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Chapter 25

COMMUNITY SELF-PROTECTION IN COLOMBIA

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Introduction

In Colombia the conflict has exceeded seven decades, making it one of the longest in the world. According to data analyzed by researchers from Los Andes University and the organization Paso, between 1985 and 2016 more than 1900 peace initiatives have been established at the national level (Rettberg and Quishpe, 2017). Thus, it can be deduced that civil society has played an important role in peacebuilding, even when the State and the international community promoted it (Rettberg, 2012, pp. 35–36). These initiatives include the self-protection of communities living in violent contexts, and in this chapter, we will discuss these self-protection strategies and mechanisms and how they have been developed by communities in response to conflict and a repertoire of highly sophisticated forms of violence.

Self-protection and *Unarmed Civilian Protection* (UCP) are not common terms used in Spanish-language literature related to the armed and social conflict in Colombia. Instead, other words are more frequently used such as *civil resistance*, *peacebuilding*, *human rights defense*, *accompaniment of human rights defenders*, among others. These terms have some points of contact with the UCP definition, but their main meanings are more related to self-protection. On the one hand, Furnari et al. (2016, pp. 5–8) define UCP as: "[…] […] the work of trained civilians who used nonviolent, unarmed approaches to protect other civilians from violence and the threat of violence and support local efforts to build peace […] […]." On the other hand, self-protection is part of a new paradigm that allows an understanding of protected civilians as subjects who have the capacity for agency. In this way, civilians are no longer passive actors onto which foreign organizations can impose new ways of understanding the world (Bonwick, 2006).

Community self-protection is perhaps the most disseminated and exercised form of UCP in Colombia. Practices such as civil resistance, creation of peace spaces, breaking relations with the State, non-cooperation with armed actors, and others, have been disseminated throughout the country. These practices have allowed communities to remain in their territory despite the violence, and they have created possibilities for dialog and peacebuilding. Thus, even when the State has promoted multiple peace processes with armed actors since the 1980s (Gutiérrez Loaiza, 2012), the main characters of peacebuilding have

been civilian communities. For this reason, this chapter focuses on community self-protection. It will discuss how it is precisely the local actors in peripherical and/or marginal territories who have invented and reinvented many forms of protection amid the conflict since the 1970s. They have had to do this to ensure their survival in the medium and the long term, constituting a rich inventory of self-protection alternatives. Even when there is international or national accompaniment, the key to making these strategies work is community management. Communities get involved through processes of appropriation or adaptation or because they manage their own protection initiatives.

Neither War Nor Peace in Colombia

In December 2016 the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia[1] (FARC-EP, by its acronym in Spanish) signed a Peace Agreement with the Colombian government. It was preceded by multiple attempts at negotiations since 1982 and the beginning of the 21st century. Furthermore, since the 1990s there have been several peace agreements with other insurgent groups such as April 19 Movement (M-19), Popular Liberation Army (EPL), Quintín Lame Armed Movement, Socialist Renewal Movement, Revolutionary Workers Party, Armed Commands Independent Revolutionary Movement,[2] and some popular militias from Medellín and the Aburrá Valley. Additionally, in 2005 there was another negotiation with paramilitary groups called the Justice and Peace Agreement.[3] These experiences were framed within the mainly peace and disarmament processes of irregular armed groups. They led to the creation of policies, pacts, and legal and administrative measures that aimed to accomplish two objectives: overcome the internal armed conflict and deactivate armed actors.

In this context, civil society has made multiple efforts to achieve peace through social mobilization, and peasant, Afro, and indigenous struggles. Women always play an active role in these movements. Unfortunately, impunity, denialism, absence of the State in territories in conflict, and indifference of a large part of the urban population have also been part of the Colombian conflict dynamic (Comisión de la Verdad, 2022, pp. 31–35). During the last seventy years, there have been many generations of victims, especially from civil society. In addition to structural violence, there were other violent acts such as homicides (massacres, extrajudicial executions, and selective murders), attacks against the right to life, forced disappearances, kidnappings, torture, arbitrary detentions, sexual violence, threats, child and teenage recruitment, forced labor, extortion, attacks on protected property, forced displacement, confinement, dispossession, and looting (Comisión de la Verdad, 2022, p. 123).

