

Peacebuilding

ISSN: 2164-7259 (Print) 2164-7267 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpcb20

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To cite this article: Marjoke Oosterom (2017) Gendered (in)security in South Sudan: masculinities and hybrid governance in Imatong state, Peacebuilding, 5:2, 186-202, DOI: 10.1080/21647259.2016.1277015

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277015

Published online: 28 Feb 2017.

PEACEBUILDING, 2017
VOL. 5, NO. 2, 186–202
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277015

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Gendered (in)security in South Sudan: masculinities and hybrid governance in Imatong state

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ABSTRACT

Despite the end of the civil war in 2005, many people in South Sudan continued to experience a deep sense of insecurity due to the many different types of violent conflict in the country. This sense of insecurity is exacerbated by the lack of protection from the state and the perceived injustice in how power is distributed at the national level. Based on a study carried out in 2013, prior to the country's relapse into large-scale violence, this article discusses gendered insecurity and agency among the Latuko in Imatong state. In response to their sense of insecurity, the Latuko have developed security arrangements that represent forms of hybrid security governance. Using a notion of masculinity, the article will reflect on the gender dynamics in these local security arrangements. This shows that the social order that customary institutions create can contribute to an increase in violence against women at the domestic level. However, although women are excluded from the decision-making institutions that govern the security arrangements, they exercise subtle forms of agency to influence them.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 13 December 2016
Accepted 13 February 2017

KEYWORDS
Hybrid governance; citizenship; gender; masculinity; security; South Sudan

Introduction

Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 ended the civil war between north and south Sudan, many citizens of what is now South Sudan have increasingly felt left behind by their government. While their people had been central to the liberation struggle, Equatorians feel marginalised from political power as other ethnic groups dominated both the transitional government (2005–10), and the government that was elected in 2010. They feel neglected in the allocation of resources, and deprived of state protection in a deeply insecure state. After the civil war, local conflicts between groups over land and cattle, sometimes fuelled by the involvement of political actors at higher levels, have formed a major source of insecurity at the local level.[1] Neither the national nor the state government have been able to provide adequate protection and address the deep-rooted causes of these conflicts.

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[1]Mareike Schomerus, 'Violent Legacies: Insecurity in Sudan's Central and Eastern Equatoria' (Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) Working Paper 1, Small Army Survey, Geneva, 2008); and United Nations Development Programme, *Community Consultation Report. Eastern Equatoria State, South Sudan*. Report (Juba: South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control, 2012).

This article is based on research among the Latuko, one of the Equatorian ethnic minorities living in Imatong state in the Equatoria region. Imatong is one of the now 28 states of South Sudan.[2] In response to ongoing insecurity, the Latuko use the customary institution of the *'Amangat'*, a village-level decision-making body of adult males, to develop security arrangements in response to a (potential) threat of violence, in the case of land disputes and attacks by cattle raiders or bandit groups. The *Amangat* decides protection strategies and mobilises the '*Monyomiji*' (able men) to protect the area. In everyday life, the *Monyomiji* are far more effective in addressing people's security concerns than the state. The article will show, however, that customary institutions like the *Amangat* do not necessarily produce optimal security outcomes for everyone. Women are excluded from the *Amangat*, and when they do not comply with the rules set by the *Amangat* they may experience domestic violence at home. However, women exercise subtle forms of agency to influence both the *Amangat* and the *Monyomiji*.

This article contributes to debates on hybrid security arrangements by showing how social practices in and around these institutions are strongly gendered, and how this affects their inclusiveness and legitimacy. The article uses the concept of masculinities to analyse the gender dynamics in the local, hybrid security governance institutions. While many studies on masculinities in (post)war contexts have focused on the behaviours of (ex)combatants,[3] the reproduction of masculinities by both men and women, including non-combatants, in everyday life has received less attention. This study shows that masculinities are reproduced in local institutions and everyday social practice by both genders. The civil war itself did not simply produce 'militarised masculinities'. Rather, in the light of ongoing insecurity in South Sudan since the end of the civil war, hybrid security arrangements produce notions of masculinity by organising the protection roles of men. Even though women's interests are rarely included in these institutions, they are deemed highly legitimate due to ongoing insecurity that has prompted people who are living at the margins to make their security arrangements.

This study was carried out before violent conflict re-erupted in December 2013, which started in Juba between factions in the SPLA loyal to President Salva Kiir and factions supporting his political rival, Riek Machar, the former vice-president. The situation rapidly escalated into a civil war situation in the northern states, with Machar leading a violent insurgency against the government. Imatong state has not been directly affected by the civil war violence. Nonetheless, the findings presented in this article should be read against the background of this highly unstable and often violent political context, which instils a deep sense of insecurity in the people despite the absence of civil war in their region.

The article will first discuss the recent political history of South Sudan and the events in Equatoria region that paved the way for its development into a type of 'insurgent margins'. The subsequent sections describe the particularities of the locality where this research was

[2]Imatong is located in what used to be Eastern Equatoria State (EES). In October 2015, President Salva Kiir issued a decree to create 28 states out of the existing 10 states that were constitutionally established. For a discussion of the longer history of debates on subdivision in South Sudan and the political significance of this administrative restructuring, see Mareike Schomerus and Lovise Aalen, *Considering the State. Perspectives on South Sudan's subdivision and federalism debate*. Report (London: Overseas Development Institute, August 2016).

[3]Robert W. Connell, 'Arms and the Man: Using the New Research on Masculinity to Understand Violence and Promote Peace in the Contemporary World', in *Male Roles, Masculinities and Violence*, ed. I. Breines, R.W. Connell and I. Eide (Paris: UNESCO, 2000/2011), 21–33.

carried out and the research methodology. The article will then discuss the hybrid security arrangements created by the Latuko in response to this sense of insecurity, making use of the existing literature on hybrid security governance, and the literature on gender and masculinities in settings affected by violent conflict. The article discusses how these institutions function in Imatong, how they reproduce notions of masculinity and how they impact on gender relations. A brief reflection on the implications of the findings for peacebuilding precedes the conclusions.

The insurgent margins of Imatong

As Luckham and Lind (this issue) explain, the kind of places they describe as the 'insurgent margins' are contexts often marginalised from state power, while state power has a profound influence over local power configurations, and in the occurrence of violence, the violence experienced at the insurgent margins is part of a complex interplay between local struggles and the wider, national arena. Furthermore, these dynamics have deep historical roots in past patterns of violence. This certainly applies to Imatong state in the south-east of South Sudan, where this study was conducted.

