately to the deteriorating security situation on the ground by enhancing its presence and effectiveness. This failure on the part of the AU Mission has led to a serious international pressure. However, the article failed to make some recommendations to overcome some of the challenges.

Writing on some of the Lessons Learned from Peace Operations in Africa, Paul D. Williams, highlighted the 40 peace operations deployed to 14 African states since 2000 and

how an effective political strategy and peace process played a role in the success or failure of peace operations.²⁸ The article discussed how policymakers need to move beyond a preoccupation with the number of personnel deployed for each mission and focus on what capabilities are needed to generate the desired political effects. He emphasised that maintaining legitimacy is a crucial part of achieving success.

The article provides insight into peace operations which involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel such as the police and/or military with a mandate to assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process. It further serves as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements, and enforce ceasefires or peace agreements, or efforts by the UNSC in order to build stable peace. It explains how the peace operations in Africa have revealed some of the best and worst dimensions of peacekeeping, thus providing an empirical perspective for future researches in the area of conflict and civil wars in Africa. According to the article, peace operations remain international society's principal tool for conflict management, and empirical evidence suggests that, they have contributed to the decline of conflict in numerous war-torn territories despite some criticisms and serious imperfections.

The article emphasized the need for policymakers and analysts alike to work to ensure that peace operations are given lucid operational directives, clear mandates, and sufficient resources to fulfil the proposed objectives for which they were established. The article provided details on the missions, date, locations and size of the 40 peace operations between 2000 and 2009 but failed to highlight on the outcomes of these missions.

In his article, The African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan-Technical/Operational Dimensions, Henri generally focused on the technical and operations dimensions needed in the AU Mission in Sudan. He discusses the force structure, mission structure, mission

statement, mandate and tasks, the mission component, AMIS deployment concept, logistics and funding.²⁹

However, the article failed to provide other relevant information in the area of the AU achievements so far in bringing peace and stability to Sudan. It failed to give in details the outcomes of the mission to Sudan. The historical background and causes of the prolong conflicts in that country and AU's role in this direction were also not captured.

Tim Murithi, in his article, The AU's Foray into Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Hybrid Mission in Darfur, captures major issues such as, the Brahimi Criterion of Peacekeeping, the African Union's Framework for Peacekeeping, and the African Union Mission in Somalia.³⁰ It further captured practical AU Peace operations in Burundi, in Darfur AMIS I, and peacekeeping operations in Somalia. Finally, it analyses the failure of AMIS II, the trajectory of UN Engagement in Darfur, and deployment of the Joint AU-UN Hybrid operation in Darfur as well as the challenges facing UNAMID.

The article highlighted the AU peacekeeping missions in Burundi in 2003, in Darfur in 2004, and in Somalia in 2007. These cases provided the practical and empirical scenarios for the analysis in this study. According to the article, the AU's operations in Burundi and Somalia aided the joint AU-United Nations (UN) hybrid mission in Darfur. The article concluded that the AU has a better chance of success when it undertakes a concise and focused operation with a clear mandate and the modicum of logistics to ensure its effective implementation, as demonstrated by its experiences in Burundi. It therefore implies that AU Missions involving the Africa Armed Force in other areas in Africa will not achieve any meaningful results if factors contributing to the past failures are not addressed.

The major strength of the article is the discussion which focused on the African Union's Framework for Peacekeeping. The framework involves the signing of AU constitution,

and establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council in 2004 through the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of 2002.

The article made clear that the formation of AU was the realization of many Africa leaders the need to find a way to revive the spirit of Pan-Africanism as a vehicle to resolve urgent problems such as conflicts. The article however failed to comment on the continent's efforts in using the military intervention in bringing peace to conflict regions of the continent. It rather quoted the AU using Brahimi Criterion for the deployment of operations in peacekeeping campaign. However, it argues that the hybrid mission therefore falls short of the Brahimi Criterion and suggest that UN intervention following an initial AU peace operation is not necessarily a panacea to the continent's peacekeeping challenges. It noted further that, the AU's foray into peacekeeping was hasty, erratic, and not carefully planned. The organisation's joint effort with the UN in Darfur is similarly constrained by the absence of a peace to keep.

Indeed, it is clear from the above literature review that a lot has been written on peace keeping in Africa involving African Armed Forces which is of relevance to this study. The literature so far explored the subject highlighting the problems and issues at the tactical levels of the operations and making some recommendations. However, there is a gap at the strategic level for which the recommendations of this study focussed.

1.10 Arrangement of Chapters

The dissertation is organized into four main chapters. The first chapter deals mainly with introductory issues including the background of the study, statement of the problem, literature review, scope and significance of the study. The second chapter provides an overview of Africa conflicts and the Military Interventions in different countries over the years. It discusses the various African Armed Forces involvements focusing mainly on AU Mission in Sudan. Chapter three explores the historical and political background of the

Sudanese conflict. It critically evaluates the available data on the Sudan intra-state conflicts over the years and AU efforts in resolving the situation. Finally, chapter four records summary of the major findings, the conclusions made based on the research objectives and questions. The chapter ends with some recommendations towards enhancing military interventions in ensuring peace and stability in most parts of Africa, especially in Sudan.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

Conflicts have been perceived as an inevitable phenomenon at the workplace, social settings and at the national level. The occurrence of conflicts in almost every human setting is as a result of the many cultural, social, political, and economic factors. Even personal desires and ambitions have contributed to many conflicts across the globe. However, the alarming rate of conflicts and wars in continents such as Africa has become a global concern. The continent of Africa, for more than six decades now, has witnessed many conflicts and wars which led to the retardation of her development and progress. This chapter attempts to review the nature of African conflicts and its adverse consequences over the years. This chapter deals with:

- Overview of African Conflicts;
- The Concept of Military Intervention;
- Overview of Military Interventions in Africa;
- The Concept of Peace Keeping and its Evolution;
- The Organization for African Unity and Conflict Resolution in African; and
- The African Union's Framework for Conflict Resolution, Peace and Security in African.


2.2 Overview of African Conflicts

The African continent, after the 1960s when majority of the African states had their independence, should have been characterized with much stability and development in freedom and peace since the Western rule and oppression in the continent were over. This era in the history of Africa saw a major transition of government from the colonial masters to the

indigenous peoples. It was a time that government and administration of the African state rested solely in the hands of the Africans. The Africans were expected to manage their affairs to achieve much progress and development.

However the reality was entirely a different story. The continent was rather plagued by major challenges, of which conflicts and wars ranked top among the m. The map below depicts the conflict zones on the continent.

Figure 1 - Africa's Conflict Map



Source: Adapted from <http://www.google.com.gh/imgres?imgurl=http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/>

According to Keith, Africa since the end of the Cold War has been the site of severe human rights violations, including many that were perpetrated or directed by national governments against their own citizens. Governments that commit such atrocities do not do so lightly.¹ Powerful motivations lie behind their “preferences for repression,” which is a tool that they employ to retain political power, secure and distribute resources, and ultimately

ensure their regime's survival.² Could it be that Africa is not capable of managing its own affairs as it was believed or there could be factors behind these conflicts on the continent?

The term conflict has been described as a rubber concept, stretched and moulded for the purposes at hand and is often used interchangeably with dispute and crisis.³ Conflicts occur as a result of incompatibility of goals and actions between collective actors.⁴ A most useful perspective of conflict is provided by Bloomfield and Leiss analytical model which presents conflict as a dynamic process consisting of a sequence of phases containing factors that generate pressures toward or away from violence. According to this model, conflict originally arises out of a substantive dispute which may be over issues of self determination, autonomy, legitimacy or other values.

The conflicts within the continent can be viewed from a social perspective. According to Coser, social conflict may be defined as a purposeful struggle between collective actors aimed at controlling, neutralizing, deflating or removing opponents in order to gain access to power, status, scarce resources and other values.⁵ African conflicts have their own dynamics, involve their own actors, take place in a unique environment and require a different approach and solution – especially if the root causes of the conflict are not properly analysed.⁶

The conflicts in Africa have come in the form of civil wars within the nations and wars between the nations. Some were wars which erupted in the fight for independence of some African nations while others were just colonial wars and conflicts in Africa. The continent has also recorded few secessionist and separatist Conflicts. The continent has recorded conflicts in almost all the countries. Some of the recent conflicts in the continent include Libyan civil war in 2011 – 2012 and 2007 – 2008 Kenyan crises. In the case of Libya, it was factional fighting involving some of the indigenous people. The series of civil wars in Chad in 1965–1979, 1979-1982, 1998–2002 and 2005–2010 were typical example.

The efforts by local and foreign bodies to resolve Africa conflicts will yield no positive outcomes if the basic causes of the phenomenon are not identified. It is highly prudent to investigate background of the nature and the root causes of violent conflict in Africa.⁷ According to Aning, contemporary armed conflicts in Africa are being prosecuted by various national and international actors, to include state and non-state actors, insurgents, terrorists, various belligerents and warlords, illegal arms merchants, criminal drug cartels, and transnational criminals.⁸ These miscreants operate in an environment of failed African states or states emerging from civil conflict.⁹ The root causes of war in Africa cannot be attributed to a single factor, but the causes are interrelated and interwoven into a complex nexus.

The root causes of several violent armed conflicts in Africa can also be traceable to colonial rule, whose legacy of arbitrary colonial borders has precipitated intra-state and inter-state conflicts.¹⁰ The colonial powers gave little consideration to ethnicity, culture, and language when state borders were drawn: these borders often divided ethnic communities and joined traditional enemies into a common jurisdiction.¹¹ However, each region in Africa has peculiar features causing conflicts. The following according to Moghalu are the causes of armed conflicts in the under listed countries in Africa:¹²

- a) Ethnicity, discrimination and national rivalries - Rwanda and Burundi;
- b) The illegal exploitation and competition for natural resources - Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo;
- c) The proliferation of small arms and light weapons - Sierra Leone;
- d) Poverty - Sudan;
- e) Fundamentalism, religious cleavages, crises of identity within a society and exclusionary ideological beliefs - Nigeria and Somalia;
- f) Territorial disputes - Ethiopia and Eritrea; and

g) The struggle for access to political power in Kenya and Zimbabwe.

It should be noted that the root causes of war in Africa cannot be attributed to a single factor. The causes are interrelated and interwoven into a complex nexus.¹³ Factors such as state and non-state actors, insurgents, terrorists, various belligerents and warlords, illegal arms merchants, criminal drug cartels, and transnational criminals have contributed to conflicts and wars on the continent. Most contemporary armed conflicts in Africa have been characterized by these various national and international actors. Their violent activities usually have a spill-over effect, with regional ramifications. Moreover, regional instability entices the unintentional or purposeful involvement of neighbouring states that host or support certain of these actors.¹⁴ The actors and the environment within which they conduct their undesirable behaviour illustrate the inter-connectedness and complexities associated in resolving armed conflicts in Africa.

Amoo reported that the African region has been plagued with conflicts leading to a widespread destruction of life, limb and property.¹⁵ The cost in human life, counting both casualties from combat and starvation brought on by war, exceeded one million during the decade and might have reached two million.¹⁶ The waste in human life would boggle the mind if we were to add the casualties from the 1960s and 1970s when we had the Congo crisis, the Nigerian civil war, and Idi Amin's butchery in Uganda, the Ogaden war between Somalia and Ethiopia, and others. According to Kobbie, there were about 150 million Africans living in countries in the throes of war during the 1980s.¹⁷ Conflicts can therefore be looked at as one of the major problems facing the African continent. According to Amoo, conflicts in Africa constitute the preeminent regional problem; they are as tragic as they are complex.¹⁸

The continent's recent conflicts in areas such as Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Kenya and Zimbabwe, have killed millions and displaced many more, leaving them to run the gauntlet of violence, disease, and malnutrition. These conflicts have also traumatized a generation of children and young adults, broken bonds of trust and authority structures among and across local communities, shattered education and health care systems, disrupted transportation routes and infrastructure, and done untold damage to the continent's ecology from its land and waterways to its flora and fauna. In financial terms, the direct and indirect cost of these conflicts is well over \$700 billion.¹⁹

These concerns have led to the designation of conflict resolution a top priority for the governments in Africa. This conflict resolution is referred to as the elimination of the underlying causes of conflict, generally with the agreement of the parties, and the establishment of peaceful relations between hitherto conflicting parties.²⁰ In the final analysis, conflict resolution lies within the competence of the direct parties in the conflict; they have to consider the stakes in dispute and undertake a cost and benefit analysis as to whether their respective interests would be better served by continuing to wage war or pursuing a pacific settlement of their differences.²¹

Peace operations are arguably the principal international instrument to curb conflict in Africa. Since 2000, the United Nations (UN) alone has spent over \$32 billion on its 12 peacekeeping operations on the continent, of which the U.S. Government contributed roughly one-quarter. For some, this has been a good investment. The Human Security Brief 2007, for instance, concluded that the rise in peace operations since the mid-1990s was a major contributing factor to the 60 per cent decline in the number and magnitude of African conflicts over the same period.