One of the structural causes of conflict is related to natural resources. In both national and international studies of armed conflicts, there is a line of research that tries to understand the relationship between looting and the exploitation of primary resources, with the presence of armed actors and the permanence of wars (Le Billon, 2001; Yaffe, 2011; Mantilla Valbuena, 2012; Gutiérrez Almanzar, 2016). Debates on the political economy of war recognize the overlap between conflict over natural resources in Colombia and some self-protection mechanisms.[4] Armed and social conflict is motivated by causes that go beyond economics or territorial control. However, we believe that by superimposing these variables, it is easier to understand how civilians have responded to violence caused by geopolitical and transnational interests that install multiple points of territorial tension. A cross-analysis between conflicts over natural resources and self-protection mechanisms allows us to complexify our understanding of peacebuilding. From this perspective, for conflict resolution, it is necessary to include in our analysis neo-extractivism and how international capital operates.

Although the 2016 Peace Agreement was an opportunity to propose transformations in Colombia, it did not guarantee peace. Neo-extractivism adds to the structural causes of the conflict, creating situations that are sustained in a web of economic and political interests, which circulate between illegality and institutional formality. This panorama is like many post-war contexts at the international level (Nordstrom, 2021). These networks maintain illegal armed structures, both insurgent and paramilitary, which today have occupied former FARC-controlled territories. In addition, National Liberation Army[5] (ELN) guerillas remain active after unsuccessful negotiation attempts. According to the Red Cross, by 2022 there were five active internal conflicts in the country: (1) between the State and ELN; (2) between the State and Gaitanistas Self-Defense Groups of Colombia[6] (AGC); (3) between the State and groups of former FARC-EP not currently covered by the Peace Agreement; (4) between groups of former FARC-EP not currently covered by the Peace Agreement and Second Marquetalia;[7] and (5) between groups of former FARC-EP not currently covered by the Peace Agreement and Border Command[8] (ICRC, 2022).

At the time of writing this chapter, the government proposal of Total Peace (Paz Total) intends to further the Peace Agreements agreed with FARC-EP and start conversations with other illegal armed groups. The Total Peace proposal comes from a government with progressive tendencies—a rarity in Colombian political history. These talks seek solutions to the armed conflict, effective application of International Humanitarian Law, respect for human rights, cessation or reduction of hostilities, and reincorporation of members of these organizations into civilian life. Dialog has been initiated with ELN and with groups of former FARC-EP that did not accept the Peace Agreement (El Espectador, 2022; Valencia Agudelo, 2022).

As described, the Colombian experience is a clear example of the coexistence of peace and conflict, as dynamic realities that mutate and modulate each other. In this reality, social actors have played an active role. To exemplify this point, it is worth noting a study on local peace capacities conducted in 2010. It managed to identify, only in the eastern subregion of Antioquia, 1580 social and institutional organizations, mechanisms and processes of various kinds, and cases of resistance that bet on peace through different initiatives or projects (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo-PNUD, 2010).

Colombia's different peace processes and negotiations have not seriously addressed the economic and political structures of national and international hegemonic order. Past peace processes have not had a real impact on the transformation of situations that have enabled conflicts. The 2016 Agreement has many novelties. For example, it tried to improve living conditions in rural areas for peasants. Even when the negotiation was made between two factions of power (guerrillas and government representatives), it also had the participation of civil society through mechanisms of direct participation It is recognized, by many actors, that peace is a matter of co-responsibility between institutions and social actors, which is represented, embodied, and experienced at the local level.

A 2022 report of the Truth Commission shows that the inhabitants of different territories in Colombia have acted as protagonists during the armed conflict. They have been seeking alternative ways to make peace possible amidst war. In the words of Mac Ginty (2022), this phenomenon could be called conflict disruption. The Truth Commission report is rich in information on actions and postures deployed in territories. These actions allowed at certain times a reduction of tension and violence. Moreover, they enable the development of transformative spaces, as we will see later with iconic experiences such as Peace Communities.

Self-Protection Strategies During the Armed Conflict and the Transition to Peace in Colombia

Self-protection in Colombia has become a key strategy for the survival of many communities in violent environments. Beyond the defense of human rights, self-protection has also aimed to strengthen territorial and food sovereignty, conservation of indigenous cosmologies, the vindication of self-determination, and defense of the ways in which people live. Internationally, Colombia has one of the more advanced community self-protection programs and mechanisms (Jiménez Ospina and Arias López, 2023).