Imatong state was important territory during both civil wars that were fought between the Khartoum-based Government of Sudan and the southern region, which were driven by the long historical marginalisation of the south and its structural exclusion from political power and economic resources.[4] The 1951 revolt that developed into a full-fledged war (Anya Nya I, 1951–72) against the Khartoum Government started among soldiers based in Torit town.[5] During the second civil war (Anya Nya II, 1983–2005), the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), led by Dr. John Garang de Mabior, was based in the Equatoria region.

The SPLA was predominantly made up of men belonging to the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups, which led to various tensions between the SPLA and Equatorian communities, which viewed the SPLA as a 'vehicle of Dinka domination' and experienced mistreatment.[6] Tensions between Dinka and Nuer factions within the SPLA escalated into large-scale violence in 1991, and spread to violent clashes between Nuer and Dinka communities.[7] One of its consequences was the displacement of thousands of predominantly Dinka into Equatoria region. Their presence sparked land disputes during and after the civil war, as part of the wider dynamics between the Dinka and Equatorian ethnic groups.

Throughout the second civil war local militias emerged across South Sudan, or split off from the SPLA. One of the stronger militia groups formed in Imatong in the early 1990s: the Equatoria Defence Force (EDF). Like other militias, the EDF emerged in response to perceived domination of ethnic Dinka in the SPLA, and to the often violent ways in which the SPLA sought to control and govern the civilian population.[8] The EDF also wanted to protect the Imatong population against abuse by members of the displaced Dinka communities. It

[4]Adam Branch and Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, 'Winning the War, but Losing the Peace? The Dilemma of SPLM/A Civil Administration and the Tasks Ahead', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43, no. 1 (March 2005): 1–20; Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars*. African Issues (Oxford: Currey [u.a.], 2007); and Schomerus, 'Violent Legacies'.

[5]Schomerus, 'Violent Legacies'.

[6]Branch and Mampilly, 'Winning the War', 4.

[7]Sharon Elaine Hutchinson and Jok Madut Jok. 'Gendered Violence and the Militarisation of Ethnicity: A Case Study from South Sudan', in *Postcolonial Subjectivities in Africa*, ed. R. Werbner (London: Zed Books, 2002), 84–107.

[8]Branch and Mampilly, 'Winning the War'; Anne Walraet, 'Governance, Violence and the Struggle for Economic Regulation in South Sudan: The Case of Budi County (Eastern Equatoria)', *Afrika Focus* 21, no. 2 (2008): 53–70.

had 12,000 fighters at its height and developed stronger ties to Khartoum than many other groups.[9] The EDF was incorporated into the SPLA following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005.

The CPA in 2005 and the secession from the North in 2011 did not put an end to violent conflict in South Sudan.[10] Different types of violent conflict kept affecting communities across the country. Ethnicity is not necessarily the cause of these conflicts, as many are rooted in the civil war, or result from the politicisation of ethnic identities. Militias and groups of SPLA-defectors have emerged sporadically, launching attacks against state actors and communities. At the time of research, a militia led by David Yau Yau in then Jonglei state caused significant havoc.[11] Yet the challenges to North–South relations remained the focus of attention of politicians and international actors, at the expense of addressing divisions within the country,[12] and widespread concerns over the domination of certain ethnic groups in the government and in business[13] – particularly the perception of Dinka domination.[14] Power struggles within the SPLM and the country's weak and corrupt governance structures only compounded the already instable situation.[15] These dynamics eventually caused the rupture in December 2013, when a new civil war began.

As was to be expected, the people of Equatoria are among those that felt disenfranchised after the CPA. They feel that they have contributed to the liberation struggle, but have since been politically marginalised.[16] Also in Imatong, various forms of violent conflict have affected local communities since the end of the civil war. Border conflicts over state, county and *payam* borders, cattle-raiding and disaffected youth are considered major sources of conflict, both between and within ethnic groups. The majority of the State's counties are affected by cattle-raiding and conflicts over access to water and grazing land. There have not been any insurgent militia groups, but armed robbers and criminal gangs have caused insecurity, particularly on main roads. Although not all forms of conflict are politically motivated, politics and the political economies of conflict play a strong role in many of them.[17]

To conclude, the development of Imatong state as insurgent margins, and the Equatoria region at large, has its historical roots in the civil war. The tensions between Equatorians

[9]Schomerus, 'Violent Legacies'.

[10]Roberto Belloni, 'The Birth of South Sudan and the Challenges of Statebuilding', *Ethnopolitics* 10, no. 3–4 (November 2011): 411–29.

[11]David Yau Yau ran for a seat in the Jonglei state assembly in the 2010 elections , but lost. Accusing the government of fraud, he started an insurgent group known that locally was referred to as the Yau Yau. Alison Giffen, 'Case study: South Sudan', in *The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect*, ed. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 857–875, online access doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198753841.013.46.

[12]Branch and Mampilly, 'Winning the War'; and Mareike Schomerus and Tim Allen, *Southern Sudan at Odds with Itself: Dynamics of Conflict and Predicaments of Peace* (London: LSE-Destin, 2010).

[13]Belloni, 'The Birth of South Sudan'; and C. Zambakari, 'South Sudan and the Nation-building Project: Lessons and Challenges', *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies* 8, no. 1 (2013): 5–29.

[14]Schomerus and Allen. *Southern Sudan at Odds with Itself*.

[15]Øistein H. Rolandsen and Inge M. Breidlid, 'A Critical Analysis of Cultural Explanations for the Violence in Jonglei State, South Sudan', *Conflict Trends* 201, no. 1 (2012): 49–56; Alex de Waal, 'When Kleptocracy Becomes Insolvent: Brute Causes of the Civil War in South Sudan', *African Affairs* 113, no. 452 (2014): 347–69; and Lotje De Vries and Peter Hakim Justin, 'Un mode de gouvernement mis en échec: dynamiques de conflit au Soudan du Sud, au-delà de la crise politique et humanitaire [A way of governing put in check: conflict dynamics in South Sudan, about a political and humanitarian crisis]', *Politique africaine* 135 (2014): 159–75.

[16]Schomerus, 'Violent Legacies'.