2.3 The Concept of Military Intervention

The use of third party in controlling intra-state conflicts in Africa has been considered as one of the contemporary tools in conflict management. Likoti argues that third-party intervention has become increasingly important to the peace and security of the international system.²² Though the effectiveness of such intervention without properly evaluating the reasons why a third party chooses to commit military resources to such endeavours is questioned by critics.²³ The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his 2000 report to the Millennium Assembly, challenged the international community to try to forge consensus, once and for all, around the basic questions of principle and the process involved: when should intervention occur, under whose authority, and how. It was in this spirit that the Canadian government established the Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Both reports establish a conceptual framework upon which humanitarian intervention may take place and defines boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate interventions. Both reports therefore, form the basis of how interventions should be perceived as both legitimate and illegitimate by the international community.

The term intervention means coercive military intrusion into the internal or foreign affairs of another state.²⁴ Holsti defines intervention as a designation of any activity that deliberately seeks to change the political leader(s) or the constitutional structure of a foreign political jurisdiction.²⁵ It involves a demonstration or show of force aimed at making another state change its policies.²⁶ It is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state.²⁷ It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of international relations.

The term military intervention has also to do with activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organisation which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state.²⁸ Military intervention is not a new

phenomenon but has existed for decades.²⁹ In the aftermath of the devastating Westphalian wars in Europe, military intervention in intrastate conflicts was seen as violating the fundamental norm of the Westphalia treaties, which state that “war is not waged against a sovereign state which has not itself militarily attacked another sovereign state.”³⁰ These interventions were seen as contrary to international rules. More fundamentally, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has strong roots in the moral political theory of Just War.

The meaning of military intervention can be derived from various contexts in which intervention takes place and from the aim of the action itself.³¹ According to Pearson and Baumann,³² military intervention is the operational movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling) of one country into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or forceful military action by troops already stationed by one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute. This form of intervention involves the sending of large quantities of troops either to stabilise a regime against rebels or to help overthrow an established set of authorities. Vertzberger also added to the various definitions of military intervention.³³ The writer argues that intervention is state organised and state controlled, goal orientated military coercion by one foreign state in the territory of another. The activities are directed at its political structures with the purpose of preserving or changing that structure thereby influencing its domestic political process or certain of its foreign policies. From a general perspective, foreign military intervention involves the direct, overt commitment of uniformed, combat-ready units and formations to conduct conventional operations in a foreign state.³⁴

Intervention, as explained above, comes in many forms. Likoti identified two main types of interventions; the humanitarian and military interventions.³⁵ According to Bowden, military intervention in certain context is synonymous with humanitarian intervention. However, he argues that humanitarian intervention has lost its significant in wars in Africa.³⁶

According to the theory of sovereignty, humanitarian intervention could not be regarded as lawful.³⁷ Military intervention during the 19th and 20th centuries was regarded as the last option when all peaceful measures were not successful.

The military intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Serbia in 1999 demonstrated to the international community contradictions about a lack of respect for sovereignty and intolerance by NATO towards human rights violations.³⁸ Bloomfield and Leiss' analytical model argues that the dispute may initially not be necessarily perceived in military terms by either party. A process of negotiation may be initiated by the parties or a mediator to resolve the issues in dispute. If one or more introduce a military option to resolve the dispute, however, a threshold is crossed to a second phase in which hostilities are potentially likely or at least reasonably expected. This second phase starts when dispute comes to be regarded in military terms by one or both parties, is what Bloomfield and Leiss describe as conflict.

Military intervention has been a major instrument in the hands AU and foreign nations or agencies in controlling conflicts in some parts of the world. However, the practice has been criticized by a section of the public. De Waal argues that sovereignty does not legitimize violation of human rights and denial of humanitarian assistance.³⁹ According to Likoti military intervention is this pattern which has been consistently broken in most African conflicts.⁴⁰ For example, Rwanda in 1990 was subjected to intervention by Uganda, while in the DRC almost eight countries intervened without a UNSC mandate. Such actions violated the critical aspect of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention which is enshrined in customary international law and codified in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. This is because military intervention in the domestic affairs of other states is characterised by coercion and violation of sovereignty and it is therefore not consensual.

The problem still remains that any military interventions conducted outside the UNSC's authorisation is seen as geared towards attaining the realist interests of intervening states. The record of unauthorised military intervention in intrastate conflicts appears to be far from over. More countries have become involved in intrastate conflicts than ever before.⁴¹ From 1945 to 1989, the world witnessed around 269 interventions. All were conducted without UNSC resolution. They were unilateral and hence illegitimate in terms of international appeal.⁴²

However, the escalation of violence often attributed to military forms of intervention may have severe costs for both the target of intervention and the state choosing to intervene.⁴³ It can therefore be concluded that intervention was only accepted by the international community when it was based on humanitarian grounds.

2.4 Overview of Military Interventions in Africa

The use of military intervention started when UN first deployed a force known by the acronym ONUC to try and preserve a fragile national integrity in Zaire, former Belgian Congo.⁴⁴ The UN after the Congo experience shield away from deploying armed military forces for purposes of peace-keeping in Sub-Saharan African until 1989, when it became involved with the transition to independence in Namibia. According to Brooks, Pan-African efforts at conflict resolution shifted to the organisation of African Unity, now the AU.⁴⁵ The OAU or the AU now has responsibility of deploying armed military to its conflict zone, using its own means, which are extremely limited. Since then, the Sub-Saharan African military personnel have participated as observers and staff officers during United Nations peace operations throughout the world. Furthermore, African countries have proven willing to participate in peace operations in Africa and elsewhere. Although some of these operations were less than successful, Africans have gained a wealth of experience in both troop deployments and headquarters staff positions.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as a model has been developed to assist the AU to aid in the effective management of peace and security on the continent.⁴⁶ The Heads of State and Government of the Union also made provision for the establishment of the African Standby Force in 9 July 2002. The military intervention in resolving conflicts on the continent was major component of the ASF.⁴⁷ The military component is well developed at both continental level and the regional level. It is envisaged that with the activation and deployment of the ASF that the military and police component will have the main responsibility to restore peace and security in a country. Thus, the military component has the mandate of stabilizing the security situations in conflict areas on the Africa continent.

The military intervention has proven its potential of being a strategic approach of solving Africa's intrastate conflicts.⁴⁸ However, military solutions to African conflicts are regarded as controversial since it is now accepted that democratic means were more desirable than military intervention. This is after several cases have shown that both political and military solutions may not, at times, work as expected. According to Williams, there have been 40 peace operations deployed to 14 African states since 2000.⁴⁹ This writer was not specific on the success of these peace missions. However, peace operations must be part of an effective political strategy and peace process, not a substitute for them, if it will be successful.

The African continent has since the 1960s witnessed a series of conflicts and wars. McNamara argues that the end of the Cold War in 1989 did not, and will not, in and of itself, result in an end to conflict.⁵⁰ The Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the turmoil in northern Iraq, the tension between India and Pakistan, and the conflicts across the face of sub-Saharan Africa in Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are examples. These all make clear that the world of the future will not be without conflict, conflict between desperate groups within nations and conflicts extending across national borders are still

occurring. While Africa experienced military coups during the Cold War, the character and form of military interventions in the 1990s was unique. In most cases, interventions appear to have been used for strategic interests, thus militating against negotiations and other peaceful means of conflict resolution. The African military interventions have been applied in the followings conflicts and wars.

1. The 1990 Ugandan military intervention in Rwanda;
2. The 1996–97 Rwandan and Ugandan intervention in the DRC and the 1998 military rebellion in the DRC;
3. The 1998 South African and Botswana military intervention in Lesotho.

In terms of political solutions in Rwanda, soon after the 1993 political settlement President Habyarimana's regime reverted back to military strategy and attacked the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). Jones states that as a result of this violation of the Arusha political settlement, several neutral regional interventions by regional security organisations were sent to Rwanda, to oversee cease-fires but had little overall impact on the cause of war.⁵¹ Most important, a UN peacekeeping mission was sent to Rwanda to secure a negotiated settlement to the conflict. It failed utterly to do so and did nothing to prevent Rwandan genocide. This has demonstrated that neither peacekeeping nor military intervention may be appropriate where negotiations fail. Military intervention have also failed in most cases, as in the DRC, for example, where both Ugandan and Rwandan forces are still present in the eastern Congo despite their public pronouncement that they have completely pulled out. In fact, it has been claimed that Rwanda has continued mounting operations against former Rwandan soldiers who sought refuge in the DRC. This is despite the peace agreement negotiated in Lusaka by the UN Secretary-General, which was signed by all countries involved in the DRC's conflict.

The military interventionist approach appeared to have been used by the intervening countries as a realist foreign policy tool in the absence of authorisation from the United Nations and other regional and sub-regional bodies such as the OAU and SADC.

According to Bowden military intervention cannot be synonymous with humanitarian intervention.⁵² This is because some forms of intervention are humanitarian while others are not as in the three cases under discussion. While it has been difficult to categorise African wars into conventional factional warfare, genocide or ethnically-based conflicts, the military interventions in Rwanda and the DRC have coalesced all three of these elements. Bowden maintains that in all these cases, conventional forces found themselves engaged in intensive attrition warfare.⁵³ The military intervention by Uganda in Rwanda in 1990, which ended with the removal of Habyarimana regime in 1994, was such a challenge. The explosive war involving eight countries in the DRC in 1997–98 and the 1998 military intervention in Lesotho by two countries were a further extension of the above challenges.

Few successes have been recorded with military interventions. Pearson and Baumann cite the military display demonstrated by South African forces near the borders of both South Africa and Lesotho in 1994, which successfully reversed the Palace coup in Lesotho as a typical example.⁵⁴ This form of diplomacy coerced the King of Lesotho into reinstating the democratically elected government. This was also the case in point with the combined Angolan, Rwandan and Ugandan intervention in the DRC in 1997 and in 1998, together with countries such as Burundi, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Chad. While this contribution came almost a year after the above interventions, there is truism to the fact that Rwanda, the DRC and Lesotho were, at the time of intervention, militarily and politically too weak to repel the massive force mounted by the intervening countries.

2.5 The Concept of Peace Keeping and its Evolution

The term peacekeeping came about in 1956 during the Suez Canal crisis. The ad hoc nature of peacekeeping has many times seemed reactive to crisis and had until 1956 relegated any UN efforts to unarmed observers.⁵⁵ Peacekeeping is an instrument, not a strategy.⁵⁶ Without a viable political strategy, peace operations should not be an automatic response to all wars. The remarkable surge in the increasingly complex UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) in Africa after the Cold War and 9/11 renewed the interest of the international community in the concept of “partnership peacekeeping.”⁵⁷ Despite a range of valid criticisms and serious imperfections, peace operations remain international society’s principal tool of conflict management, and empirical evidence suggests they have contributed to the decline of conflict in numerous war-torn territories.

Since the 1950s, Peacekeeping has evolved from Traditional Peacekeeping (Separation and Monitoring Forces) to complex and multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. Complex or Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations has to do with monitoring and protecting human rights; ensuring the promotion of the rule of law; providing access for humanitarian assistance; supporting reconstruction; undertaking public information; and gender mainstreaming.⁵⁸ It encompasses UN, UN-authorized, and non-UN operations, which may range in size from small observation forces and security sector reform missions involving fewer than 50 personnel to multidimensional operations involving tens of thousands of soldiers, police, and civilians.⁵⁹

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2003) argues that peacekeeping is based on the principle that an impartial presence of peacekeeping forces on the ground can ease tensions between hostile parties and create space for political negotiations. In the widest perspective, it has to do with the influence of regional organizations in the prevention, management, and resolution of violent armed conflicts since

these organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of armed conflict.⁶⁰ According to Murithi, peacekeeping includes both military tasks such as monitoring ceasefires and patrolling buffer zones between hostile parties, and non-military tasks such as civilian policing; oversight of political and civil affairs.⁶¹ Adding to this, Williams said that peace operations involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel of police and/or military with a mandate to assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process.⁶² It serves as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements and it enforces ceasefires, peace agreements, or the will of the UN Security Council.