Mechanisms, formats, and the scope of self-protection strategies are diverse and depend on the changing nature of threats. Some self-protection strategies emerge to address contingencies and emergencies, so they may have a transitory and fleeting character. While others are developed as part of medium and long-term processes. These kinds of strategies involve establishing organizations and developing relationships with communities that face armed actors. Additionally, many community organizations become, explicitly or implicitly, engaged in social transformations through peacebuilding. Besides, they also develop endogenous strategies and/or collaboration with international actors and organizations related to humanitarian aid and UCP.

In general terms, it can be said that all these self-protection strategies involve active unarmed civil resistance and a political position of disobedience towards armed actors. Although these mechanisms do not always save communities from violent situations, they can provide them with options for sovereignty and self-determination amidst the asymmetries and disputes inherent to violent contexts. The affirmative rather than defensive character of resistance awards them creative and transformative potential (Arias-López, 2014).

Territorial and Spatial Delimitations

Strategies related to territorial and spatial delimitations have in common the identification of territories and territorialities that are under serious threats, but which at the same time constitute the spatiality of collective protection. In this sense, territory and protection merge in a synergic continuum that seeks to guarantee conditions of protection and security for the people inside its borders. These mechanisms constitute a move towards territorial sovereignty for certain groups and collectives. This territorial perspective takes up the idea that territories are not simple physical containers but are historically set up and produced on a diverse scale, amidst disputes among imaginaries, interests, and powers. These struggles install processes of inclusion/exclusion, access, benefits, and detriment for some groups over others (Beuf, 2017; Boelens et al., 2017). Thus, self-protection in a territorial sense is an active participation of communities in the field of these disputes.

In this category, there are three subgroups of UCP. The first is composed of humanitarian zones, spaces, and shelters. It proposes an explicit self-protection mission, while the second subgroup has as its central purpose the search for sovereignty. The second includes Agro-Food Peasant Territories, peasant reserves, and biodiverse zones. The third involves Territorial Reincorporation Spaces[9] (ETCR). ETCRs were created for signatories of the Peace Agreement with FARC-EP. As will be seen below, some strategies are fundamentally social and community-based initiatives, others are promoted by an organization external to communities. Yet, there are a couple that emerges under governmental institutional tutelage, although they eventually mutate through community appropriation for self-protection and sovereignty purposes.

Humanitarian Zones, Spaces, and Shelters

So-called *humanitarian zones* date back to the end of the 20th century. They are delimited places characterized by the expulsion of both legal and illegal armed actors, rejection of militarization, and the prohibition of armed confrontation. In some of these areas, inhabitants enjoy collective titling of territory[10] and share common life projects, making it easier for social cohesion and the integral defense of human rights. Most of them have public manifestos of adherence to non-violent forms of self-protection. Besides, they seek to sustain and remain as sovereign territories, protected by their manifestos, with support from international organizations that practice UCP.

In Colombia, these types of initiatives are mainly under the leadership of Afro-descendant communities living in rural areas of the department of Chocó,[11] or the region of Antioqueño Urabá. The best-known experience is the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó. It was founded in 1997 in the town of San José de Apartadó amidst a context of conflict and paramilitary violence. People who were part of the community agreed to remain neutral in the conflict and to peacefully resist armed groups that tried to enter their territories. They have been victims of persecution by paramilitaries, the Army, and the State.

Humanitarian spaces are characterized by the expulsion of illegal armed groups, but not of legal/State armed actors. It is a fundamental point of difference with peace communities or humanitarian zones. The only humanitarian space in Colombia is in Puerto Nayero (Buenaventura, Cauca), created in 2014 as a community response to urban violence. It is led by Afro-descendant groups, which shows the racialization of the armed conflict and structural violence throughout history in our country. This phenomenon can be seen as a specialization of colonialist logic (Wade, 2020). Humanitarian spaces aim to document and denounce abuses of illegal armed actors, seeking support from the international community, including the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from which they obtained precautionary measures in 2014.

The purpose of *humanitarian shelters* is to respond to emergencies by protecting the population from armed incursions and fighting by providing a safe space and food. Some national organizations, especially of a religious nature, have created these places to attend displacement and violence victims. Unlike previous strategies, these shelters tend to be transitory in time and mobile in space, according to the dynamics of conflict in different territories.