[17]See Schomerus, 'Violent Legacies', about involvement of politicians in border disputes; and Walraet 'Governance, Violence and the Struggle for Economic Regulation' about links between politicians in the illegal cross-border trade in arms.

and the SPLA and displaced Dinka communities signified how Equatorians felt they were being marginalised on their own territory, and a sense of political marginalisation deepened after the civil war. Although the new civil war did not directly affect Imatong, this article describes how the people in this state have always anticipated it might happen one day and therefore needed to be ready.

Research location and methodology

The study was conducted in Imurok payam, which is located in Torit county of Imatong state. Imatong state is a hill area in South Sudan's borderlands, in the Equatoria region in the south-east, bordering Uganda. Torit town is the headquarters of both the county and the state. Imatong has 12 counties in total, which are divided into administrative units called *payams* (districts), and these are sub-divided into *bomas* (clusters of villages). Equatoria region is home to approximately nine ethnic groups. All are ethnic minorities – the Dinka are a majority nationally but a minority in this region – and many of these groups have a pastoralist lifestyle. This study was carried out in Imurok payam, a two-hour drive from Torit town. Going further south one arrives in Magwi county, which borders Uganda. Imurok was selected because it has a number of unresolved border issues and the presence of customary institutions known for their involvement in local security arrangements. At the same time, Imurok was also relatively stable enough for fieldwork to be carried out safely. Imurok *payam* is populated by the agro-pastoralist Latuko. Little has been documented about the Latuko in academic literature, with the work of S. Simonse on the Latuko customary institutions being the only point of reference for this study.[18]

A mud-brick building in one of the *bomas* held a small office for the *payam* administrator: the appointed local official, who in this case was a resident from the *payam*. The *payam* administrator is the main channel of communication to the county government and the single embodiment of state presence in the *payam*. For the remote parts of the payam, finding the administrator requires a three-to-four-hour walk. In the past, two NGOs had visited the *payam* to take stock of any community conflict and discussed the border disputes in all-community meetings, emphasising the importance of inter-community dialogue, but without concrete follow-up on the issues.

Various qualitative research methods were used in this study, enabling triangulation. At *payam* level 20 focus group discussions were conducted, with equal numbers for men and women. Groups used participatory methods to analyses the forms of insecurity and violence in the *payam* and Imurok state, their causes and consequences.[19] Topic guides were used to facilitate discussions about agency in response to insecurity. In addition, 18 individual interviews were carried out with customary leaders and local state officials about their roles. A Photo Voice exercise with six men and six women (including two seventeen year-olds) focused on individual perceptions on the causes of insecurity, and individual responses.[20]

[18]Simonse, 'The Monyomiji Age-Class Systems of the Southern Sudan', *Nilo-Ethiopian Studies Newsletter (Kyoto)* no. 1 (1993): 6–11.

[19]Adapted from Caroline O.N. Moser and Peter Horn, 'Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: Conceptual Framework Paper' (University of Manchester: Urban Tipping Point (UTP) Project, 2011).

[20]Caroline C. Wang, 'Photovoice: A Participatory Action Research Strategy Applied to Women's Health', *Journal of Women's Health* 8, no. 2 (1999): 185–92; and Esther Prins, 'Participatory Photography: A Tool for Empowerment or Surveillance?' *Action Research* 8, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 426–43.

All pictures were printed and returned to participants, after which follow-up interviews were conducted, and two group discussions, again with men and women separately.

Hybrid governance institutions in Imurok

As Luckham and Lind (this issue) explained, the state may be little present in the insurgent margins, while non-state institutions may offer basic governance and security. Among the Latuko, a number of customary institutions exist that are part of the hybrid governance set-up. Hybridity denotes 'the multiple sites of political authority and governance where security is enacted and negotiated'.[21] It entails the many ways in which traditional, kin-based or clientelistic practices interact with modern, imported, or rational actor-based practices,[22] thus producing a new governance reality consisting of a hybrid practice. Hybridity means that a continuous negotiation between local state and customary institutions takes place, often around very concrete and local issues, thus producing 'negotiated statehood' in the words of Hagmann and Péclard. Customary and local state institutions may compete as much as they collaborate,[23] as is also noted for South Sudan.[24]

This section will explain how the hybrid governance institutions in Imurok work by making use of the concept of masculinities. Masculinities can be defined as the stereotypes, behavioural norms, expectations and rules assigned to men[25]; the set of traits or patterns of behaviour that are considered 'typical' of men.[26] These norms thus tend to represent a presumed essence of manhood. Expressed in plural, the concept of masculinities underlines that a variety of such behavioural norms and rules exist within every given context.[27] Masculinities are socially constructed and as such they are not 'fixed', but can change over time.

The concept of masculinities has been used to analyse how gender relations are reconfigured during and after conflict. War and violent conflict are often associated with producing 'militarised masculinities', with men represented as fighters and the protectors of women and children and embodying aggression when they return home.[28] However, 'militarised masculinities' are not simply reproduced by the behaviours of ex-combatant males. Notions of masculinity are negotiated and reproduced in everyday institutions and social interactions, by both men and women,[29] including children.[30] Furthermore, masculinities need

[21] Niagale Bagayoko, Eboe Hutchful, and Robin Luckham, 'Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Rethinking the Foundations of Security, Justice and Legitimate Public Authority', *Conflict, Security & Development* 16, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 6.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Hagmann, Tobias, and Didier Péclard, 'Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa: Negotiating Statehood', *Development and Change* 41, no. 4 (August 16, 2010): 539–62.
[24] Bagayoko et al., 'Hybrid Security Governance in Africa'; and Christopher Vaughan, Mareike Schomerus, and Lotje de Vries, eds. *The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives*, Palgrave Series in African Borderlands Studies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
[25] Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via, eds. *Gender, War, and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, Praeger Security International, 2010), 4.
[26] Md. Mozammel Haque, 'Hope for Gender Equality? A Pattern of Post-Conflict Transition in Masculinity', *Gender, Technology and Development* 17, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 55–77.
[27] Jerker Edström, Abhijit Das, and Chris Dolan, 'Introduction: Undressing Patriarchy and Masculinities to Re-Politicise Gender', *IDS Bulletin* 45, no. 1 (January 2014): 1–10.
[28] Eriksson Baaz and Maria Maria Stern, 'Fearless Fighters and Submissive Wives Negotiating Identity among Women Soldiers in the Congo (DRC)', *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 4 (2013): 711–39.
[29] R. Morrell, 'The Times of Change: Men and Masculinity in South Africa', in *Changing Men in South Africa*, ed. R. Morrell (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001), 3–37.
[30] Amina Mama, 'Khaki in the Family: Gender Discourses and Militarism in Nigeria', *African Studies Review* 41, no. 2 (September 1998): 1.

not necessarily be militarised after war: in some post-war contexts the militant masculinity became devalued and the dominant masculinity became that of men as 'model' fathers and husbands who are responsible for the education and prosperity of their families.[31]

Masculinities will influence and shape the behaviours of both men and women in relation to security and violence – insofar as existing masculinities prescribe roles in relation to the security context. The concept of masculinities can therefore be usefully brought into debates about hybrid security governance, how they function and for whom. Beyond their functioning as governance institutions, certain customary institutions serve as places where norms and practices around deliberation and decision-making are learnt and transmitted across generations, and where authority is practised and confirmed.[32] Similarly, customary institutions may confirm and reproduce certain notions of masculinity in their everyday functioning.