The Hammarskjöld's principles provide rudiments of peacekeeping. The principles emphasize:

- a) Peacekeeping forces could only be deployed after a cease-fire;
- b) The consent of the host country;
- c) UN troops could only fire in self-defence; and
- d) The UN had to remain impartial.⁶³

The realities of unceasing conflicts on the continent required the evolution of peacekeeping.⁶⁴ According to Murithi, peacekeeping is part of the international community's repertoire for consolidating peace in war-affected countries.⁶⁵ Kobbie also confirms the involvement of regional organizations in peacekeeping operations in Africa.⁶⁶ Although the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security lies with the UN, Articles 52 and 53 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter make provision for the role of regional organizations in the peaceful settlement of local disputes and enforcement operations under the authority of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Peacekeeping can help bridge the gap

between the cessation of hostilities and a durable peace, but only if the parties to a conflict have the political will needed to reach the goal.⁶⁷

The attempt to foster peace at conflict zone has to go through series of step. Murithi identified four major areas of activity in the process; including preventive diplomacy; peacemaking; peacekeeping; and post-conflict peace building.⁶⁸ The preventive diplomacy component strives to resolve a dispute before it escalates into violence. Peacemaking seeks to promote a ceasefire and to negotiate an agreement. Peacekeeping proceeds after the out-break of violence and involves the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.⁶⁹

Peace operations are arguably the principal international instrument to curb conflict in Africa.⁷⁰ According to Murithi, peacekeeping in Africa have revealed some of the best and worst dimensions of peacekeeping.⁷¹ The increasing regionalization of peacekeeping is a pragmatic response mainly due to on-going armed conflicts and the resultant humanitarian tragedies in Africa.⁷² The recent conflicts on the Africa continent have killed millions and displaced many more, leaving them to run the gauntlet of violence, disease, and malnutrition.⁷³ These conflicts have also traumatized a generation of children and young adults, broken bonds of trust and authority structures among and across local communities, shattered education and health care systems, disrupted transportation routes and infrastructure, and done untold damage to the continent's ecology from its land and waterways to its flora and fauna.⁷⁴ In financial terms, the direct and indirect cost of peacekeeping of these conflicts is well over \$700 billion.⁷⁵

The AU made an effort to conduct peace operations, notably through AMIB in Burundi, after which the UN took over the peace operation. The Human Security Brief 2007, for instance, concluded that the rise in peace operations since the mid-1990s was a major

contributing factor to the 60 per cent decline in the number and magnitude of African conflicts over the same period.

The Burundi mission in 2003 was the AU's first official foray into peacekeeping and it met with mixed outcomes. The AU subsequently deployed peacekeeping missions in Darfur, in 2004, and in Somalia, in 2007. The resulting success stories of both UN and Non-UN PKOs would contribute to the downward trend in the number and magnitude of African conflicts, reduce the human and economic cost of violence, and thereby open the door to more dynamic and sustained development.

In the absence of this conceptual and operational coherence the AU's foray into peacekeeping may continue to appear as a foraging exercise and an elusive quest for continental security.⁷⁶ According to Williams, the United Nations (UN) alone, since 2000, has spent over \$32 billion on its 12 peacekeeping operations on the continent, of which the U.S. Government contributed roughly one-quarter.⁷⁷ The huge cost in peacekeeping adventures in Africa has been a good investment in some instance. Accordingly, policymakers and analysts alike should work to ensure peace operations are given sensible operational directives, clear mandates, and sufficient resources to fulfil the proposed objectives.

2.6 The African Union and Conflict Resolution in Africa

The AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2004 through the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of 2002.⁷⁸ The AU's 15-member PSC is mandated to conduct peacemaking, peacekeeping and Peacebuilding.⁷⁹ The nature and the root causes of armed conflict within the current African strategic environment requires the AU to be ready to conduct Peace Keeping Operations (PKOs) that are executed under different policies, by different institutions that use different

concepts than the policies, institutions and concepts embodied in the traditional theory of peacekeeping as conducted by the OAU.⁸⁰ For instance, the AU's participation in African PKOs cannot be analyzed without a proper understanding of both the nature and the root causes of violent armed conflict and its subsequent impact on the readiness of the AU to conduct PKOs.⁸¹

It should be emphasised that the establishment of the OAU on 25 May 1963, the first pan-African intergovernmental organization, represents Africa's first real attempt to deal with African peacekeeping challenges through continental arrangements.⁸² The OAU was the principal regional organization in Africa that responded to violent armed conflict during the Cold War. Historically, African peacekeeping requirements were addressed through the OAU's Commission on Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation; but the Commission was dismantled in 1977 due to its ineffectiveness and its reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. For instance, in October 1963, an OAU resolution sent military observers to a demilitarized zone between Algeria and Morocco, but this decision was never implemented due to the lack of political will and interest of OAU member states.⁸³ The OAU was also reluctant to intervene in the Nigerian civil war during 1967-70, specifically because it did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Nigeria (Commission of the African Union). The OAU mainly focused on and was pre-occupied with the elimination of all forms of foreign or colonial rule on the continent. African peacekeeping interventions were not a priority. The role of the OAU in African peacekeeping, rested on the ineffective principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention. Therefore the OAU decisions to intervene in African armed conflicts lacked credibility and member states lacked the will to implement anything in line with conflict resolution, especially if their interest were threatened by an intervention. It rather focused on the objective of defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of member states.

The transformation of the OAU into the AU is indeed a step in the right direction. This new institution is demonstrating an encouraging pro-activity in terms of its preparedness to tackle the continent's peace and security challenges, and generally contributing to issues relating to the attainment of international peace and security.⁸⁴ The African Union was established as institutional mechanisms to support its role in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, particularly through the establishment of its Peace and Security Council (PSC) in March 2004. This is the most critical institutional component of the African Union's peace and security architecture.

One of the AU's objectives was to enhance the security and readiness of Africa to respond to armed conflicts in Africa. Subsequently, the Constitutive Act (2) was adopted in Lomé in 2000. It established the AU and mandated the new organization, as continental guardian, to develop a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The primary role of the AU was stipulated in Article 3 of the AU Constitutive Act: to maintain continental peace and security. It explicitly declares in its mandate that the organization will intervene in conflicts on the continent through PKOs, even when a peace agreement or cease-fire agreement is not in place.

In the case of the African Union in particular, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), was established as part of a new structure that provides a clear paradigm on security to construct continental security architecture. In effect, with the AU, the researcher can infer that there is the establishment of new mechanisms and institutional frameworks for resolving conflicts in Africa.

The objectives of the AU PSC include the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, the anticipation and prevention of conflicts and the promotion of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. According to Aning, AU PSC is established as a standing decision-making organ intended to function as a collective security and early warning

arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.⁸⁵

As a key component of the AU, the PSC is the principal decision-making element of the AU for PKOs. The PSC enable the AU to serve as a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to violent armed conflict in Africa. The Security Council afterwards adopted two Presidential Statements, which recognised the importance of strengthening cooperation with the African Union with the UN in order to help build its capacity to deal with security challenges. This cooperation has been epitomised in Security Council resolution 1625, expressing support for the establishment of a 10-year capacity building programme for the African Union.

The AU's new security regime also shows its commitment to handle efficient conflicts matters of the member states. This new regime is premised on several norms, which are both old (based on the Charter of the OAU) and new (emanating from the Constitutive Act). According to Aning, a combination of these values and norms plus the institutional mechanisms has given the AU an institutional vibrancy that creates opportunities for proactive responses to some of the continent's security challenges.⁸⁶ The Constitutive Act of July 2002 of the AU is also adopted to assist in this direction. This is a core document that defines the principles and objectives of the AU's security policy in conflict resolution. In its preamble, it states that member states are conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent, and [recognise] the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda.⁸⁷

The AU is convinced that in certain conflict situations in Africa, it is not possible to negotiate peace agreements without first establishing a certain degree of stability. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged as the world's only regional organization that explicitly

claims the right to intervene in a member state in response to grave humanitarian and human rights grounds, such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, to solidify its role as continental leader in PKOs, the AU adopted the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) to demonstrate its commitment to develop a common position on matters relating to defence and security in Africa. The CADSP seeks to identify the common security threats in Africa and attempts to approach security holistically, justifying this approach on the concept of human security. Moreover, the CADSP has been established to guide the work of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which mirrors the Security Council of the UN.⁸⁸ The AU, as the leading regional organization for PKOs in Africa, realized that deployments in Burundi and Darfur provided valuable lessons on how to meet the difficulties of the ASF and other AU PKO challenges.

2.7 The African Union's Framework for Conflict Resolution, Peace and Security in African

The AU is indeed committed to the task of managing its internal matters relating to conflicts and wars. However, the AU cannot achieve its mandate of ensuring peace and security in the Africa continent without a defined framework. According to Murithi, as stated in Analytical Report of the Brainstorming Meeting of the Commission of the African Union and Eminent Personalities, 2003;⁸⁹ the conflicts that afflicted the African continent from the end of the Cold War to the first decade of the twenty-first century demanded that urgent changes be made to the way of doing things at the regional level. In pursuant of these objectives of intervening in conflicts in the sub-region in order to restore peace and security, a framework which entails the followings is adopted.

- a) The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit in 1999, in Sirte Libya;

- b) The Signing of Constitutive Act of the African Union in Lome, Togo, on 11th July 2000;
- c) The official inauguration of the African Union in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa;
- d) The Establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council in 2004;
- e) The establishment of an African Standby Force by 2010; and
- f) The Formation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Model.

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit

The devastating situation on the continent as result of many conflicts led to the awakening of the leaders of the countries of Africa to find a way to revive the spirit of Pan-Africanism as a vehicle to resolve urgent problems.⁹⁰ Therefore, the decision for the formation of the African Union (AU) was mooted in the summit of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) convened in 1999, in Sirte Libya.

Draft and Acceptance of a Constitutional Framework

The Constitutive Acts of the African Union and many other legal frameworks were signed, in Lome, Togo, on 11th July 2000.⁹¹ In order to achieve its objective of peace and security, the AU after the transition from the OAU on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, adopted the Constitutive Act to address conflicts on the Continent as follows:

1. Article 4 (h) ‘the right of the African Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;’
2. Article 4 (j) ‘the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.’

Launch of Africa Union

The constitutional framework adopted at the summit paved the way for the official inauguration of the African Union, as the successor to the Organisation of African Unity, in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. In effect the African Union replaced the OAU and took on all its assets and liabilities. The launch of the Union with a more proactive mandate of intervening in a member-state conflict problem was a step in the right direction. The AU is to play a more active role in settling armed conflicts in Africa.⁹² This renewed interest in the role of the AU began with the failure of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in Africa during the 1990s (Rwanda, Somalia, Angola, and Sierra Leone), coupled with the indifference of the international community in participating in 21st century African PKOs. The role of the AU in African PKOs has been extremely complex due to the evolving African strategic security environment.

Establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council

The AU Peace and Security Council was established in 2004 through the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council, of 2002.⁹³ The AU's 15-member Peace and Security Council is mandated to conduct Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding operations. The Peace and Security Council is composed of 15 member countries (ten elected for a term of two years and five for a term of three years). The Chairperson of the African Union is assisted by a Commissioner in charge of Peace and Security to provide operational support to the Peace and Security Council as well as deploy efforts and take the necessary steps to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. When called upon to do so a Military Staff Committee provides the Council with advice with regards to situations on the ground. The Peace and Security Council initiates any peace operations by analysing a potential or existing crisis situation, which if necessary is followed by the deployment of fact-finding missions to

the trouble spots. The Council then makes a decision or recommendation to authorize and legitimize the AU's intervention in internal crisis situations. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act affirms the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State with respect to crisis situations. Specifically, Article 7, item (e), of the Protocol on the Peace and Security Council, states that the Council can recommend to the Assembly (of Heads of State), intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments.

Establishment of an African Standby Force

The AU authorized the establishment of Africa Standby Force (ASF) by 2010 to reinforce its efforts in peace and security in the sub-region (African Union, December 2003). According to Maasdorp, formation of the ASF is another bold step the AU took with regards to peace and security on the continent.⁹⁴ The ASF is mandated to cooperate where appropriate with the United Nations and sub-regional African organizations in conducting peace operations. It is also part of the broader African security architecture, conceptually consisting of standby multidisciplinary contingents, including civilian and military components in their countries of origin, ready to rapidly deploy as a preventative force where needed.

The ASF is composed of five regional standby brigades ready to respond to a range of contingencies, from providing support to political missions, to robust military interventions for humanitarian purposes. The five brigades are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force, the Eastern African Standby Force, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Brigade, the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC), and the North African Standby Brigade Capability (NARC).

All four sub-Saharan African brigades have taken initial steps towards becoming operational, including setting up headquarters, identifying pledged units from member states, and conducting multinational exercises. However, the North African Standby Brigade has made considerably less progress towards achieving full operational capability, and progress may be further delayed by the events of the Arab Spring.⁹⁵

The ASF remains a work in progress. The five brigades are in varying stages of readiness. None of the brigades is currently capable of conducting the range of operations contained within the ASF's mandate without significant external support in the form of financial resources, training, logistical assistance, and equipment. While most of the brigades have identified sites for their mandated logistics depots, they either have made no progress in establishing the depots themselves, or have not fully stocked their depots to address the range of contingencies. Capacity at the level of AU headquarters, specifically the Peace Support Operations Division, to manage and direct the force remains limited due to resource and staffing constraints.⁹⁶

Formation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Model

In order to effectively manage peace and security on the continent, a model has been developed to assist the AU.⁹⁷ The model is called the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and it is a mechanism adopted for peace and security in Africa. However, it does not always mean that the prevailing circumstances would allow for linear actions to be carried on the completion of the previous function. Some of the functions will happen concurrently, while some functions could happen in a linear fashion. The functions of the pillars of the APSA are categorized as follows:

- a) Common African Defence and Security Policy;
- b) Military Staff Committee (MSC);

- c) African Standby Force (AFC);
- d) Continental Early Warning System (CEWS);
- e) Panel of the Wise (PW); and
- f) African Peace Fund (APF).