Agro-Food Peasant Territories, Peasants, and Biodiverse Reserve Areas

Biodiversity zones are accredited as areas of protection and recovery of ecosystems that have been destroyed or are in danger of being destroyed by infrastructure projects, exploitation of natural resources, and extensive installation of agro-industrial projects. Their inhabitants seek to defend territory and food sovereignty through non-violent means that contribute to peace from an environmental perspective. Many humanitarian zones are also declared biodiversity zones. They are in collective territories of Afro-descendant communities, where there is a growing struggle around extractivist projects.[12]

Peasant Reserve Zones (ZRC, by its acronym in Spanish) are unique in this subgroup because they are institutional in origin, not community-managed. They emerged in 1994 intending to promote and stabilize the peasant economy, overcoming the causes of social conflicts over land and creating conditions for peacebuilding. These zones are designated by the State to be managed collectively by peasant communities.[13] They look to redistribute

resources, promote the peasant economy, solve land problems, control the expansion of the agricultural frontier, strengthen the internal organization of peasant communities, and contribute to peacebuilding. More than two decades after the establishment of this legal measure, the situation is critical. The purposes for which ZRCs were created by the State have not been fulfilled, since the possibility of autonomy and agency of peasant organizations is limited. Further, in parallel, some actors from the State promote extractivist projects and privilege agroindustry, latifundia, mining, and hydrocarbon exploitation (Quijano-Mejía and Linares García, 2017).

As a response to these contradictions, *Agro-Food Peasant Territories* emerged. They are promoted by the National Agrarian Coordinator[14] (CNA), a civil society platform that brings together different grassroots peasant organizations. The CNA seeks to promote agrarian reform, encourage collective consultations, protect peasant economies, and strengthen processes and initiatives that reflect the popular interests of the peasantry. For CNA, Agro-Food Peasant Territories are: "[…] […] territories inhabited by peasants, dedicated (not exclusively) to small-scale agricultural and livestock production, fishing and silvopastoral systems, as well as small mining combined with agriculture. [In these activities] products generated serve to satisfy the peasantry's own needs and the needs of the population that does not inhabit rural world areas […] […]" (CNA, 2015, p. 15).

This political-administrative figure seeks to legitimize territories that have historically been linked to the peasantry. It looks to guarantee territorial rights, territorial governance, and the promotion of common goods. The initiative, which emerged in 2016, was constituted an act of sovereignty. Furthermore, it seeks the recognition of peasants as subjects of special protection considering their multidimensional link to land, food production, and environmental protection. To date, seven territories with these characteristics have been declared, located mainly in the southwest region of the country (Restrepo et al., 2020).[15] We should note that, unlike territories of Afro-descendant communities, these territories are not yet a legal object of collective titling. This circumstance complicates debates around justices in terms of identity and territoriality (Montenegro, 2016).

Territorial Reincorporation Spaces (ETCRs)

These are territories established by the Peace Agreement in 2016 to facilitate collective reincorporation processes of peace signatories. In the beginning, there were 26 points throughout the national territory. They were under the tutelage and protection of national and international institutions that ensured compliance with agreements. One of the State's responsibilities was to guarantee the safeguarding and security of these places.[16] Lamentably, the functioning and structuring of ETCRs have been slow to improve due to the lack of necessary infrastructure to provide a dignified life, the limited availability of productive projects for peace signatories, and the lack of adequate security conditions. This situation has allowed the murder of peace signatories,[17] as well as significant forced displacement or abandonment (Arias-López et al., 2022). This has led to a failure of the ideal of collective reincorporation, as more than 70% of signatories have abandoned these protection spaces.[18] ETCRs have, however, sparked debates on regulatory principles of nonviolence and nonpartisanship to which many humanitarian organizations adhere. The talking point is surrounded by characteristics of actors in these territories, with their previous role of perpetrators and responsible for violent acts, who today become civilians in urgent need of protection. This means that accompaniment by international UCP organizations is lesser.

It also implies that the incorporation of non-violent self-protection initiatives is a slow process in these communities of signatories, who need to deconstruct the logic of armed solutions to their protection needs, with which they lived for decades. In the short term, they have implemented self-protection strategies such as abandoning collective reincorporation processes, collective displacements from highly insecure areas, and local informal protection agreements with irregular armed actors. They use these mechanisms to reduce the risk of physical harm and provide security in a limited sense. Still, they undermine the socio-economic foundations and political aspirations of peace signatories and society in general (Arias-López et al., 2023).

Key Actors

This section highlights two actors that have played a crucial role in the management of UCP initiatives: some factions of the Catholic Church and civil guards.