The Latuko have individual customary leaders as well as institutions for collective decision-making. Important are the Chiefs of the Land, the rainmakers and chiefs of the spear. These customary leaders are inherited positions and can be male and female. They are highly respected in the community and their authority increases with age and experience. All these customary leaders took on protective roles during the war, using their spiritual powers to protect the community. In the present, all act as community advisors. Chiefs of the land have knowledge of boundaries and territorial borders and therefore play an important role in land disputes. For serious border disputes between communities, the Chiefs of the Land from both sides of the border need to discuss a resolution. When they cannot agree, a ritual is performed in which a goat is slaughtered, its blood tasted by the Chiefs of the Land, and then both chiefs need to 'swear' on the border. The chief of the land who had claimed the land under false pretences is expected to die or fall seriously ill over the next few days. This ritual is therefore considered to be very serious and used as a last resort. Chiefs of the land can furthermore bless the land for cultivation and perform rituals to ensure good harvests. As their title suggests, rainmakers perform rituals to attract the rains at the right time for cultivation. The chiefs of the spear bless the arms of the men who go out to fight and perform rituals for the protection of those who fight and those who stay behind.

The institutions '*Amangat*' and '*Monyomiji*' have been documented by Simonse.[33] The *Amangat* (village section) is the assembly of adult males and the decision-making institution at the local level. Young adult males, called *Monyomiji*, are organised in age cohorts. *Monyomiji* means 'owners' or 'fathers' of the land.[34] They are the rulers and protectors of the community until they reach the age set of 'elders' and retire. Young men belonging to the same age set group 'graduate' to become *Monyomiji* at the same time (approximately every five years), which is when the older age set of *Monyomiji* retires. It is as much a social identity as it is an age group with certain responsibilities: they preside over the social order, moral integrity and security (both food security and physical security) of the community.

[31]Haque, 'Hope for Gender Equality?'
[32]Stephen N. Ndegwa, 'Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics', *American Political Science Review* 91 (1997): 599–616; Ben Jones, *Beyond the State in Rural Uganda* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009); and Marjoke A. Oosterom, 'The Effects of Protracted Conflict and Displacement on Citizen Engagement in Northern Uganda', *Conflict, Security & Development* 16, no. 1 (2016): 75–101.
[33]Simonse, 'The Monyomiji Age-Class Systems'.
[34]Ibid.

This study found that the *Amangat* stands as a symbol for unity and harmony in the community. The *Amangat* meets at the *Adufa*, which is a fenced meeting place where the drums are kept. It is a place where visitors can be received and provided with food, and huts built around the *Adufa* can accommodate visitors. Women cannot participate in the gatherings of the *Amangat*. They are not allowed to enter the *Adufa* and if a woman trespasses her whole age group will be fined. Within the *Amangat* a social hierarchy exists, based on age and level of authority, with corresponding responsibilities. The *Amangat* in Imurok included four age sets: *Ahou* are the most senior *Monyomiji*, who play an advisory role and give orders to the lower rank *Monyomiji*. They keep the fire in the *Amangat*. *Ohiji* are the senior *Monyomiji* who enforce the orders given by the *Ahou*. *Ofirat* are the middle-senior *Monyomiji* who oversee the implementation of orders by the *Asahat*. They are the first to be mobilised to defend the community. *Asahat* are the junior class of *Monyomiji*, the 'footmen' who implement any orders given to them.[35] Customary leaders and elders are advisors to the *Monyomiji* in the *Amangat*.

At the time of research, many *Monyomiji* gather every evening in the *Amangat* to discuss the day, and periodically all members of the *Amangat* come together to deliberate on community affairs. The Amangat discusses, takes decisions about celebrations, cultivation, initiations and communal labour (on roads or schools) The *Amangat* can decide to put requests to the *payam* authorities, for example, when the local health unit runs out of drugs. *Payam* authorities, in turn, consult the *Amangat* about community needs. The security of the *payam* is a main concern of the *Amangat*. In the case of an acute emergency or security threat, the drums in the *Adufa* will be beaten and the *Monyomiji* will gather in the *Amangat* to decide on their strategy. The decision on whether 'to talk peace or to declare war' is taken here. In *Amangat* meetings the day-to-day security of the *payam* is discussed, varying from any incident of 'two brothers arguing among themselves' to possible tensions with other communities. *Monyomiji* will report the news from other places and on anything unusual observed on their territory.

The *Amangat* is a site for preparing youth for adulthood and for becoming active members of their community. In order to become *Monyomiji*, a young man needs apply to the *Amangat* and pay a contribution to its members. In the case of Imurok, the contribution consisted of 18 sticks of bamboo and a goat. Failing to do so 'a youth will not have voice in the community and will be regarded as a woman', one man stated in a focus group, underlining that the public sphere for deliberation and decision-making is the domain of men. All men highlighted the Amangat as the place where the youth are 'taught' norms and values, and the culture and history of the Latuko. They are given advice on how to live in harmony, on how to protect the women in case of any external threat or attack. If a *Monyomiji* is not following the rules, then the senior *Monyomiji* will intervene and his entire age cohort may be fined. *Monyomiji* can temporarily be suspended from the *Amangat* and disciplined and advised by the elders.

Older men indicated that this function of the Amangat had been disrupted during the war. The *Amangat* had barely functioned as people were dispersed and many men participated in the SPLA. One of the local *boma* chiefs explains:

[35]Our Latuko interpreters indicated that the social hierarchy within the *Amangat* exists in all Latuka areas , but the titles of each age group can vary from place to place, but that.