According to Maasdorp, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Panel of the Wise (PoW) were established by the AU to ensure an effective framework for conflict prevention, mediation and peacemaking on the continent.⁹⁸ In terms of the specific modalities for launching an AU peace operation, the decision comes from the AU Peace and Security Council, which meets regularly at the level of ambassadors based at the organizations' headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Council can also meet at the level of Ministers and Heads of State and Government to expedite vital decisions on the need to intervene in a member state to prevent human rights atrocities or manage a conflict situation.

In addition, the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the AU Commission was also established at the Maputo Summit in July 2003. This new department was charged with the responsibility of managing peace and security on the continent.⁹⁹ Consequently, in view of the changing security milieu, certain policy, institutional and conceptual changes are needed in the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in order for the AU to better respond to armed conflicts on the continent.¹⁰⁰ These are the AU mechanisms for peace and security.¹⁰¹ The researcher therefore applauds the AU and other stakeholders in these endeavours to ensure peace and security in Africa. However, these frameworks should not remain only a blue print but should be translated into actions to ensure their effective implementations.

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CHAPTER THREE

FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

3.1 Introduction

The conflict in Sudan, as in other parts of Africa, has attracted attention of both the national and international communities. The effects of the crisis are all over the place, first to the immediate neighbours such as Egypt, Chad, Ethiopia and Libya who have opened their doors to refugees from the country (Sudan) and also share their scarce resources with them. The international community is also affected since it has to provide aid in cash and kind to those within the country as well as those who have fled to other countries. The involvement of the Sudanese Government, the AU, the UN and other foreign groups has therefore become necessary to reverse the situation. This chapter evaluates the nature of the Sudan conflict crisis and the AU's efforts so far to foster peace and security. The highlights of the chapter are:

- a) Overview of the Conflict in Sudan;
- b) African Union intervention in the Conflict in Sudan;
- c) Successes of the African Union Mission in Sudan; and
- d) Challenges of the African Union Mission in Sudan.

3.2 Overview of the Conflict in Sudan

The persistent and devastating nature of the Sudanese's conflict has made it a major concern to the country's Government, the Africa Union (AU), the United Nations (UN) and other benevolent organisations. Following bellow is an overview of the Sudan's conflict.

3.2.1 Background of Conflict in Sudan

The people of Sudan and South Sudan have a long history of civil war.¹ This assertion is in line with Keith who also argues that, the violence in Darfur is part of a complex history.² Sudan has long been beset by conflict. Two rounds of north-south civil war cost the lives of 1.5 million people, and a continuing conflict in the western region of Darfur has driven two million people from their homes and killed more than 200,000. According to van der Zwan, conflicts involving the use of arms have been present there in one form or another for the last six decades.³ The conflict continues to have devastating effects on local populations, institutions and society. The Arab-dominated central government in Khartoum fought a long civil war against rebels in Sudan's predominantly black South between 1983 and 2005.⁴ The Map in figure 2 below depicts the geography of Sudan, South Sudan and Darfur region.

Figure 2 – Geographical Map of Sudan



Source: Adapted from <http://unamid.unmissions.org/>

According to the background provided by UNMIS, the Sudan has had civil conflicts for most of the years since its independence in 1956.⁵ In another development, Berg, also said the country has experienced continuous conflict since its independence from English colonial rule in 1955.⁶ The implication therefore is that the current conflicts in Sudan have their roots from pre-independence era.

The Sudan's conflict can best be understood if the past, present and future conflict context of Sudan and South Sudan is examined. The country has been in a state of war and violent conflict for decades.⁷ He further argues that the Sudanese civil war was one of the longest running conflicts in Africa. It started in 1954, two years before Sudan gained independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956, as the South's disgruntlement with the Northern-dominated government grew and eventually developed into a full-blown campaign of guerrilla warfare across much of southern Sudan. These issues were not adequately addressed in the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement. According to van der Zwan, the Sudan's conflict in the past was fuelled by the chronic underdevelopment of marginalised areas of Sudan, coupled with often violent competition for access to political and economic power.⁸ By 1983 the fragile peace had been undermined by the continued skewed distribution of power and resources between the North and the South, and tactics of marginalisation. Southern rebel groups were consolidated into what became the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by Dr John Garang de Mabior.

The present conflict in Sudan emerged in early 2003 when non-Arab rebels from Darfur, frustrated with attacks on their land and convinced that their interests were not being represented in the ongoing peace talks between Khartoum and the southern rebels, launched a guerrilla war on government forces.⁹ The Sudanese Government responded by launching a brutal counterinsurgency completely disproportionate to the targeted guerrilla warfare of the two Darfur insurgent groups.¹⁰ Khartoum again supplemented its own forces with proxy

Janjaweed militias, who have committed numerous crimes against humanity and war crimes in an effort to kill and displace the ethnic groups tied to the rebel forces.¹¹

3.2.2 Nature of the Conflict in Sudan

Sudan and South Sudan have some of the most complex conflict in the world, and any actor's ability to carry out conflict analysis, early warning and conflict prevention is constrained by the intricacies and convolutions of the political, security and socio-economic setting. According to Kapila, the crisis in Darfur has been described by the UN as "the worst humanitarian and human rights catastrophe in the world."¹² The current conflict is anchored in long-standing struggles over resources (primarily land and water) between farming and nomadic communities.¹³

The majority of violent conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan take place in remote rural areas, where communities are often the poorest and most difficult to reach. Information about tensions and conflicts in these areas does not necessarily reach the outside world easily. On top of this, the governments in both Khartoum and Juba have been involved in the promotion of violent conflict at different levels, which further complicates a coherent response to conflict prevention and, of course, poses significant dilemmas to international actors such as the AU.

The main atrocities in the country's conflicts have been described as genocide on large scale.¹⁴ This agrees with Powell when he said that genocide has been committed in Darfur and may still be occurring. According to de Waal, the level of violence has ebbed and surged again in the following years, but lawlessness continues to prevail as of early 2007, creating an especially dangerous environment for displaced civilians and the aid workers that provide their humanitarian lifeline.¹⁵ According to Powell, the U.S. government, though

reluctant to commit itself to action, declared in 2004 that the violence in Sudan has been carried out with such coordination, intensity, and focus on particular ethnic groups.¹⁶

The available literature reveal that violent conflict erupted in Darfur in February 2003 when the well-armed Sudan Liberation Movement, the Sudanese Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement took advantage of turmoil within the al-Basher regime and launched attacks on government military bases.¹⁷ According to Keith (2012), there have been cases of human rights violations and the atrocities carried out since beginning in 2003 by government-supported militias against non-Arab ethnic groups in the Darfur region of Sudan. The security situation there has deteriorated dramatically since the end of 2005, a development interpreted by the media as well as those involved in the political debate as a direct spill-over of the Darfur conflict.¹⁸

The local populations of Sudan continue to be affected by insecurity and violent conflict; they have seen food and commodity prices increase dramatically in recent years, and are governed in ways that are insufficiently responsive, transparent and accountable.¹⁹ According to Konare, the Darfur situation was a tribal conflict, an internal matter in which no international organisation could legitimately intervene.²⁰ By repeating and exaggerating the ethnic component of the war, or its 'African' character, outside advocates played into the hands of the Government of Sudan.²¹ This war was indicative of questions of power and development, and posed a threat to the inner circle of the regime.²² Nevertheless, the AU Peace and Security Council in July 4, 2004 said the situation could not be defined as genocide even though the crisis in Darfur was grave. There was hardly any acknowledgement of the civil war in Darfur that had been well under way since 2002.

3.2.3 Causes of Conflict in Sudan

The roots of the country's conflict included inequality and exclusion.²³ In another development, Berg said the causes for the conflict are deeply rooted historically and relate to the marginalization of the Darfur population, to the gradual emergence of militia groups in the area, and to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.²⁴ Additional contributing factors include issues related to drought and famine, the government's policy of 'Arabization', and the effects of the north-south conflict. Apart from the mentioned roots causes, van der Zwan outlined few other issues as contributing to the conflict situation.²⁵ These include local conflicts, over grazing rights, access to water and control over humanitarian aid, as well as ethnic and religious manipulation and mobilisation, have also been fuelling instability and tensions. Towards the end of the second civil war, violent struggles also intensified for control over and access to the different oilfields, which are mainly located along the North-South border.

According to the New York Times, the border area between Sudan and South Sudan is a complex assortment of different ethnic groups and political loyalties, and it is also home to the bulk of the country's oil wealth and swathes of fertile land, leading some commentators to conclude that the question of who owns and has access to it, is one of 'the most explosive issues the nation confronts as it prepares to split in two. It is evident that the escalation of violence around the North-South border in the run-up to South Sudan's independence has sparked fears of a new drawn-out war.'²⁶ In short, the civil war and localised conflicts were predominantly a violent struggle for access to and control over resources, political and economic power.

The Darfur crisis raging in Western Sudan, with its millions of refugees, hundreds of thousands of people killed and unabated violence against the civilian population, has been at the centre of global public attention since the conflict escalated in autumn 2003.²⁷ Movements of refugees and cross border attacks have also drawn attention to neighbouring

regions in eastern Chad and the northern Central African Republic. The concern in the Sudan situation has mainly been with the adverse effect of the prolonged conflict in the country.

3.2.4 Effects of Conflicts in Sudan

The adverse effects are being experienced by the entire Sudan, both the Southern and Northern parts. Kobbie argues that the instability in Darfur has assumed regional and international dimensions, evolving into a large-scale humanitarian crisis in Sudan and bordering countries, claiming over 200,000 lives, displacing over 2 million people, and poses security threats to neighbouring countries.²⁸ According to van der Zwan the second phase in the country civil war continued until the conclusion of the DPA in January 2005 with about 1.5 and 2 million people killed in this period.²⁹ The Northern part also has to deal with the loss of a significant and resource-rich part of its territory, and at the same time faces increasingly complex internal and external pressures. It is an absolute fact that more than two million Darfurians have been internally displaced or driven into neighbouring Chad, and many thousands have been raped.³⁰ Estimates of the number of Darfurians to die as a result of the campaign vary widely: one U.S. government study concluded that an estimate of 170,000 dead by mid-2005 was the most credible, though other estimates have placed casualty figures as high as 400,000.³¹

It has created crises that still need to be resolved between Sudan and South Sudan in connection with the oil sharing, border demarcation, national currencies and sharing of the debt burden.³² The main towns facing these problems as a result of conflicts are Abyei and South Kordofan. In addition, South Sudan is faced with one of the greatest tests of state building and rehabilitation since the end of the Cold War.

3.2.5 Conflict Resolution in Sudan

It is important at this point of the analysis to examine the efforts by local authorities in resolving the long lasting conflicts, thus ensuring peace and stability in Sudan. According to van der Zwan, Sudan's national government has been deeply concerned about the threat of the conflicts to its own survival and therefore has mobilized and acted in concert with militias to crush the rebellion and exterminate its civilian base of support.³³ There has been no success so far in this development since the threat of the rebellion and other perceived dangers continue to drive Sudan's central government to block all effective efforts by outside actors to stop its deadly campaign. Khartoum's performance with regard to the Darfur Peace Agreement, which it signed with one faction of a major Darfur rebel movement on May 5, 2006, similarly reflects the regime's unyielding commitment to protecting its position. Khartoum committed to disarm the Janjaweed but has done little to stop them from continuing to operate in Darfur well after the agreement was signed.³⁴

Khartoum has also refused to concede significant power-sharing measures as it did in the Naivasha accord, which gave the regime a narrow majority of executive and legislative positions.³⁵ It refused to sign any agreement that called for replacing the African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur with a more effective UN force, and Sudan's President Omar al-Basher has taken such an extreme rhetorical position against a stronger UN force that "backing down would have domestic political repercussions."³⁶ Finally, the ICC's prosecutor has issued an indictment for a senior Sudanese official implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity, giving the regime still another pretext not to allow into the country UN forces that it fears would seek to arrest its top personnel.³⁷

The Sudanese government launched a counterinsurgency campaign of 'ethnic cleansing' against its opponents in response to the February 2003 attacks.³⁸ To reinforce its attack, the government mobilized the Janjaweed, then armed and trained them for the ethnic cleansing mission. The on-going conflicts and tensions between the North and the South,

with a specific focus on the situation in Abyei and the intra-South conflicts escalated in the period after the successful referendum in January 2011. The above account of efforts by local authorities in resolving the long lasting conflicts, thus ensuring peace and stability in Sudan has rather did very little to deescalate the situation.