Catholic Church

A leading role has been played by the *Social Pastoral*, part of the Catholic Church that understands the evangelization action of accompaniment aimed at social transformation, and in line with the principle of solidarity with the poorest and most neglected people in societies. Influenced by the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) and the Second Latin America Episcopal Conference of Medellín, it is based on Liberation Theology and holds a progressive view of the social action of the Church and its role beyond the walls of any ecclesial institution. The Social Pastoral has been dedicated to generating and supporting initiatives of peaceful resistance against illegal armed actors in different territories. Its "armoring" rests on the symbolic power of protection in a deeply religious culture. An important element of self-protection is its permanence in the most remote territories (Plata and Figueroa, 2017).

Through social pastorals, territorial jurisdictions of the Catholic Church in Colombia—dioceses and archdioceses—have played a central role as peacebuilders, mediators, and support for communities affected by the armed conflict. As mentioned above, they are responsible for the mobilization of humanitarian shelters and for several mechanisms that will be presented below.[19]

Civil Guards

Civil guards date back to the 1960s with the mobilizations of the National Association of Peasant Users[20] (ANUC). This organization created civil guards that later inspired indigenous, Afro-descendant, and peasant populations to create their unarmed civil guards in the last three decades. The Indigenous Guard is the one that has the longest history and the largest presence in the national territory. Guards have focused on defending ancestral and collective territories, protecting human rights, defending demonstrations, and emergency response. All of these are under the principles of unarmed and non-violent protection.

Two recent events have been fundamental to give them social legitimacy: the first was the accompaniment of the Indigenous Guard in the social protests of 2021 in Bogotá, amid one of the longest national strikes in Colombian history. They tried to guarantee the non-violent management of social protest. The second was their presence at the inauguration ceremony

of President Gustavo Petro and Vice President Francia Márquez in August 2022. It was an invitation that expressed recognition of their activity as a non-violent civil organization in a country undergoing a hoped-for transition to peace.

Mechanisms and Logic of Action

Mechanisms can be gathered into three groups: reporting and disclosure; strategies for training and capacity enhancement; and political advocacy exercises.

Reporting and Disclosure

Self-protection actions that operate under the logic of reporting and public disclosure may have different legal scopes and/or audiences. They include strategic litigation, investigation, and reporting of human rights violations, humanitarian caravans, and popular tribunals.

Strategic litigation is one of the mechanisms most widely used by communities. It is more than a legal instrument because it is nourished and complemented by an interdisciplinary and community perspective. It is aimed at the protection of human rights, through actions of accompaniment and legal advice before courts. It has special advocacy for ethnic groups and environmental issues (Coral-Díaz et al., 2010). It differs from traditional litigation in that it goes beyond a particular case to deal with collective repercussions or impact. That is why it must be accompanied by informative and pedagogical actions of its results (Londoño-Toro, 2015). This strategy aims to achieve internal justice, reparation, systemic changes, and enhanced self-protection and protection tools for other victims.

Many communities have opted to *investigate and report human rights violations* without going to court. Examples include the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó and the Kankuamo Local Defense Network. The Community reported online how paramilitaries and state armed forces have committed abuses against its members. The Network documents and denounces violations of the human rights of indigenous groups in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. These actions have succeeded in pressuring the State to open channels for dialogs and solutions.

Humanitarian caravans have two objectives: to accompany the population living in the area where the caravan is traveling and to make visible problems that affect local communities. The caravans are organized by national and international human rights organizations and activists. They try to recognize *in situ* situations from the voice of communities to make first-person documentation for subsequent reports and disclosure. Caravans of this type were carried out in areas of Cauca,[21] Chocó,[22] and Valle del Cauca (Kavilando, 2023), mainly occupied by Afro-descendant and indigenous communities.

Popular tribunals follow the logic of alternative international tribunals, but they have local and national interests. They seek to redress the ineffectiveness of state justice operators, without having a formal or legal character. In this sense, their legitimacy is given by the possibility of making visible human rights violations and the proclamation of popular rules and recommendations.

Training Schools

These are teaching actions through which communities receive training in human rights and International Humanitarian Law. They have support from various national and international organizations, but often they are managed by communities themselves.