> The Monyomiji were powerless at that time. They could only send people to fight in the SPLA and follow the orders of those in command. Some stayed behind to protect the area, but they had no weapons. So they protected only with words [spells]. They would accompany the women and show them where to hide. Whenever the SPLA came into their area they would say: 'We are just here with the women to cultivate. We have already sent our children to fight. We have nothing, we are just farming'. All the Monyomiji did was to pick up and carry the small children that were left behind when the women had to run [to hide].

In this interview and other discussions, it appeared that the men's role as fighters in the SPLA had been in tension with losing the institutions of the *Amangat* and the codes among the *Monyomiji* that govern how fighting is done. They also stressed that as many young men were conscripted into either the SPLA or the SAF, they missed formal education and 'the education at home' – meaning participation in the customary institution of the *Amangat* where one learns to become a man. Some elders expressed their concerns over the *Monyomiji* who nowadays choose to fight where other resolutions are possible, which they view as one of the causes for conflict in Imatong state.

Aside from the *Monyomiji* masculinity being reproduced in the *Amangat*, it is constructed in other social practices, like in social gatherings that bring age cohorts together. Alcohol consumption is an important part of that, for instance after a day of group cultivation. The men emphasised that drinking is again a social activity that supports togetherness among men, like during the war when it had been a reward for the hardship they endured as soldiers. They felt that peer pressure among *Monyomiji* encouraged them to drink, especially among those within the same age group. They also recognised the many problems caused by drinking, including wife battering and physical fights among men.

In terms of local state authorities, various forms of collaboration exist between the *payam* administration, the *Monyomiji* and customary leaders. This is possibly enabled by the fact that several customary leaders in Imurok double as local government chiefs. For instance, the head chief of the *payam* was one of the important Chiefs of the Land and some of the *boma* chiefs are respected elders. The men state that the *payam* authorities often consult the *Amangat* and that, when a problem or dispute is reported to the *payam* administrator, he will involve a number of *Monyomiji* to discuss the issue.

Local state actors like the *payam* administration have blended in with the customary institutions when minor issues need to be resolved. For example, physical fights among men were usually stopped and settled among the *Monyomiji* themselves, who would 'put the culprits down to advise them'. A group of *Monyomiji* with involvement from older age groups and sometimes the elders would tackle this. It is accepted among the *Monyomiji* that the *payam* administrator has to intervene if a fight results in serious injuries. The preferred solution was to resolve the dispute internally and not to involve the police because this could threaten community unity. Mindful of this, the *payam* administrator would try to settle the issue locally with some of the elders involved.

Gendered experiences of insecurity among the Latuko

The findings showed clear differences between men and women and the forms of violence and insecurity that affect them. In ranking exercises, women prioritised a wide range of

forms of violence with physical violence against women in the community and domestic violence ranked the highest by far. They also listed girl-child compensation,[36] sexual violence and rape, early marriage, no education for girls, widow inheritance and the effects of polygamy. Women identified cattle raiding and land disputes as major public security concerns, although Imurok has rarely experienced attacks by raiders. Men ranked the presence of land mines, which limits opportunities for cultivation, and effects of alcohol highest. Men prioritised 'fights within the community' next, which caused disunity and could subsequently weaken collective capacities to take care of food security and protect the community. 'Wife battering' only followed after this.

In the Photo Voice exercise, all six women included pictures representing domestic violence. Their pictures of livestock referred to cattle raiding, and pictures of bushy areas reflected their fear of unpredictable attacks of raiders and militias. Men took pictures that reflected their concerns about cattle raids and border disputes. Even if a raid has not taken place in the *payam* itself, raiders moving through the *payam* can be a risk. One man explained: '*If the raiders hide themselves and the cattle on our territory, others may think we support them. This may lead to retaliation by those who were affected*'. He referred to an incident in 2011, when county security forces retrieved six hundred head of cattle from a criminal gang that had come to hide in Imurok.[37] Men were not as concerned about militias as the women. Often better informed about events in the country, they currently did not feel under threat of any militia group.

From focus group discussions as well as Photo Voice pictures it became clear that deeper concerns underpinned the sense of insecurity among the Latuko, which reflect their experience of living in the insurgent margins. Both men and women agreed that the imbalance in the distribution of power at the top of the government was the root cause of most conflicts in South Sudan. In pictures, this was represented as the shattered flag of the new nation, a crack in the wall of the *payam* administration office. One man said:

> Of course poverty is a cause [of violence]; it makes people go steal and carry out raids, which may lead to revenge by those other communities. But power struggles at the top and tribal politics is the major cause of conflict. That is why violence persists. In the government, only a few tribes occupy the important government positions. Such people often have direct influence on the distribution of services to communities. Those people who lack representation [in the government] often lag behind in terms of employment, because they have no schools and remain uneducated.[38]

This study also encountered the frustration among the Latuko about their contribution to the war that is not acknowledged or rewarded, and their sense of living on the margins of the state. An older man, who fought in both the first and second civil war, explains:

> … we [Equatorians] have fought for other people. During the war I was convinced that when we achieve our goal that there would be equal development. But to my surprise things are moving in a different direction. We are not equal because others claim that they were 'born to rule'. Who is born to be ruled? The Dinkas are not good people and [are] responsible for our suffering. They have created income inequality, they enjoy life while we are suffering (...) The majority of us who started the movement during the Torit mutiny feels we are left out.

[36]Girl-child compensation refers to a form of compensation after someone is killed. The family of the perpetrator has to compensate the family of the victim by sending them one of their daughters, often a very young girl.

[37]This incident was also reported on the Catholic Radio Network, 8 October 2011, http://catholicradionetwork.org/?q=node/5049.

[38]Focus group discussion with men, Imurok, 9 November 2013.

> The current government is not doing the things we want. That is why Imurok is the way it is, despite the fact that the liberation struggle started from our mountains.[39]

To both men and women, the Yau Yau rebellion[40] that was ongoing in Jonglei state was a sign that the government was unable to address conflict in areas that were not in its interest. One male participant said: '*The government is trying to resolve this. But we hear the news about people being killed every day on the radio. We also hear about peace talks, but the Yau Yau are still invading areas*'.[41] While the men were not as concerned as the women about the Yau Yau, the men recognise the volatility and unpredictability of many of the violent conflicts in South Sudan, which may affect the *payam*. This was captured by this participant:

> The violence may approach as rapidly as a bushfire. That conflict of Yau Yau is politically motivated. We and the people of Jonglei are under the same [national] government. We are worried these things can happen here …[42]

Due to the distrust in the national state, the Latuko feel that they are largely left on their own to protect their communities. This came out clearly in focus groups and the Photo Voice exercise, in which both men and women expressed that local institutions like the *Monyomiji* are far more important for organising protection than the state. Local officials at the *payam* and *boma* level enjoyed some respect, mainly because they were from Imurok and could handle local disputes. The people had very little confidence, however, in the county and state government.