3.3 African Union intervention in the Conflict in Sudan

The AU's commitment to ensuring peace and security on the continent has been demonstrated in its various missions to Sudan and Somalia. In the case of Sudan, the Union has done what it could in resolving the long conflicts in region such as Darfur. According to Boshoff, the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 8 April 2005 by the Government of Sudan (GoS), Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) paved the way for the AU to approve the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) on 28 May 2005.³⁹


The African Union's intervention in Sudan's conflict situation is also joint effort with the UN. It is called the United Nations Africa Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). This AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur was established on 31 July 2007 with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1769.

The intervention was Africa's attempted to find lasting peace and security to the civil war which erupted in Darfur in 2003 between the Government of Sudan and its allied militia, and other armed rebel groups. The AU's long peace and security process also included the Darfur Peace Agreement signed on 5 May 2006 with the support of the UN and other partners. Based on the terms of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and the Darfur Peace Agreement, the AMIS deployed military personnel and police officers to the Darfur and its surroundings areas. The military personnel were selected from Burkina Faso, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria,

Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The Mission and mandated tasks of AMIS was to deploy with a mandate to monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004 and assist in the process of confidence building. It was also mandated to contribute to securing the environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.⁴⁰ The Mission Structure of AMIS is as shown in figure 3 below:

Figure 3 – AMIS Mission Structure



Source: African Security Review Vol 14 No 3, 2005.

According to Henry Boshoff, The military component of AMIS consists of the following:

- a) Force HQ;
- b) One airmobile special forces company, which will constitute the military component reserve;
- c) One explosive ordinance device (EOD)/de-mining platoon;

- d) One light field engineer platoon;
- e) One military police platoon;
- f) Military interpreter pool;
- g) Eight sector HQs;
- h) Four MilOb teams for each sector;
- i) One enhanced infantry company in each sector; and
- j) One helicopter squadron in three selected sectors with six to nine (El Fasher) medium transport helicopters (these will eventually be civilian assets).⁴¹

In addition to the above, Henry Boshoff explained that the military component established eight sector sites that the Military Observers (MilOb) teams operate from (within the boundaries of their Teams' Areas of Responsibilities - TAORs). The TAORs were based on current regional and administrative boundaries and were consistent with those proposed or the civilian police component. Each MilOb team consisted of ten MilObs, with representation of the parties, and an infantry protection platoon. Sector HQs will have a support group (level I medical facility, maintenance package and fuel operators).⁴²

The military and the civilian police HQs of AMIS were located in El Fasher, which was also the HQ for sector 1 (see figure 4 below). There were seven other sectors located as follows: Nyala (sector 2), El Geneina (sector 3), Kabkabiyah (sector 4), Tine (sector 5), Kutum (sector 6), Zalinguei (sector 7) and El Daien (sector 8).⁴³

Figure 4 – AMIS Deployment concept and logistics

Source: African Security Review Vol 14 No 3, 2005.

The Peacekeeping forces conduct an average of more than 200 patrols a day, attempting to increase its robustness, often in the face of bureaucratic or armed obstruction. The main objective was to do everything in its power to protect civilians in Darfur, facilitate the humanitarian aid operation to all areas, regardless of who controls them, and to help provide an environment in which peace can take root.

The role of the AU in fostering peace and stability in Sudan can be considered solely as legal and social responsibility. Bergholm reported Sudan foreign minister, Dr Mustafa Osman, asking the AU to take the lead over the Darfur issue.⁴⁴ This appeal was made in a briefing with the AU Peace and Security Council in July 2004. According to Bergholm, this ensured that Sudan was protected from negative foreign interference.⁴⁵ It was after the GoS

has resorted to a manoeuvre commonly used by a regime preoccupied with its own survival. The pressure to do something mounted as reports of the violence proliferated and the word ‘genocide’ began to be used. More and more sources showed that the ‘Janjaweed’, proxy militias of Arab identity, were operating with the full support of the regular Sudanese Army (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Turning to the AU can be seen as an illustration of the on-going ‘decentralisation’ of international peace and security management.

The initial purpose of the operation was monitoring, not peacekeeping, reminiscent of the ineffectiveness of OAU deployments.⁴⁶ According to Kobbie, evaluation of AMIS is done by identifying the strengths and weaknesses of AU PKOs.⁴⁷ These factors have indeed assisted in assessing the capability of the AU to conduct successful PKOs. The structure, effectiveness and efficiency of both operations are also critical in assessing the readiness of the AU.

The AU leaders did not seek the consensus of all the conflicting parties to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of the respective countries’ armed conflicts, nor was a formal cease fire agreement in place prior to the interventions. However the operations required the consent of the ruling government to enter the country, and AU peacekeepers operated under a limited mandate. In Sudan, AU peacekeeping troops did not have the authority or manpower to disarm the Janjaweed and other paramilitary forces, since the mandate stipulated only the PKO authority to monitor the peace agreement, but not to enforce the peace.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the AU Commission chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konaré, held several consultations with the GoS, expressing concern over the humanitarian situation in Darfur.⁴⁹

The AU’s Constitutive Act articulates a strong commitment to human rights. The charter also gives the AU the authority to back up that commitment with action, explicitly providing for “[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State...in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (Article 4h).

Given the record of their predecessors, African leaders seemed to have “slaughtered a holy cow” by taking even a declaratory step in this direction.⁵⁰ The world therefore waited with high hopes and expectations from the AU.

The Darfur crisis has put these expectations to the test, and the results have been mixed. As the violence in Darfur continued into 2004, the African Union sent a small mission to Darfur with UN Security Council endorsement to monitor a cease-fire agreement between the rebels and Khartoum.

There have been significant contributions of the African Union and the UN Security Council to the effort to halt the violations in Darfur.⁵¹ Proactive leadership at the pan-African level in 2003-2004 provided momentum for the AU to engage both politically and militarily in Darfur, through the mediation of ceasefires, negotiation, and its peacekeeping operation, AMIS.⁵²

The intervention started in June 2004 when 80 AU military observers and a small protection force of 300 Nigerian and Rwandan troops arrived in Darfur to ensure peace and stability. They faced a general situation of continued ceasefire violations by all parties to the conflict, as well as ongoing abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law such as the government’s aerial bombardment of villages. The AU in October 20, 2004 authorised the transformation of AMIS into a peacekeeping mission of 3,320 personnel, which included force protectors and unarmed civilian police. However, the mission eventually evolved into the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which remains the only external peacekeeping force providing security in Darfur until it was replaced in 2007 by the unprecedented joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), currently considered as the largest peacekeeping mission in the world. UNAMID’s mandate has been extended since then on several occasions.

Intensive diplomatic and political efforts to bring the non-signatories into the peace process have continued since then, with the All Darfur Stakeholders' Conference of 27-31 May 2011 in Doha intended as another milestone. Once an agreement has been reached between the major parties to the conflict, the United Nations and African Union intend to bring the peace process back to Darfur for dialogue and implementation on the ground.

3.4 Successes of the African Union Mission in Sudan

The AU's success in conflict resolution using African Armed Forces has been very eventful. The normative shift from 'non-interference' to 'non-indifference' in itself is a basic success story in the history of conflict resolution in Africa. In Darfur, the AU was already involved, since late 2003, in the Chad-led mediation process between the GoS and the (then) two main rebel groups: the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).⁵³ Bergholm perceived the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) in N'Djamena, on 8 April 2004 as the AU's success in the sense that the agreement detailed the provisions for the deployment of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS).⁵⁴ According to him, it was in this agreement that the GoS, the SLM/A and the JEM consented to an AU military presence in Darfur (AU, 2004). The key drive behind the AU's involvement in Darfur is to be found in the politics of the evolving African security architecture and the normative shift from non-interference to 'non-indifference'.⁵⁵

According to Kobbie, the success of the AU's involvement in Sudan can be measured by the fulfilment of the mandate of the PKO as set by the AU and the resolution of the underlying disputes precipitating the conflict.⁵⁶ Aning explored the deepening efficacy of the AU, especially in matters relating to peace and security and its institutional efficacy in eliciting member states' compliance with respect to their responsibility to protect, and therefore focuses especially on its peace and security architecture and its broader relationship

with the international mechanisms for attaining peace and stability.⁵⁷ The involvement of the AU in Sudan (AMIS I and II, and later separately AMID - African Mission in Darfur) represents one of the most critical tests of the role of AU in African PKOs.⁵⁸ According to Kobbie, the AU presence prevented violence against women, reduced the recruitment of children into armed forces, assisted with displaced persons and protected humanitarian corridors and convoys.⁵⁹

In 2006, a peace agreement was signed that provided for the disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed militia by the Sudanese government of national unity, the integration of former combatants into the Sudanese armed forces, upholding the right of the people of Darfur to elect their leaders and determine their regional status, and the establishment of protective buffer zones around camps for the internally displaced. Though underfunded and understaffed, AMIS has received some praise for improving a grim security situation and received credit in UN Security Council Resolution 1706 for “reducing large-scale organized violence.”⁶⁰ But AMIS’s efforts have fallen far short of ending the human rights violations in Darfur and its contributions have been generally recognized as inadequate. The force has been unable to play the protective function that the Darfur Peace Agreement assigns it largely because it is too small, often operating below an authorized capacity that, even if fulfilled, would still be inadequate to secure enough of Darfur’s vast territory.⁶¹ Finally, it can be inferred that the AU presence so far provided opportunities for supporting positive changes for peace, development and accountable governance at this crucial time are also significant.⁶²

3.5 Challenges of the African Union Mission in Sudan

According to a report by the UN Secretary- General dated 3 May 2005, AMIS is effective where it is deployed and needs strengthening so that it can expand its presence

to cover more of the vast and difficult terrain of Darfur. This was coincident with the findings of an AU assessment mission that visited Darfur in March 2005, which noted that AMIS is extremely hard pressed to implement its mandate effectively and that the mission remains well short of being fully operational. Its weakness can be pinned down to three categories: command and control, logistical support and operational practice.⁶³

The above statement succinctly summarises the challenges of AMIS. The AU's efforts in the Sudan's conflict, even though has achieved some successes, but has also recorded some short comings due to certain constraints. According to Kobbie, an assessment of AU peace keeping operations (PKOs) in Sudan affirms that the Union is subject to constraints on the political, institutional, and conceptual levels that detract from the effectiveness and readiness of the AU.⁶⁴ However, as the leading continental organization, it has a moral and institutional responsibility to contribute prominently to African peacekeeping requirements.

The African Union has been admirably engaged in the Darfur crisis but has ultimately proven ineffectual, hindered by poor resources and weak political will.⁶⁵ However, President al-Bashir has insisted, contrary to any reasonable interpretation of the facts, that the AU mission has been a successful "African solution to an African problem."⁶⁶

It is also argued that, the AU PKO in Sudan achieved only limited results because the AU force was not large enough and the mandate was too weak. According to Kobbie, the 7,400 AU troops in Darfur were authorized only to monitor the situation and to report ceasefire violations: they were not authorized to protect civilians from attacks by the Janjaweed.⁶⁷

The mission was further weakened by the lack of resources.⁶⁸ The AMIS lacked a well-defined mission, lacked a clear mandate, and a plan for reaching peace. It also lacked funding and manpower throughout the mission. Finally, there was no commitment to

complete the mission.⁶⁹ In short, AMIS was not able to contain this crisis due to its limited mandate, manpower and equipment. The crisis in Darfur has expanded and now affects the entire region's stability, fuelling conflicts in Sudan and Chad that have become mutually reinforcing. According to Pham (2009) UNAMID remains ineffective because it is understaffed, underequipped, and overextended.

The African Union suffers from a chronic dearth of resources and political will to effectively persuade or prevent the Sudanese government from continuing its campaign, while the UN Security Council too faces problems of will, aggravated by the Sudanese government's defiance and China's deep reluctance to act (Keith, 2012). According to Pham, the 25,987 personnel of UNAMID, including 19,555 military personnel, 3,772 civilian police, and 2,660 formed security units, is inadequate to meet the peacekeeping requirements of Darfur.⁷⁰ The planned force has not yet been fully raised. The Sudanese regime is insisting that AU Commission Chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konaré, fulfil his promise that the entire force for Darfur would be entirely African, a binding commitment that only African peacekeepers would be allowed in Sudan. The Sudanese government has refused to accept units from Thailand, Nepal, and the Nordic countries.⁷¹

The Union's failure to halt the human rights violations in Darfur has confirmed that its shortage of resources and political will are a real hindrance to its effectiveness in protecting human rights. It is true that the specific circumstances of the Darfur case, especially the governments active support for the violations being committed; magnify these shortcomings in ways that may not apply in other peacekeeping situations. Kobbie outlined some specific challenges the AU faced in the Sudan conflict resolution process. The challenges are the inability to make the rebel movements to comply with the ceasefire agreement and sign the peace accord; lack of an adequate warning system for imminent

attacks; lack of comprehensive and timely intelligence; difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and allies.