Local Advocacy Exercises

Constituent assemblies are spaces for participation and deliberation in which civil society can influence decision-making over the executive branch. Their objectives are linked to strengthening the democratic and political participation of civil society, searching for a political solution to armed conflicts, and implementing governance models that guarantee the protection of civilians.[23]

Unlike assemblies, *peace laboratories* were peacebuilding programs carried out through bilateral cooperation agreements between the European Union and the Colombian government. They were active between 2002 and 2010 in multiple regions. Although they have been considered one of the most effective peacebuilding tools for channeling international cooperation funds, they have also been the subject of debate by social organizations. They are criticized because they are seen as an instrumental and functionalist tool for the maintenance of the *status quo* and co-optation of local processes.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we tried to show multiple ways in which Colombian communities have energized strategies to protect themselves from legal and illegal armed actors, while they seek spaces of sovereignty and self-determination. Of course, the Colombian example is just one of many around the world with communities in Kenya, the Philippines, Peru, and elsewhere seeking to deploy civilian self-protection mechanisms. All of these try to achieve peace from the perspective of their daily dynamics. Despite the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement, many peripherical territories, especially those where racialized populations live, are still in the middle of conflict situations. These conflicts are characterized by disputes among reconfigured armed actors, social and economic elites, and changing threats, amidst strong geopolitical pressures. Additionally, the defense of human rights in Colombia has been linked to social mobilization because activists have understood that protest is one of the most effective non-violent pressure strategies available. This phenomenon has led both social mobilization and human rights defenders to be stigmatized, persecuted, criminalized, and often killed.

Acknowledgments

Notes

1 In Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.
2 In Spanish: Movimiento 19 de abril M-19, Ejército Popular de Liberación EPL; Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame; Corriente de Renovación Socialista, Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores; Movimiento Independiente Revolucionario Comandos Armados.

3 In Spanish: Acuerdo de Justicia y Paz.

4 We make a map that tries to show some of the relationships between conflicts over natural resources and the emergence of self-protection mechanisms. An English version of this map is available here: https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/edit?hl=es-419&mid=17uTFKMi3u0WHzBoMmPhbZt DSjJOcAViA&ll=6.5779257828651705%2C-. A Spanish version of this map is available here: https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/edit?hl=es-419&mid=1oObcDX8n7eEY-OuRrMEDc U9yONXvsTo&ll=6.5779257828651705%2C-76.04244550000001&z=6

5 In Spanish: Ejército de Liberación Nacional.

6 In Spanish: Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia.

7 In Spanish: Segunda Marquetalia.

8 In Spanish: Comandos de la Frontera.

9 In Spanish: Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación.

10 This mechanism was achieved for indigenous and Afro-descendant communities with a reform of the 1991 Constitution.

11 Humanitarian Zones of Andalucía, Camelias, Caño Manso, Caracolí, and Costa Azul, in the Collective Territory of Curbaradó, and Humanitarian Zones of Nueva España, and Pueblo Nuevo, in the Collective Territory of Jiguamiandó.

12 Biodiversity Zones La Yulima, El Retorno, La Esperanza, Mary Hernández, Mi Tierra, Andalucía, and La Caracolí in the Collective Territory of Curbaradó, Chocó. El Hobo and La Madre Unión Collective Biodiversity Zonas in the Collective Territory of Jiguamiandó, Chocó.

13 Colombia currently has 61 ZRCs established, under construction, or planned. See: http://reporte. humboldt.org.co/biodiversidad/2017/cap4/404/

14 In Spanish: Coordinador Nacional Agrario.

15 Colombian Massif, Northern Nariño and Southern Cauca (2016); Cordillera Suroccidente, Micay Region (2017), Vida y Soberanía Popular, Saravena, Arauca (2017); Piedemonte araucano, Fortul, Arauca (2017); Laguna del Lipa, Soberanía y Resistencia Popular; Arauquita; Arauca (2018); Galeras, Nariño (2018) and Defensores de la Vida y la Agricultura, Tame, Arauca (2019).

16 Nowadays, the number of ETCRs has been reduced to 24. See their location at: http://www. reincorporacion.gov.co/es/reincorporacion/Paginas/AETCRs.aspx

17 To date, 330 signatories have been killed since 2016.

18 These places have been institutionally called New Reincorporation Areas (NAR, by its acronym in Spanish).

19 These include the Diocese of Barrancabermeja, the Diocese of Apartadó, the Diocese of Quibdó, and the Diocese of Sonsón-Rionegro.

20 In Spanish: Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos

21 See: Asociación Nomadesc, 2020a; Asociación Nomadesc, 2020b.

22 See: Conferencia Episcopal de Colombia, 2021.

23 Municipal Constituent Assembly of Mogotes (Santander) in 1999; Municipal Constituent Assembly of Tarso (Antioquia) in 2001; Provincial Constituent Assembly of Eastern Antioquia (2002-2008).

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