To conclude, this section argues that a sense of security among men and women is shaped by the threat of violence associated with violent conflict in other parts of Equatoria region and the country. The uncertainty about conflicts elsewhere is deepened by lack of trust in the government of South Sudan to resolve them, especially for populations that are marginalised from political power. The remaining sections will elaborate how the Latuko respond to this sense of insecurity and discuss how responses are gendered.

Security responses by the *Amangat* and the *Monyomiji*

The Latuko's responses to their sense of insecurity are embedded in local social and political institutions, the *Amangat* and the *Monyomiji*, and are informed by a notion of masculinity that defines men as protectors. At the same time, these strategies produce a new social reality. Part of this reality is that certain forms of violence against women have increased, as this section will explain. This links to debates about the inclusiveness of hybrid governance institutions, and for whom they work. The potential exclusionary nature of non-state security institutions has been noted in particular for women and other vulnerable groups, which impacts on their everyday security.[43] Meagher argues it is important to clarify to what extent hybrid governance institutions are locally legitimate in the eyes of the governed, and are accountable to them. She shows that some of them have been driven by elite interests,[44]

[39]Payam chief of Imurok payam, Interview, July 31, 2013.
[40]See note 11 above.
[41]Focus group with men, Imurok, August 5, 2013.
[42]Focus group discussion with men, Imurok, November 9, 2013.
[43]Ibid.
[44]Kate Meagher, 'The Strength of Weak States? Non-state Security Actors and Hybrid Governance in Africa', *Development & Change*, 43, no. 5 (September 2012): 1073–101.

while other forms of non-state governance enjoy popular support.[45] Therefore, Bagayoko et al. argue that research into hybrid governance institutions must ask how these institutions work and for whom, and critically examine their legitimacy, and furthermore look at how different groups exercise agency in relation to hybrid governance institutions and confer legitimacy to them.[46]

The men in Imurok *payam* were initially very keen to emphasise that there were no security issues in the area and that they were not afraid of anything. The way they spoke about their *payam* was in line with their role of protector: the area is safe *under their protection*. The discussions conveyed an important message: the *Monyomiji* are always ready to fight and are always vigilant. They demonstrated their vigilance in various ways, which were explicitly mentioned in the context of discussing insecurity caused by 'enemies' from elsewhere and not only in relation to local communities of raiders. Particular areas in the *payam* are regularly monitored to see if any intruders have entered. The junior *Monyomiji* are sent to look out for footsteps and any other traces. Each and every *Monyomiji* will monitor his surroundings whenever he is travelling, hunting or moving to his gardens. This practice of monitoring the area is a key responsibility of the *Monyomiji* and one of the practices that defines his social, masculine identity as *Monyomiji*. Each individual *Monyomiji* regards upholding these responsibilities as highly important, especially in relation to the peers in his age set. In the *boma* in the north of Imurok *payam*, people keep large stocks of cattle. Seeing this as an increased risk to raids, the *Monyomiji* sleep in shifts while others are on guard to protect the cattle and the territory.

Their responses may extend to security issues at the state and national level. At the time of research in November, a raid and revenge attack had just happened in Hiala *payam*, Torit county. News of it was shared in several *Amangats* in the *payam*. It was decided that no action needed to be taken, but that all *Monyomiji* had to be alert, especially in the northern parts. In relation to the Yau Yau rebellion, the senior *Monyomiji* and elders advised the members of the *Amangat* to stay united, so that they could fend off attack by these militias – or should other militias approach Imatong state. Across the *payam*, the *Monyomiji* had established that it was unlikely that Yau Yau would come as far as Imurok, and therefore no extra measures were taken. When news arrived that President Salva Kiir had dissolved the cabinet in July 2013, possible security implications were discussed in the *Amangat*. This time, the *Monyomiji* were more alarmed and made sure to follow the news closely, either over the radio or from town.

In this particular *payam*, local state officials all originate from Imurok and are therefore part of local customary institutions, since the Latuko are the only ethnic group. Their identities as state official and Latuko males intersect and, interestingly, the Latuko male identity might dominate in cases of acute insecurity. The men stressed that anyone who is part of the local government administration will have to join the defence when 'the drum is beaten'. Thus, much as *payam* administrators and chiefs are obliged to report pending violence to the county government, their membership of the *Monyomiji* requires them to engage in

[45]Ibid.; Lars Buur, 'The Sovereign Outsourced: Local Justice and Violence in Port Elizabeth', in *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World*, ed. Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 192–217; and Rachel Sieder, 'Contested Sovereignties: Indigenous Law, Violence and State Effects in Postwar Guatemala', *Critique of Anthropology* 31, no. 3 (2011): 161–84.

[46]Bagayoko et al., 'Hybrid Security Governance'.

non-state responses. The study did not verify whether this had occurred in the past, but these responses emphasise the importance of the Monyomiji in hybrid security governance.

It is concerning the protection of women that the strategies of the *Monyomiji* could be seen as detrimental to gender equality. For men, the security concerns over violent conflict elsewhere have become sites where particular versions of masculinity can be confirmed and reproduced, and the identity of the *Monyomiji* reasserted after having been largely dysfunctional during the war. On the one hand, *Monyomiji* will carry out genuine protection activities. They inform the women about any security concerns, advise them on how to behave and ask them to report anything or anyone unusual and unknown. When the presence of enemies is suspected they will accompany women to the water points and their gardens, sometimes climbing the trees to survey the area. On the other hand, the *Amangat* may impose rules that restrict the mobility of women. They have to be home in the afternoon, long before dark. They have to avoid certain places and cannot move without the permission of their husbands. Women may be punished when they break the rules. Yet it is impossible for women to obey them all. '*If you need to take vegetables to the market and you use the road, then it is between you and God. You have to go, out of poverty. You cannot not go*'.[47] Also, women explained that they do not manage to complete all their tasks within these limitations. As explained above, perceived 'negligence' in completing duties easily leads to domestic violence.