The AU's dependency on external resources also prevented any long-term planning on the part of AMIS and impacted on what civilian protection the force was able to provide. The dependency of the AU's actions on outside assistance and expertise is also due to the reluctance of AU member states to contribute. Close to 75 per cent of the entire AU budget is paid by only five countries, namely South Africa, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and Algeria. Furthermore, the contribution of the AU PKO in the resolution of the underlying disputes generating the conflict and the maintenance of peace and security has been very limited. These political, institutional, and conceptual constraints and challenges have a profound impact on the role and readiness of AU PKOs.⁷²

There are also lack of sufficient and essential equipment, such as armoured personnel carriers and helicopters, to carry out even the most elementary of peacekeeping tasks. The mobility of AMIS was highly reliant on the vehicles, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft provided by donors. However, AMIS lacked attack helicopters, military pilots, adequate intelligence, proper communications technology, and professional medical services.

Another significant factor that contributes to the ineffectiveness of the AU PKOs is political in nature, particularly due to the indifference and polarization of the international community over the resolution of the Darfur crisis, coupled with the obstructive behaviour of the Sudanese government. The AU lacked the finances, human resources, logistical procurement capability and military capability necessary to sustain a peace process or a military presence in a crisis as complex as that of Darfur is a serious blot on the organisations future viability. The non-existence of strategic policy statements on the role of AU also contributed to its challenge and some level of its failure.

Politically the AU is, in some cases, captive to the internal politics or interests of member states, foreign powers, and host governments. These circumstances prevent it from acting effectively with governments such as Sudan, out of fear of reaction from key African member states or foreign powers. This uncertainty effectively undermines AU PKO credibility and recalls OAU's weakness.⁷³ This lack of member states' political will is a major impediment to the effective deployment of PKOs. Furthermore, both African and non-African leaders are not willing to risk the loss of soldiers in poorly understood countries where there may be no perceived strategic national interests at stake. As a result, African peacekeeping requirements are being addressed in an ad hoc manner, with states acting independently, reflecting the same inabilities and weaknesses that characterized the OAU.⁷⁴

Another political challenge faced by AU PKOs, specifically in Sudan, is the difficulty of reconciling the apparent contradictions between state sovereignty and the need for intervention in intra-state conflict. Although AMIS represented a bold step by the AU to intervene in Sudan and Darfur, the PKOs in Sudan have demonstrated that the AU did not yet overcome the political weakness inherent in the OAU because of its fixation on the principle of sovereignty and resulting indifference to the grave humanitarian and human rights situation in the country. African governmental leaders, even if their legitimacy has been questioned, continue to be protected by the AU. The Sudanese situation proves that the organization has not provided the kind of leadership and political will envisioned when it was transformed from the OAU to the AU.

The AU PKOs are still constrained by the principles of sovereignty, consent and territorial integrity in that restricted mandates are negotiated that limit the authority and operational effectiveness of peacekeepers. So, although the AU proclaims that the organization is currently acknowledged as the world's only regional organization that explicitly recognizes the right to intervene in a member state in response to grave

humanitarian and human rights issues, its interventionist and activist stance towards peacekeeping remains paralyzed by host country demands for restrictive mandates. This is especially the case of Sudan.

Institutionally the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) lacks the capacity to plan and guide the conduct of ASF deployments at the strategic level because strategic goals are not being properly articulated. The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), for example, exposed gaps in the planning and guidance at the strategic level. It also experienced challenges in integrating the various components of the mission, such as the military, police, political, and humanitarian activities on the operational level. Furthermore, minimal strategic direction or guidance is provided, critical vacancies at the strategic level are not filled early enough during PKOs, the senior strategic leaders are insufficiently trained and the roles of international partners are unclear. Further, there is insufficient linkage between the PKO Division and other departments of the AU Commission or the Peace and Security Council (PSC).⁷⁵ These AU problems were painfully exposed in the Sudan PKOs.⁷⁶

The institutional shortcomings of the AU on the strategic level will indubitably produce ineffectiveness on the operational level, especially in the areas of operational direction and combat readiness. Successful AU PKOs are impossible without proper planning and properly articulated strategic goals, even if it is the best possible operational AU peacekeeping force. This is further aggravated by delays in member states' mobilization. Member states do not share the same decision-making processes, timelines and interests in PKOs within their respective governments.⁷⁷ This constraint impacts the readiness of the ASF, since its rapid reaction capability or ability to conduct robust peace enforcement operations and multidimensional AU PKOs depends on appropriate strategic guidance.

Another institutional deficiency is the reality that AU PKOs are challenged by financial, logistical, and personnel constraints. There are not enough well-equipped and

trained troops to deploy rapidly as a credible, robust PKO force. Moreover, the AU lacks the means to project power sufficiently and rapidly, due to insufficient airlift and rapid air response capability; forcing it to rely on external partners for this vital support.⁷⁸

Another pertinent issue is the division of the Sudan into two independent countries. Commenting on this Keith said the division into two nation states through the recent creation of the Republic of South Sudan on 9th July 2011 as a measure to ensure peace was confronted with challenges of peace; security and development in the two countries remain enormous.⁷⁹ The impact of these political, institutional, and conceptual deficiencies on the AMIS demonstrate that the AU is not yet ready to conduct intervention operations and multidimensional PKOs on its own. The AU's lack of financial and logistics capacity exposes its needs to continue to collaborate with other peacekeeping organizations, such as the UN or EU, to be successful in complex PKOs. This dependency means slower deployment times because of the need for increased political coordination. No wonder that the AU's plan to have the ASF ready by 2010 to handle multi-dimensional PKOs in Africa failed due to strategic and operational shortcomings.

3.6 Summary

The facts raised in the discussions and evaluations above, have indeed revealed that the conflicts in Sudan have existed for several decades now and it may possibly go into the near future if appropriate measures are not taken to address the situation. Many factors have contributed to existence of the conflicts in the Sudan. The efforts made so far by both national and international bodies by the deployment of AMID and UNAMID have helped to control the intensity of the conflicts in the country. It has also been a test case for the AU's much desired Security Architecture and the emerging AU/UN Hybrid Peacekeeping

cooperation. However, much still remains to be done to possibly end the conflicts; ensure peace and security in Sudan.

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- ⁷⁷ Sharamo, R., op. cit.
- ⁷⁸ (United Nations Security Council, 2008).
- ⁷⁹ Keith, A., op. cit.

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This is the final chapter of the research into the involvement of African Armed Forces in resolving African conflicts. The study was conducted by exploring the performance of African Armed Forces conflicts in fostering peace and stability on the African continent using the conflict in Sudan as case study. The outcome of the analysis and discussion are summarised in this chapter. The chapter further records the conclusions made on these findings and research objectives. It ends with some recommendations towards improving the performance peace African Armed Forces in conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

4.1 Summary

The current conflict in Sudan can be traced to the country's historical background which is related to the marginalization of the Darfur population, the gradual emergence of militia groups in the area and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The border area between Sudan and South Sudan which is the home of the country's bulk oil wealth and swathes of fertile land has recently been identified as a major fuelling factor to the existing conflicts in the country. This area also hosts a complex assortment of different ethnic groups and political loyalties. It came out that violent struggles among these groups have been mainly caused by the unfulfilled expectations of the people resulting from the anticipated wealth from the oilfields. Furthermore, over grazing rights, access to water, control over humanitarian aid and ethnic/religious manipulations are other causes to the conflicts.

The conflict in Sudan has been characterised by insecurity, violence and human brutality and even some described it as genocide. The adverse effects of the conflict in the country's history have also been highlighted. It has destabilized the country's economy because of the negative effects of the conflict on the day-to-day-life and activities of the ordinary people and the development of the region as whole. It has led to a large-scale humanitarian crisis in Sudan and bordering countries, claiming over 200,000 lives, displacing over 2 million people, and poses security threats to neighbouring countries. Further, more than two million citizens from Sudan and Darfur are now refugees in Chad and other neighbouring countries.

The Africa Union intervention to ensure peace and security in the conflict in Sudan started with the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on 8 April 2005 by the Government of Sudan, Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement. The Union since then has deployed several military observers, military personnel and police as peacekeeping force with a mandate to disarm the Janjaweed, to rebuild Darfur, and the integration of various armed groups into the national army. The AU's intervention in Sudan mainly aims at monitoring the ceasefire and assisting in the process of confidence-building. It also aims to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief; and contributing to the improvement of the security situation.

It has been established that the AU intervention in Sudan using African Armed Forces has prevented violence against women, reduced the recruitment of children into armed forces, assisted with displaced persons and protected humanitarian corridors and convoys. The presence of the AU has also provided opportunities for supporting positive changes for peace, development and accountable governance on the part of Sudanese Government. However, the Union's efforts to halt completely the conflict in Sudan have not been very successful because of political, institutional, Logistical and conceptual constraints. The lack of logistics

such as attack helicopters, military pilots, vehicles, adequate intelligence, proper communications technology and professional medical services has contributed to the AU's failure in the mission Sudan.

4.2 Conclusions

In conclusion, many violent armed conflicts in Africa trace their roots to the colonial rule, whose legacy of arbitrary colonial borders has precipitated intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Generally, the conflicts have been prosecuted by insurgents, terrorists, various belligerents and warlords, illegal arms merchants, criminal drug cartels and transnational criminals. However, different countries in Africa have also got specific factors have caused conflicts, wars and violent struggles in those countries.

The factors identified contributing to the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi are the ethnicity, discrimination and national rivalries. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons were the causes of wars in Sierra Leone. The illegal exploitation and competition for natural resources led to violent struggles in Liberia while fundamentalism, religious cleavages, crises of identity within a society and exclusionary ideological are the factors behind armed conflicts in Nigeria and Somalia. In the case of Kenya and Zimbabwe, it was a struggle for access to political power.

The AU has recorded some success in conflict resolution using African Armed Forces. The normative shift from 'non-interference' to 'non-indifference' in itself is a basic success story in the history of conflict resolution in Africa. Thus, the key driver behind the AU's involvement in Burundi, Somalia and Darfur is to be found in the politics of the evolving new African Security Architecture and the normative shift from non-interference to

‘non-indifference. In this endeavour, the AU has achieved mixed results of successes and challenges.

Indeed, the involvement of the AU in Sudan (AMIS I and II, AMID and UNAMID) represents one of the most critical tests of the role of AU in African conflict resolution and PKOs. The AU presence prevented violence against women, reduced the recruitment of children into armed forces, assisted with displaced persons and protected humanitarian corridors and convoys. The overall results are the successful and effective containment of the situation in the region.

However, the AU has also recorded some short comings due to certain constraints on the political, institutional and conceptual levels that detract from her effectiveness and readiness in ensuring peace and security on the African continent.

The AU mission in Sudan was weakened by the lack of resources, ill-defined mission and mandate, and lack of clear plan for achieving peace. The AU’s lacked the finances, human resources, logistical procurement capability and military capability necessary to sustain a peace process or a military presence in a crisis as complex as that of Darfur is a serious blot on the organisations future viability. The non-existence of strategic policy statements on the role of AU also contributed to its challenge and its failure.

In terms of basic equipment, the AU lacked sufficient and essential equipment such as armoured personnel carriers (APC) and helicopters to carry out even the most elementary of peacekeeping tasks. They also lacked attack helicopters, military pilots, adequate intelligence, proper communication equipment and professional medical services which adversely affects the smooth operations of the troops.

The AU PKOs are still constrained by the principles of sovereignty, consent and territorial integrity and the result is that restricted mandates are negotiated that limit the authority and operational effectiveness of peacekeepers.

There is also some institutional shortcomings of the AU on the strategic level for instance, the AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) lacks the capacity to plan and guide the conduct of ASF deployments at the strategic level because strategic goals are not being properly articulated. The PSOD has also experienced challenges in integrating the various components of the mission, such as the military, police, and civilian component, political and humanitarian activities on the operational level. Further, there is insufficient linkage between the PKO Division and other departments of the AU Commission or the Peace and Security Council (PSC); the result is poor strategic direction or guidance down to the operational levels and therefore poor policy implementation.

4.3 Recommendations

The findings of this study on the involvement of African Armed Forces in resolving African conflicts (using AMIS as a Case Study) demands that certain recommendations towards the improvement of the AU's efforts in resolving conflicts in Africa using African Armed Forces be made. This, it is hoped will go a long way to ensure peace and security in Africa in general and Sudan in particular.

If there is one important lesson to learn from the negotiations that ended Africa's longest civil war, it is the need for continuous, coordinated and effective linkages at the strategic and operational levels of the AU as an institution. It is recommended that the AU must ensure strong linkages and coordination at the Secretariat to improve its capacity to plan and guide the conduct of ASF deployments at the strategic and operational levels.

Effective policy formulated and implemented will help the AU's interventions in resolving conflicts on the continent. It is a fact that fashioning appropriate policy responses to hydra headed African security situation will not be a simple process. Accordingly, policymakers and analysts alike should work to ensure peace operations are given clear

operational directives, clear mandates, and sufficient resources to carry out its mandate. For instance, it is prudent to introduce mechanisms and innovations that will give the mandate some degree of robustness. A more effective option would be to provide AMIS with a well-equipped and well-resourced Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to serve under direct Operational Command (OPCOM) of the Force Commander (FC), which would give him the much-needed operational muscle to respond appropriately and in timely fashion to contingencies.

The AU should ensure that it upholds the provision of the Constitutive Act which affirms the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State with respect to crisis situations or grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments and eschew the principles of sovereignty, consent and territorial integrity which restricts mandates and limit the authority and operational effectiveness of peacekeepers.

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Appendix A - List of the UN Missions in Africa

Serial	Official Abbreviation	Mission Name	Start	End	Location	Remarks
1	ONUC	United Nations Operation In The Congo	July 1960	June 1964	Congo	
2	UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	December 1988	May 1991	Angola	
3	UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group	April 1989	March 1990	Namibia	
4	MINURSO	United Nations Mission For The Referendum In Western Sahara	April 1991	ongoing	Western Sahara	ongoing
5	UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	May 1991	February 1995	Angola	
6	UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation In Somalia I	April 1992	March 1993	Somalia	
7	ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation In Mozambique	December 1992	December 1994	Mozambique	
8	UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation In Somalia II	March 1993	March 1995	Somalia	
9	UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	June 1993	September 1994	Rwanda, Uganda	
10	UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda	October 1993	March 1996	Rwanda	
11	UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission In Liberia	September 1993	September 1997	Liberia	
12	UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group	May 1994	June 1994	Chad, Libya	

Serial	Official Abbreviation	Mission Name	Start	End	Location	Remarks
13	UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission Iii	February 1995	June 1997	Angola	
14	MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission In Angola	June 1997	February 1999	Angola	
15	MINURCA	United Nations Mission In The Central African Republic	April 1998	February 2000	Central African Republic	
16	UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission In Sierra Leone	July 1998	October 1999	Sierra Leone	
17	UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission In Sierra Leone	October 1999	December 2005	Sierra Leone	
18	MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission In The Democratic Republic Of The Congo	November 1999	2010	Democratic Republic of Congo	
19	UNMEE	United Nations Mission In Ethiopia And Eritrea	July 2000	ongoing	Ethiopia, Eritrea	ongoing
20	UNMIL	United Nations Mission In Liberia	September 2003	ongoing	Liberia	ongoing
21	UNOCI	United Nations Operation In Côte d'Ivoire	April 2004	ongoing	Côte d'Ivoire	ongoing
22	ONUB	United Nations Mission In Burundi	June 2004	2007	Burundi	
23	UNMIS	United Nations Mission In The Sudan	March 2005	2011	Sudan	
24	UNAMID	United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur	2007	ongoing	Darfur	ongoing

Serial	Official Abbreviation	Mission Name	Start	End	Location	Remarks
25	MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	2011	ongoing	DRC	ongoing
26	UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei	2011	ongoing	Abyei	ongoing
27	UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	2011	ongoing	South Sudan	ongoing
28	UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya	2011	ongoing	Libya	ongoing

Source: Based on data published at; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Nations_peacekeeping_missions

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Appendix B - List of the AU Missions

Serial	Official Abbreviation	Mission Name	Start	End	Location	Remarks
1	AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi,	2003	2004	Burundi	Violent conflict between Hutu and Tutsi factions led to intervention by an AU force with troops from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. The UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) took over in June 2004
2	AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan	2004	2007	Sudan	It merged with UNAMID, a UN-mandated peacekeeping force deployed in Darfur, in December 2007.
3	AMISOM	African Union force in Somalia	2007	ongoing	Somalia	since February 2007 in response to the War in Somalia

Source: Based on data published at; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_non-UN_peacekeeping_missions

Appendix C - Security Council Resolution 1769

31 July 2007



Security Council

SC/9089**Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York**

Security Council

5727th Meeting (PM)**SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION****'HYBRID' PEACE OPERATION IN BID TO RESOLVE DARFUR CONFLICT**

The Security Council authorized the deployment of a 26,000-strong joint United Nations-African Union force this afternoon, in an attempt to quell the violence in Sudan's western Darfur region, where fighting between pro-Government militias and rebel guerrillas has killed more than 250,000 people since 2003.

By the provisions of resolution 1769 (2007), adopted unanimously by the 15-member body, the hybrid operation will be known as UNAMID and will have up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, a civilian component including up to 3,772 international police and 19 special police units with up to 2,660 officers.

The Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorized UNAMID to take the necessary action to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its personnel and civilians "without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan".

According to the resolution, further details on the force's mandate are found in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary-General and the African Union Commission of 5 June (document S/2007/307/Rev.1).

Today's resolution also called for United Nations Member States to make troop contributions within 30 days of its adoption, and on UNAMID to establish operational capabilities by October. It also called for the

force to take command of the region from the 7,000-strong African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) by the end of the year, at the latest.

Also by the text, the Council urged the Sudanese Government and all rebel groups to negotiate a permanent political settlement to the dispute in Darfur, demanding that those parties fulfil their international obligations under relevant agreements and Council resolutions.

Hailing the Council's decision to deploy the hybrid force, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Member States must provide every support in order to meet the resolution's ambitious goals. Additional troops must be committed, support systems put in place and command structures established. While Governments knew that took time, "time is not on our side", he stressed.

The unequivocal support of the Government of Sudan was equally fundamental, he emphasized, as was that of the rebel movements. Such support was also crucial in paving the way for negotiations and, ultimately, a peace agreement. "We will build peace through negotiations for a political settlement, and sustain peace on the ground with our peacekeepers," he concluded.

Members of the Security Council joined the Secretary-General in welcoming the resolution, while warning that it was only the first step in an arduous process, the ultimate goal of which was ending the suffering in Darfur and securing a lasting peace. Most speakers also enjoined the parties, particularly the Government of Sudan, to cooperate fully with the deployment and to pursue a sincere path to a negotiated peace.

While the representative of the United States warned that failure to cooperate would have both unilateral and multilateral consequences, China's representative emphasized that pressuring Sudan was not the resolution's goal. It was important that the Council's message not be misinterpreted; the unanimity of adoption provided an important guarantee for the Darfur peace process.

The Observer for the African Union also welcomed the Council's action, saying the resolution would strengthen the already strong ties between the regional organization and the United Nations.

Also speaking this afternoon were the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation, Qatar, Slovakia, Belgium, Italy, Indonesia, Ghana, South Africa and Panama.

The meeting opened at 3:25 p.m. and ended at 4:30 p.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 1769 (2007) reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling all its previous resolutions and presidential statements concerning the situation in Sudan,

"Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan, and to the cause of peace, and *expressing its determination* to work with the Government of Sudan, in full respect of its sovereignty, to assist in tackling the various problems in Darfur, Sudan,

"Recalling the conclusions of the Addis Ababa high-level consultation on the situation in Darfur of 16 November 2006 as endorsed in the communiqué of the 66th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union held in Abuja on 30 November 2006 as well as the communiqué of 79th meeting of the Peace and

Security Council of the African Union on 22 June 2007, *recalling* the statement of its President of 19 December 2006 endorsing the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements, *welcoming* the progress made so far and *calling* for them to be fully implemented by all parties without delay and for all parties to facilitate the immediate deployment of the United Nations Light and Heavy Support packages to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) and a Hybrid operation in Darfur, for which back-stopping and command and control structures will be provided by the United Nations, and *recalling* that co-operation between the UN and the regional arrangements in matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security is an integral part of collective security as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,

“Re-affirming also its previous resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict and the subsequent conclusions of the Security Council Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict pertaining to parties to the armed conflict in Sudan (S/2006/971), and 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, as well as *recalling* the report of its Mission to Addis Ababa and Khartoum from 16 to 17 June 2007,

“Welcoming the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007,

“Commending in this regard the agreement of Sudan that the Hybrid operation shall be deployed in Darfur, as detailed in the conclusions of the high-level AU/UN consultations with the Government of Sudan in Addis Ababa on 12 June 2007 and confirmed in full during the Council’s meeting with the President of Sudan on 17 June in Khartoum,

“Recalling the Addis Ababa Agreement that the Hybrid operation should have a predominantly African character and the troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries,

“Commending the efforts of the African Union for the successful deployment of AMIS, as well as the efforts of member states and regional organisations that have assisted it in its deployment, *stressing* the need for AMIS, as supported by the United Nations Light and Heavy Support Packages, to assist implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement until the end of its mandate, *calling upon* the Government of Sudan to assist in removing all obstacles to the proper discharge by AMIS of its mandate; and *recalling* the communiqué of the 79th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 22 June to extend the mandate of AMIS for an additional period not exceeding six months until 31 December 2007,

“Stressing the urgent need to mobilise the financial, logistical and other support and assistance required for AMIS,

“Welcoming the ongoing preparations for the Hybrid operation, including the putting in place of logistical arrangements in Darfur, at United Nations Headquarters and the African Union Commission Headquarters, force and police generation efforts and on-going joint efforts by the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union to finalise essential operational policies, and *further welcoming* action taken so that appropriate financial and administrative mechanisms are established to ensure the effective management of the Hybrid,

“Re-iterating its belief in the basis provided by the Darfur Peace Agreement for a lasting political solution and sustained security in Darfur, *deploring* that the Agreement has not been fully implemented by the signatories and not signed by all parties to the conflict in Darfur, *calling* for an immediate ceasefire, *urging* all parties not to act in any way that would impede the implementation of the Agreement, and *recalling* the communiqué of the second international meeting on the situation in Darfur convened by the African Union and United Nations Special Envoys in Tripoli from 15-16 July 2007,

“Noting with strong concern on-going attacks on the civilian population and humanitarian workers and continued and widespread sexual violence, including as outlined in the Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the report of the Secretary-General of 23 February 2007, *emphasising* the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of such crimes and *urging* the Government of Sudan to do so, and *reiterating* in this regard its condemnation of all violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Darfur,

“Reiterating its deep concern for the security of humanitarian aid workers and their access to populations in need, *condemning* those parties to the conflict who have failed to ensure the full, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need in Darfur as well as the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to internally displaced persons and refugees, and *recognising* that, with many citizens in Darfur having been displaced, humanitarian efforts remain a priority until a sustained ceasefire and inclusive political process are achieved,

“Demanding that there should be no aerial bombings and the use of United Nations markings on aircraft used in such attacks,

“Reaffirming its concern that the ongoing violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the rest of Sudan as well as the region, *stressing* that regional security aspects must be addressed to achieve long-term peace in Darfur, and *calling* on the Governments of Sudan and Chad to abide by their obligations under the Tripoli Agreement of 8 February 2006 and subsequent bilateral agreements,

“Determining that the situation in Darfur, Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

“1. Decides, in support of the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the outcome of the negotiations foreseen in paragraph 18, to authorise and mandate the establishment, for an initial period of 12 months, of an AU/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) as set out in this resolution and pursuant to the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007, and *further decides* that the mandate of UNAMID shall be as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007;

“2. Decides that UNAMID, which shall incorporate AMIS personnel and the UN Heavy and Light Support Packages to AMIS, shall consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each;

“3. Welcomes the appointment of the AU-UN Joint Special Representative for Darfur Rodolphe Adada and Force Commander Martin Agwai, and *calls* on the Secretary-General to immediately begin deployment of the command and control structures and systems necessary to ensure a seamless transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID;

“4. Calls on all parties to urgently facilitate the full deployment of the UN Light and Heavy Support Packages to AMIS and preparations for UNAMID, and *further calls* on member states to finalise their contributions to UNAMID within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution and on the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to agree the final composition of the military component of UNAMID within the same time period;

“5. Decides that:

(a) no later than October 2007, UNAMID shall establish an initial operational capability for the headquarters, including the necessary management and command and control structures, through which

operational directives will be implemented, and shall establish financial arrangements to cover troops costs for all personnel deployed to AMIS;

(b) as of October 2007, UNAMID shall complete preparations to assume operational command authority over the Light Support Package, personnel currently deployed to AMIS, and such Heavy Support Package and hybrid personnel as may be deployed by that date, in order that it shall perform such tasks under its mandate as its resources and capabilities permit immediately upon transfer of authority consistent with sub-paragraph (c) below;

(c) as soon as possible and no later than 31 December 2007, UNAMID having completed all remaining tasks necessary to permit it to implement all elements of its mandate, will assume authority from AMIS with a view to achieving full operational capability and force strength as soon as possible thereafter;

“6. *Requests* the Secretary General to report to the Council within 30 days of the passage of this resolution and every 30 days thereafter, on the status of UNAMID’s implementation of the steps specified in paragraph 5, including on the status of financial, logistical, and administrative arrangements for UNAMID and on the extent of UNAMID’s progress toward achieving full operational capability;