A number of factors come together that shape the behaviour of the *Monyomiji* in relation to the women in the *payam*. First, any planning about the security of the *payam* is primarily the responsibility of the *Monyomiji*. Due to the existence of these forms of violence and the uncertainty of the context they live in, the men continue to be called upon to act in their role as protectors. This appeal to the *Monyomiji* is deepened by their perceptions of the state of South Sudan as being highly insecure. Secondly, many *Monyomiji* have – to a certain extent – inherited traits of militarised masculinities as part of the legacy of the war. More importantly, however, they are collectively trying to reassert their authority and the functioning of customary institutions like the *Amangat*, after these had been disrupted during the war. Thirdly, the *Monyomiji* are obliged to their peers and to the *Amangat* to enforce rules and protection mechanisms. Thus, while domestic violence and inter-community violence seem to be two different problems, one of the ways in which they are connected is through the rules and protection strategies developed through hybrid institutions.

Women's agency in relation to hybrid security governance

This final section discusses the agency of women vis-à-vis the *Amangat* and *Monyomiji*, thus addressing the issue of inclusiveness and accountability of hybrid governance institutions, and the ability of relatively marginalised groups to influence them.[48] It is well established that populations living in areas affected by violence and conflict exercise agency in various ways,[49] but that this agency is strongly gendered.[50] Discourses about women in

[47]Individual interview with a woman, August 5, 2013.

[48]Bagayoko et al., 'Hybrid Security Governance'; and Meagher, 'Strength of Weak States'.

[49]Shane Joshua Barter, 'Unarmed Forces: Civilian Strategies in Violent Conflicts', *Peace & Change* 37, no. 4 (2012): 544–69; Caroline Nordstrom, *A Different Kind of War Story* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997); Mats Utas, 'West-African Warscapes: Victimcy, Girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic Agency in a Young Woman's Social Navigation of the Liberian War Zone', *Anthropological Quarterly* 78, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 403–30; and Henrik Vigh, *Navigating Terrains of War Youth and Soldiering in Guinnea-Bissau* (Oxford: Bergahn Books, 2006).

[50]Caroline O.N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark, eds., *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?: Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence* (London: Zed Books, 2001).

conflict zones have shifted from emphasising the victimhood of women to seeing women as agents, both within combatant groups and as the organisers and protectors of families in their homesteads, taking up new roles in the absence of men.[51] It has furthermore been increasingly understood that violent conflict can reconfigure gender relations.[52] A popular thought is that, while their husbands are away fighting, women gain certain freedoms by engaging in economic activities and taking up social leadership roles, which they would maintain in the post-conflict situation.[53] However, in the aftermath of conflict there can be a push to return to 'normality' from various sides, from ex-combatant men but also other men and women, which pressures women to resume domestic roles and leave the public sphere, which can lead to frictions.[54] In South Sudan, even female SPLA combatants were expected to resettle in domestic life. Shaped by their combat experience the behaviour of these women was considered 'unfeminine' in a context where women are expected to be docile. Even though they became part of an elite as fighters, it did not transform deep-rooted patriarchal institutions,[55] which underlines the importance of feminities and masculinities in gender relations. In this study, it became clear that (non-combatant) women actively seek to influence hybrid governance institutions but also reproduce the masculinities within the *Amangat*.

In Imurok *payam*, the women are as vigilant as the men when they move through their area. They bring news from town when they have gone to the market, including about security issues, and they share information at water points and markets. Security issues in the county concerns them as much as issues further away:

> We hear over the radio that things have happened in Jonglei [Yau Yau militia]. (…) When I hear news about Jonglei, I will tell my neighbour that there is no good news. It is important to share this, because what if my neighbours have plans to travel? Many of our men in the army stay in such places, but their wives should not go visit them when the situation is bad. Also, it is important to know this for our own security. Because if those people [Yau Yau] move this way, then we will have followed their movements.[56]

If women hear anything unusual, they will report it to the *Monyomiji*. As mentioned, women cannot formally take part in the *Amangat* and they are largely excluded from decision-making processes about security arrangements. In very subtle ways, they seek to influence the male-dominated institutions to enhance their personal security.

The study found that women try to address domestic violence through the *Amangat*, when Photo Voice pictures showed portraits of elderly women, who command respect for their seniority and experience, and the few female customary leaders like the rainmakers or Chiefs of the Land. They help to settle marital disputes and talking to the men who had beaten their wives. The homes of these women leaders can act as safe havens. '*When*

[51] Donna Pankhurst, 'The "Sex War" and Other Wars: Towards a Feminist Approach to Peace Building', *Development in Practice* 13, no. 2–3 (May 2003): 154–77; Judy El-Bushra, 'Fused in Combat: Gender Relations and Armed Conflict', *Development in Practice* 13, no. 2–3 (2003): 252–65; and Chris Coulter, 'Female Fighters in the Sierra Leone War: Challenging the Assumptions?' *Feminist Review* 88 (2008): 54–73.

[52] Myriam Denov, *Girls in Fighting Forces. Moving Beyond Victimhood* (Otawa, Canada: CIDA, 2007); and Sjoberg and Via, eds. *Gender, War, and Militarism*.

[53] L. Handrahan, 'Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction', *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 4 (December 1, 2004): 429–45.

[54] Pankhurst, 'The Sex War'; and Henri Myrttinen, 'Masculinities, Violence and Power in Timor Leste', *Revue Lusotopie* XII, no. 1–2 (2005): 233–44.

[55] Sjoberg and Via, eds., 'Gender, War and Militarism'; and Clémence Pinaud, '"We are trained to be married!" Elite Formation and Ideology in the "girls' battalion" of the Sudan People's Liberation Army', *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 9, no. 3 (2013): 375–93.

[56] Focus group with women, Imurok, November 7, 2013.

a beating is really bad, we can go to their homes, even at night. The woman leader will let you sleep in her hut and you are now under her responsibility. The next day she can call the husband to settle the issue'.[57] These women leaders can act on behalf of the interests of all women and speak to the *Amangat*. A woman leader cannot enter the *Adufa*, but will stand at an appropriate distance and speak to the gathering of the *Monyomiji*. Or, some of the *Monyomiji* will come out of the *Adufa* to listen to her and subsequently convey her message. One of the older women in the focus groups had raised the issue of 'taking responsibility for a family and staying in peace', which send a message to the *Amangat* about addressing domestic violence.[58] Also the female rainmaker and Chief of the Land had spoken to the *Amangat*, who, in their position of customary leaders, can be invited to advise the *Amangat* and may use the opportunity to raise concerns the women have. They will present it as a threat to the harmony of the entire community. They emphasise that disharmony can make the community vulnerable, thus speaking to a major concern of the *Amangat*.