“7. *Decides* that there will be unity of command and control which, in accordance with basic principles of peacekeeping, means a single chain of command, *further decides* that command and control structures and backstopping will be provided by the United Nations, and, in this context, *recalls* the conclusions of the Addis Ababa high level consultation on the situation in Darfur of 16 November;

“8. *Decides* that force and personnel generation and administration shall be conducted as set out in paragraphs 113-115 of the report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007, and *requests* the Secretary-General to put in place without delay the practical arrangements for deploying UNAMID including submitting to the General Assembly recommendations on funding and effective financial management and oversight mechanisms;

“9. *Decides* that UNAMID shall monitor whether any arms or related material are present in Darfur in violation of the Agreements and the measures imposed by paragraphs 7 and 8 of resolution 1556 (2004);

“10. *Calls* on all Member States to facilitate the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to Sudan of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive use of UNAMID in Darfur;

“11. *Stresses* the urgent need to mobilise the financial, logistical and other support required for AMIS, and *calls* on member states and regional organisations to provide further assistance, in particular to permit the early deployment of two additional battalions during the transition to UNAMID;

“12. *Decides* that the authorised strength of UNMIS shall revert to that specified in resolution 1590 (2005) upon the transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID pursuant to paragraph 5(c);

“13. *Calls* on all the parties to the conflict in Darfur to immediately cease all hostilities and commit themselves to a sustained and permanent ceasefire;

“14. *Demands* an immediate cessation of hostilities and attacks on AMIS, civilians and humanitarian agencies, their staff and assets and relief convoys, and *further demands* that all parties to the conflict in Darfur fully co-operate with AMIS, civilians and humanitarian agencies, their staff and assets and relief convoys, and give all necessary assistance to the deployment of the United Nations Light and Heavy Support Packages to AMIS, and to UNAMID;

“15. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:

(a) *decides* that UNAMID is authorised to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to:

(i) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers,

(ii) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan;

(b) *requests* that the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and the Government of Sudan conclude within 30 days a status-of-forces agreement with respect to UNAMID, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and General Assembly resolution 61/133 on the Safety and Security of Humanitarian Personnel and the Protection of United Nations Personnel, and *decides* that pending the conclusion of such an agreement the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall provisionally apply with respect to UNAMID personnel operating in that country;

“16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to achieve actual compliance in UNAMID with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, including the development of strategies and appropriate mechanisms to prevent, identify and respond to all forms of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse, and the enhancement of training for personnel to prevent misconduct and ensure full compliance with the United Nations code of conduct, and to further take all necessary action in accordance with the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (ST/SGB/2003/13) and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct of pre-deployment awareness training and, in the case of forces previously deployed under AU auspices, post-deployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

“17. *Calls* on all concerned parties to ensure that the protection of children is addressed in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and *requests* the Secretary-General to ensure continued monitoring and reporting of the situation of children and continued dialogue with parties to the conflict towards the preparations of time-bound action plans to end recruitment and use of child soldiers and other violations against children;

“18. *Emphasises* there can be no military solution to the conflict in Darfur, *welcomes* the commitment expressed by the Government of Sudan and some other parties to the conflict to enter into talks and the political process under the mediation, and in line with the deadlines set out in the roadmap, of the United Nations Special Envoy for Darfur and the African Union Special Envoy for Darfur, who have its full support, *looks forward* to these parties doing so, *calls* on the other parties to the conflict to do likewise, and *urges* all the parties, in particular the non-signatory movements, to finalise their preparations for the talks;

“19 *Welcomes* the signature of a Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur, and *calls* for it to be fully implemented and on all parties to ensure, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, the full, safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need and delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to internally displaced persons and refugees;

“20. *Emphasises* the need to focus, as appropriate, on developmental initiatives that will bring peace dividends on the ground in Darfur, including in particular, finalising preparations for reconstruction and development, return of IDPs to their villages, compensation and appropriate security arrangements;

“21. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council for its consideration no later than every 90 days after the adoption of this resolution on progress being made on, and immediately as necessary on any obstacles to:

- (a) the implementation of the Light and Heavy Support Packages and UNAMID,
- (b) the implementation of the Joint Communiqué between the Government of Sudan and the United Nations on Facilitation of Humanitarian Activities in Darfur,
- (c) the political process,
- (d) the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and the parties’ compliance with their international obligations and their commitments under relevant agreements, and
- (e) the ceasefire and the situation on the ground in Darfur;

“22. *Demands* that the parties to the conflict in Darfur fulfil their international obligations and their commitments under relevant agreements, this resolution and other relevant Council resolutions;

“23. *Recalls* the reports of the Secretary-General of 22 December 2006 (S/2006/1019) and 23 February 2007 (S/2007/97) which detail the need to improve the security of civilians in the regions of eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic, *expresses* its readiness to support this endeavour, and *looks forward* to the Secretary-General reporting on his recent consultations with the Governments of Chad and CAR;

“24. *Emphasises* its determination that the situation in Darfur shall significantly improve so that the Council can consider, in due course and as appropriate, and taking into consideration recommendations of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union, the drawing down and eventual termination of UNAMID;

“25. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.”

Statements

United Nations Secretary-General BAN KI-MOON said the resolution’s adoption was the culmination of serious and painstaking collaboration within the Security Council. It was the result of sincere and intensive cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. “As we open this new chapter, I pay tribute to the men and women of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), who have given their all in the service of peace — some paying the ultimate price. We must now move forward, in all haste, to build on their work. We must put in place the complex and vital peacekeeping operation, which you have authorized today.”

He said preparations for the operation had been under way since early 2007. In order to meet the resolution’s ambitious goal and assume authority in Darfur by the end of the year, the Council must remain engaged and Member States must provide every support. Additional capable troops must be committed, support systems put in place and command structures established. While Governments knew that took time, “time is not on our side”.

The unequivocal and continuous support of the Government of the Sudan was equally fundamental, he stressed, adding that, if it was not a good-faith partner in the initiative, the operation would fail. The same expectation existed regarding the rebel movements. The Special Envoys of the United Nations and the African Union would be meeting with the parties in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, later in the week, and it was crucial that that meeting yield positive results, so as to pave the way for negotiations and, ultimately, a peace agreement. "We will build peace through negotiations for a political settlement, and sustain peace on the ground with our peacekeepers."

EMYR JONES PARRY ([United Kingdom](#)), paying tribute to the African Union personnel, said the hybrid force must be deployed as part of a multifaceted approach on the political, security and humanitarian tracks. The political track was now a priority, and the United Kingdom pledged full support for the upcoming negotiations in Arusha.

He also called for stepped up humanitarian protection and assistance, and cooperation from all sides, stressing the need for compliance with the comprehensive resolution and that, if compliance failed, there would be consequences. The suffering in Darfur would not be ended by today's action, but it offered the prospect of a new start for the region.

JEAN-PIERRE LACROIX ([France](#)) said the resolution was a decisive step to end the suffering in Darfur, and it must start a course of real action. France had been integrally involved in the development and adoption of the text, working closely with the United Kingdom and in consultation with the Government of Sudan.

Stressing the crucial need for all parties to comply with and respect the ceasefire, he said the operation would require a strong commitment from the international community. AMIS also required stronger support in the period leading up to the deployment of the hybrid force. Humanitarian personnel must be protected and supported, and the political front must be strengthened. France was willing to contribute in many areas, including those of security and displacement.

VITALY CHURKIN ([Russian Federation](#)) described the resolution as "timely", saying it embodied the cooperation of the United Nations and the African Union. However, peace could only be achieved through a comprehensive political settlement, and it was to be hoped that the hybrid operation would help move that process forward, while also assist with protection of the vulnerable, in full recognition of Sudan's sovereignty. For the operation to succeed, all parties must carry out their obligations, while deepening the relationship between the United Nations, the African Union and the Government of Sudan.

NASSIR ABDULAZIZ AL-NASSER ([Qatar](#)) recalled that Sudan had initiated the request for United Nations assistance to address some internal issues. The country had taken many positive steps in partnership with the Organization and the African Union, and had given its consent to the deployment of the hybrid operation. All that was needed now was the continuation of encouragement towards Sudan and the fulfilment of the Security Council's promise to continue respecting the country's sovereignty and forcing the rebel movements to refrain from violence and join the peace process. Qatar encouraged the Sudanese to continue their cooperation with the United Nations.

PETER BURIAN ([Slovakia](#)) welcomed, as one of the resolution's co-sponsors, its unanimous adoption, saying his country had been greatly concerned about the suffering of Darfur's civilian population, in particular women and children. The unprecedented human crisis and its regional consequences should end as soon as possible. The resolution reflected the new partnership between the United Nations and the African Union,

and Slovakia called on all parties to facilitate an expeditious deployment and cooperation in order to achieve a lasting solution.

JOHAN C. VERBEKE ([Belgium](#)) said the resolution's unanimous adoption was a decisive moment towards solving the crisis in Darfur. Mandating the first hybrid peacekeeping force was a strong sign of the cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. However, the responsibility did not stop with adoption of the text. A solution to the crisis must involve recognition of the responsibility of all actors to pursue the political process.

ZALMAY KHALILZAD ([United States](#)) said UNAMID would have a strong mandate and promised to play a critical role in ending the suffering in Darfur, which had been staggering. The brutal treatment of the region's people was unacceptable to the United States, whose citizens had contributed much assistance to them.

Emphasizing that the resolution must be implemented without delay, he said the transition to a unified control with the African Union was imperative and must be expedited in a timely manner. At the same time, the Government of Sudan and other signatories must comply fully with the Darfur Peace Agreement and its humanitarian protections. All parties must cooperate fully with the resolution and, if Sudan's cooperation was not forthcoming, the United States would call for both unilateral and multilateral action.

MARCELLO SPATAFORA ([Italy](#)), praising the strong message contained in the resolution and the Secretary-General's commitment, called on the international community to meet the challenges of such a large peacekeeping operation. The international community must heed the humanitarian, political and development tracks of the resolution in an effort to end the suffering in Darfur and to create a sustainable peace.

HASAN KLEIB ([Indonesia](#)) said the resolution laid the necessary foundation for a successful outcome, and the Council should now continue to give strong support to the political process. Efforts should also be made to strengthen the ceasefire. It was essential that AMIS receive the international community's support, including financial support and the deployment of the light and heavy support packages. A solution should be based on the tripartite approach between the United Nations, the African Union and the Government of Sudan.

LESLIE KOJO CHRISTIAN ([Ghana](#)) said the resolution paved the way for deployment of the hybrid operation and the ultimate goal of the Council's action should be to end the suffering in Darfur. Ghana called on the Government of Sudan and other parties to abide by the intent of the resolution. The adoption was the culmination of cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, and that momentum must not be lost. It was also incumbent on the African Union and the United Nations to address other conflicts in Africa.

BASO SANQU ([South Africa](#)) said the resolution gave practical expression to the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union. Because the Darfur peace process provided the only chance for a solution to the conflict in the region, South Africa urged all parties to cooperate in the forthcoming Arusha meeting. It also encouraged the Secretary-General and the President of the African Union to provide leadership to ensure deployment of the hybrid force as soon as possible.

RICARDO ALBERTO ARIAS ([Panama](#)), welcoming the leadership of the Secretary-General on Darfur and the action taken by the Council, said it was a proud day for the United Nations and the international community. Today, however, was just the beginning of a process, of which the culmination would be peace in Darfur, where human rights must be assured and suffering ended. Only then could the international community truly feel proud.

Council President WANG GUANGYA (China), speaking in his national capacity, said a positive momentum had been generated in the past few months, providing a rare opportunity that the international community must not miss in pushing for a gradual, appropriate and comprehensive settlement in Darfur. That issue, however, could not be resolved without the cooperation of the Sudanese Government, which had shown flexibility and taken vigorous measures. The fact that the Council had spoken with one voice was an important guarantee for the Darfur peace process.

He emphasized that the purpose of the resolution was to authorize the launch of the hybrid operation, rather than exert pressure or impose sanctions. The text had room for further improvement, and was only the first step towards full settlement of the Darfur question. The next step was faithful implementation of the resolution. In deploying the hybrid operation, all parties should abide strictly by the tripartite consensus and avoid wanton misinterpretation of the resolution. Also, the Council should now focus on urging the international community to provide financial support to AMIS and fully implement the United Nations light and heavy support packages.

Peacekeeping deployment was only one aspect of the settlement, he said, noting the importance of accelerating the political process as part of the “two-track strategy”. The fundamental prerequisite for lasting peace and stability in Darfur was to encourage all factions in the region to conclude and implement a comprehensive peace agreement. The international community should take a long-term perspective, work out a development strategy for the country and provide more input for the region’s economic and social development.

ALICE MUNGWA, Observer for the African Union, welcomed the Council’s action and thanked members for their statements of support. Today’s resolution would strengthen ties between the African Union and the United Nations. The African Union would continue to work with the international community on all aspects of creating a durable peace in Darfur, where successful operations could help create a new framework for cooperation in Africa.

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