In a similar vein, women may try to trigger and influence responses to public security concerns. Concerning land disputes, for instance, other than female Chiefs of the Land no woman is expected to participate in the resolution of land disputes because '*women cannot be expected to have the historical knowledge of the borders*.'[59] When tensions increased in a border dispute with Magwi county in 2012, the women were concerned about the effects of (possible) violence on social relationships with Magwi communities, and about their mobility as they needed to be able to go to the market in Magwi town. They also need to use the land in the border area for cultivation. When tensions about the disputed border were considerably high, women refrained from going near the border. For such concerns, women may try to influence the *Amangat*. They may again send a women leader to the *Amangat*. Also wives may call upon their husbands to take issues into the *Amangat* on behalf of the women. These cannot be minor or 'private' issues, but issues that affect the wider community, and they cannot be the opinion of an individual, but it needs to be endorsed by a group of women. An example from one of the *bomas* concerned the start of the season for cultivation. In 2012, many of the men had been drinking before they went to the garden and this had led to many fights. Concerned that this would happen again this year, a group of women had approached one *Monyomiji* and asked him to raise it in the *Amangat*, after which the *Amangat* reinforced that drinking was an activity for after work.

Influencing may also occur very subtly in everyday interactions. During the Magwi border dispute, wives appealed to their husbands' responsibility to protect, as *Monyomiji*, using the defining traits of the prevailing masculinity. The men mentioned that the women spoke about the consequences for their children, who might lose the land as their resource for production. This directly appealed to the *Monyomiji*'s responsibility for food security. Furthermore, by warning the men that '*we* [women from Imurok] *will be their women*' the women emphasised they belong to their men, and that the men would risk losing their pride. While in everyday life, the fact that women are 'owned' after the bride price is paid limits their voice in the household, here women used it to prompt action. But although women wanted their men to act, they did not want the situation to escalate into violence. The women therefore emphasised that there was a lot of inter-marriage with the people across the border. Women live in Imurok as wives, while daughters of Imurok are married

[57]Ibid.
[58]Interview with the older woman leader, November 8, 2013.
[59]Interview, man, Imurok, July 28, 2013.

in Magwi. They stressed it would be wrong to fight with in-laws, thus appealing to some of the values that were recognised in the *Amangat*, and pointing at a peaceful resolution by interventions from the Chiefs of the Land.

Thus, women seek to enhance their personal security by appealing to customary institutions and to the values they embody. In everyday social practice, like in their conversations with their husbands, they emphasise certain values and lines of action. In the process, they also reproduce the masculinities that sustain a social order that is largely exclusionary for women.

Reflections on peacebuilding

Before the concluding section, a brief reflection on the implications of these findings for peacebuilding activities. A plethora of international and South Sudanese non-governmental organisations are based in Torit town, many of which run women's rights and peace programmes throughout the Equatoria region. Peacebuilding activities focus on resolving local conflicts over land and cattle, often in the form of mediation activities, like peace conferences. Recognising the strength of customary institutions, NGOs bring together community representatives and customary leaders. The second most common activity is awareness-raising, which involves discussing the importance of peace in the communities. In both activities, women's organisations promote women as peacemakers in the communities. To this end, several CBOs run training for local women peacemakers. Other organisations support the gender-desks in police posts to address violence against women.

While some international and all national NGOs operating in Imatong state recognised the strong influence of *Monyomiji* at the community level, they were mostly seen as an institution that embodies 'culture' and 'tradition' that resist change, rather than as entry points from where change could begin. Interestingly, the senior women who sometimes negotiate with the *Amangat* and could therefore play an important role in local peace, had not been noted by international and national NGOs implementing peacebuilding activities. Working with these women, and thus recognising that hybrid governance institutions are strongly gendered, could offer an avenue for enhancing their negotiation capacity for everyday peacebuilding in relation to the governance institutions that matter in everyday life.

Conclusion

This article has explained how the Equatoria region developed as a region on the 'insurgent margins'. For the people of Equatoria, the way they were governed was never 'theirs': after the colonial regime the North dominated, during the second civil war it was the SPLA that was predominantly Dinka, and now the feeling prevails that the state continues to exclude Equatorians. Since the civil war ended, new forms of insecurity have spread across the state. As described in this article, the people have a strong sense that the state is a major cause of many of these conflicts, and they are left to their own devises when it comes to protection. The hybrid governance institutions of the *Amangat* and *Monyomiji* serve this purpose and are considered a highly legitimate form of governance. The masculinity of the *Monyomiji* has been constructed not only out of tradition, but also out of war, and out of the need to respond to persistent insecurity. What has not developed are new mechanisms

to keep oversight over the *Monyomiji*, as the old system of disciplining by the senior age group seems no longer effective.

The article has shown that aside from delivering security, hybrid governance institutions are sites where certain norms around masculinities are reproduced. This quite clearly happens 'inside' these institutions: in this case study they were places where participating young men are 'educated' to become responsible members of their communities. It also happens in the social practices around these institutions: in the ways in which both men and women relate and engage with them, and reproduce notions of masculinity in everyday interactions among themselves.

In this case, hybrid security governance enjoyed popular legitimacy and were considered conducive to a locally accepted form of order from the perspective of both men and women.[60] However, it does reproduce a gender bias and creates a situation in which women are still excluded from actual security, and from having voice within the institutions.[61] Yet this article showed the complexity of exclusion, as it was not just driven by men. Women themselves exercised agency to influence the governance arrangements, but at the same time their actions and discourses contributed to reproducing masculinities and to a balance of power that largely excluded them.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the people of Imurok payam who were willing to dedicate their time to this research project. Many thanks to Lotje de Vries (Wageningen University), and Jeremy Lind and Robin Luckham (Institute of Developmnent Studies, University of Sussex) for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

This work was supported by ICCO and carried out in collaboration with Voice for Change.

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[60]Meagher, 'Strength of Weak States?'.
[61]Bagayoko et al. 'Hybrid Security Governance'.